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i 
Abstract 
This dissertation focuses on two educational reforms in Thailand (1978 and 2000), using these policy 
initiatives to explore the impact of education on income, income distribution and poverty. Investigating 
the causal relationship between education attainment and income raises endogeneity concerns, both in 
terms of reverse causality and omitted variables.  To overcome such limitations, the wage of individuals 
is estimated by using Two-stage least squares (2SLS) models.  The years of schooling is instrumented by 
the year of birth of the individuals who were born around the cut-off year requiring pupils to attend 6 and 
9 years, respectively, of compulsory education. This approach ensures that individuals are homogeneous 
in terms of individual characteristics (e.g. abilities, motivation) across groups because of the proximity of 
birth.  We also include province fixed-effects to capture heterogeneity in economic development and 
quality of schools across geographic units. The estimations are extended to uncover both endogeneity and 
heterogeneity biases by using the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression Methods (IVQR).  
We found that the 9-year compulsory schooling reform has been more effective in extending access to 
education, especially for the disadvantaged, than the 6-year compulsory schooling reform.  With the 6-
year compulsory schooling reform, we find statistically significant results that an additional year of 
schooling positively impacts individual incomes by about 13 percent.  However, over half of the increase 
in average income is concentrated amongst the wealthiest individuals. Estimations for the 9-year 
compulsory schooling reform suggest that an additional year of schooling increases the monthly income 
of an individual on average by approximately 8.5 percent.  Although the highest returns to education still 
accrue to the wealthiest income group, the income increased of the poorest and poor income groups 
become higher and statistically significant compared with the estimated results from the 6-year 
compulsory schooling reform. The study also shows that the main contribution to a reduction in poverty 
in Thailand is through economic growth.  In order to eradicate poverty and reduce income inequality, 
universal education to Lower-secondary level (9th grade) is recommended.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
This dissertation analyses the causal impact of education on income, income inequality and poverty in 
Thailand. Thailand has experienced a strong economy in recent decades, along with a significant 
reduction in poverty. However, income inequality has remained stable over time, which has limited the 
alleviation of poverty. This study, therefore, intends to contribute to understanding the importance of 
educational attainment and achievement for income and income equality. The chapter is divided into four 
sections. The contribution of this study is explained in the context of Thailand. The incidence of 
economic growth, poverty and income inequality, together with the education system, are examined in the 
first section. The research questions and objectives are explained in the second and third sections 
respectively. The fourth section outlines the organisation of this dissertation.  
1.1 Contribution of the study 
Poverty is a major global concern. It has always existed and still constitutes a problem for many 
countries, especially developing ones (Kakwani and Krongkaew, 2000, p. 141). This is because the 
benefits from growth have not been equally distributed across the population, since the average incomes 
of the poor increase more slowly than the average income of the population (Ahluwalia, Carter and 
Chenery, 1979). It is estimated that in 2013 approximately 10.67 percent of people worldwide 
(particularly concentrated in developing countries) were still living in poverty (income less than $1.9 per 
day) (The World Bank, 2016). According to the United Nations (2015), one of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) is to end poverty by 2030.  To achieve this, the provision of sustainable 
economic growth and a reduction in income inequality are key strategies. The first strategy is to target the 
poor by extending welfare services such as family planning education and healthcare. The second is to 
improve the productivity of labour, also known as human capital (Odior, 2014; The World Bank, 1995; 
You and Annim, 2014).  
The government and non-government agencies in Thailand have adopted poverty reduction as a central 
objective of their development strategy over past decades, attempting to share the benefits of economic 
growth equally amongst Thai nationals (“pro-poor” development). Many initiatives, such as debt 
  
 
2 
reduction schemes, the village fund, micro-credit schemes, low-cost housing and the universal health care 
scheme, were introduced and have improved the living standards of Thai citizens, especially 
disadvantaged families (United Nations Development Programme, 2014). According to the Office of 
National Economic and Social Development Board (2014), growth and poverty reduction in Thailand 
have been impressive. On the other hand, inequality has remained high. Therefore, poverty in Thailand 
may have not been reduced to its potential minimum. In other words, the adverse effects resulting from 
income inequality may hamper the potential for growth to reduce poverty in Thailand.  Policy-makers 
justify increased educational spending as a highly effective tool for reducing income inequality (Gregorio 
and Lee, 2002, p. 395). Therefore, this thesis reviews the impact of education on average income and over 
income distribution by taking specific education policy reforms – the compulsory education laws – and 
examining the effect of these exogenous shocks on the educational system in Thailand. The poverty 
impact will be analysed under two components; namely, the average returns to education and the returns 
to education across the income distribution. 
The aim of this study is to understand the potential for reducing poverty by addressing the impact of 
education on income and income distribution. The main purpose of  this dissertation is to consider the 
impact of Thailand’s compulsory schooling reforms on income and income distribution. The sample 
construction and the model identification strategies are based on the years of birth of individuals in 
relation to the reforms imposed in 1978 and 2000. Significantly, the education attainment targets, 
especially for the 9-year compulsory schooling reform, have not been universally achieved. Therefore, it 
is important for policy-makers to determine whether: 1.) Education can be a tool to improve income and, 
in turn, economic growth; 2.) Education can be a means of redressing income inequality; and 3.) Poverty 
can be reduced by increasing education.    
In the next section, we examine the background, data, and policies relating to economic growth, poverty, 
income inequality and education, in the context of Thailand. 
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1.1.1 Background: Economic Growth in Thailand 
On 2nd August 2011, the World Bank upgraded Thailand’s income categorisation from a lower-middle 
income economy to an upper-middle income economy. Recent records show that Thailand has a GDP of 
$406.84 billion and a population of 68.8 million people in 2016 (The World Bank, 2017).  According to 
the NESDB, Thailand has shown a strong economic performance over many decades (Figure 1.1). Table 
1.1 reviews the annual growth rate of GDP per capita from 1995 to 2016 across countries. Thailand has 
achieved impressive economic growth with an average annual growth rate of 2.75 percent over the last 
two decades. Figure 1.2 illustrates the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by region, indicating growth 
has been highly concentrated in the Bangkok area. Economic growth in the east region has also been 
significant because of the industrial estates of the Thailand Eastern Seaboard with heavy industries such 
as car manufacture. Significantly, the main sources of GDP (Table 1.2) come from the manufacturing 
sector, which accounts for over 28 percent, followed by wholesale/retail trade (15 percent) and agriculture 
products (8-11 percent)  
The economy grew on average at 8 to 9 percent a year from the 1980s to the early 1990s.  Then, it 
experienced moderate rates of growth as Thailand was affected by the “Asian Crisis” from 1997 to 1998.  
Following the depreciation of the Thai Baht, the economy experienced a negative growth rate of 
approximately minus 4 to 8 percent in the two years after the crisis (Table 1.1). Between 2002 and 2007 
the growth rate was approximately 5 percent per year.  Gross national income per capita rose by over 125 
percent, increasing from US$1,060 in 1987 to US$2,400 in 2004 (The World Bank, 2014). While 
economic growth in Thailand has been significant, it has lagged behind that of its upper middle-income 
East Asian neighbours such as Malaysia and China, as well as high-income Singapore (Figure 1.3).  
Comparing economic growth to the developed countries such as the UK and USA, Thailand’s growth rate 
is higher except during the East Asian financial crisis of 1998 (Table 1.1 and Figure 1.3). However, 
Thailand’s economic growth has also lagged behind lower middle-income countries such as Myanmar 
and Cambodia since the “opening up” of these countries in recent years.  
According to Hewison (2005) and Tejapira (2002), the political issues in Thailand could be attributed to 
the underperformance in economy. The political crisis began in 2005, with demonstrations against the 
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawat, followed by a coup d’état in September 2006 (Chambers, 2013; 
Farrelly, 2013; Prasirtsuk, 2009). The former Prime Minister’s party (Thai Rak Thai, the red shirts), won 
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a majority in the late 2007 election, but in May 2008 the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD, the 
yellow-shirts), opposing Mr.Thaksin restarted their protests, arguing that the government was a nominee 
government of Mr.Thaksin.  The protesters shut down Bangkok’s two airports to force the pro-Thaksin 
governing party to step down from power for alleged electoral misdemeanours. The new Prime Minister, 
Mr. Abhisit Vejjajiva, was appointed because a significant number of the Thai Rak Thai changed sides to 
support a Democrat Party (opposition party) government. However, red-shirt protesters from the United 
Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) who supported the former Mr. Thaksin Shinawat came 
to Bangkok to force for a national election. Commercial and business areas in the capital city were 
damaged when protesters burned buildings. The protest was eventually cleared by government troops and 
the leaders were arrested, but soldiers and protesters lost their lives during the attack. Elections were 
organised again in 2011. Miss Yingluck Shinawatra, Mr. Thaksin's sister, became Thailand's first woman 
Prime Minister.   
The growth rate dropped from 5.5 percent to 1 percent during this political turmoil, and foreign demand 
for goods and services from Thailand was then affected by the global financial crisis in 2008-9. The 
economy recovered to achieve 7 percent growth in 2010.  Then Thailand suffered from flooding in 2011.  
The damage spread through many provinces in Northern, Northeastern and Central Thailand along the 
Mekong and Chao Phraya river basins from end July 2011 to mid-January 2012. The total damage and 
loss from this natural disaster was estimated at $45.7 billion, which mostly affected the private sector 
(The World Bank, 2011).   
A coup d’état took place again on 22nd May 2014 and the coup leaders are still in power today. The 
growth rate fall below 1 percent during this period but recovered in 2015 and 2016 to reach 2.6 to 3 
percent.  Growth is currently projected to be around 3-4 percent for 2017 (Office of National Economic 
and Social Development Board, 2017). In this dissertation, it is, thus, necessary to understand the policy 
implications regarding the returns to education in the context of the current political economy in 
Thailand.  
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Figure 1.1: Real Gross Domestic Product of the whole Kingdom of Thailand 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
Figure 1.2: Gross Domestic Product by Region 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Figure 1.3: Annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product per capita by country 
 
Data: Databank, World Development Indicators by the World Bank  
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1.1.2 Poverty in Thailand 
Amongst the major measurements of poverty are the headcount index, the poverty gap index, and the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke measurement (Ravallion and Datt, 1991). The first of these, the headcount index, 
is the proportion of the population living in poor households with consumption expenditure or income 
below the poverty line. The head count ratio is the main indicator measuring poverty incidence in 
Thailand (Jitsuchon and Richter, 2007; Kakwani and Krongkaew, 2000). There are some drawbacks in 
using the poverty line as the main measurement, principally as the degree of poverty can be difficult to 
identify because of ambiguity regarding an individuals’ minimum living requirements (food and non-
food). Secondly, the poverty gap index captures the incidence of poverty through estimating the 
difference between the average level of poor people’s consumption expenditures and the poverty line thus 
indicating the depth of poverty among people (Hayami and Godo, 2005, pp. 197–198; Lipton and 
Ravallion, 1995, p. 2579). An average of squared differences from the poverty line defines the severity of 
the poverty index. This measure is more sensitive to the distribution of income amongst the poor 
(Deolalikar, 2002; Hayami and Godo, 2005, p. 198).  Thirdly, the square of the poverty gap index, the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index (FGT), is also used to measure poverty because the FGT index identifies 
the degree of the inequality of income amongst the poor (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, p. 2579; Ravallion 
and Datt, 1991).  
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According to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), the official poverty line 
for a Thai citizen was 3,132 Baht (92 USD or 62.6 GBP)1 per person per month in 2015, which had been 
steadily increasing over the years (Figure 1.4). The poverty line in Thailand takes into account a 
combination of food and non-food poverty which gives rise to ambiguity. The food poverty line is 
derived from updated nutrition requirements for Thai people, as established by the nutrition division of 
the Department of Health in 2003.  However, consumption patterns and classification areas have varied as 
a consequence of economic and government policy changes (Jitsuchon and Richter, 2007). Table 1.3 
presents the proportion of people whose expenditure is below the poverty line, by region. Thailand 
experienced a steady decline in poverty over the period 2000-2015 (Figure 1.4). Poverty alleviation was 
mainly focused on Bangkok, followed by the Central, South, North, and North-east (the poorest) regions. 
The number living in poverty are highly concentrated in the North-east and North of Thailand (Figure 
1.5).  In the poorest rural North-east region of Thailand, the number of impoverished households dropped 
from 59 percent to 10 percent in 15 years. 
Although growth has mostly been focused on Bangkok, economic growth has contributed to a fall in the 
national poverty headcount from 42.33 percent in 2000 to 7.21 percent in 2015, while the number of the 
poor dropped to 3.4 from 4.8 million people. In terms of other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); 
there has been a dramatic fall in maternal mortality, and under-five mortality and over 97 percent of Thai 
citizens have access to clean water and sanitation, not only in urban but also in rural areas (The World 
Bank, 2014).  
According to Jitsuchon and Richter (2007), poorer people tend to live in villages and have limited access 
to basic social services such as water and sanitation. Table 1.4 shows that the proportion of the poor 
living in rural areas was more than twice that in urban areas from 1988 to 2015. Poverty increases 
uniformly with family size, since the head of household is responsible for the household’s members who 
are more likely to be either children or the elderly (Jitsuchon and Richter, 2007; NESDB). Figure 1.6 
illustrates the number of the poor by level of education they obtained in 2007, 2011 and 2015. The 
                                                            
 
1  Currency rate (on average) in 2015: 1 US dollar = 34 THB and 1 GBP = 50 THB provided by 
http://www.xe.com/company/ 
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number of people whose expenditure is below the poverty line decreases with the level of education.   
Moreover, the incidence of poverty decreases over time. Significantly, there were no poor people who 
completed  Master’s and Doctorate degrees from 2007 to 2015 (Table 1.5). According to Jitsuchon and 
Richter (2007), the poor have far fewer average years of schooling than wealthier people. The poor also 
tend to work in the agricultural sector since they are restricted in accessing skilled-labour opportunities. 
Moreover, poverty incidence is more prevalent where the heads of household are elderly, retired workers, 
or disabled.  Jitsuchon and Richter (2007) studied poverty incidence across Thailand at the provincial 
level. They found that provinces with larger populations tend to have higher poverty headcounts than 
other those with lower population densities. 
 
Figure 1.4: Poverty in Thailand (2000 to 2015) 
 
 Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Figure 1.5: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Thailand (2000-2015) by Region 
 
 Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
 
Figure 1.6: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Thailand (2007, 2011 and 2015) by Level of Education 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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1.1.3 Income Inequality in Thailand 
According to the NESDB, inequality in Thailand is gauged through measuring the deviation in the 
distribution of individuals’ monthly income from a perfectly equal distribution. The Gini index is 
calculated from the area between the Lorenz curve, the cumulative percentage of total income received by 
the cumulative percentage of the individuals, and the absolute equality line. The Gini coefficient takes the 
value between 0 and 1, where the higher the Gini index, the higher the degree of inequality.  Figure 1.7 
shows the Gini coefficient in Thailand from 1998 to 2015. Thailand has experienced high, but stable,  
income inequality over the past decades. Perhaps more significantly, income inequality declined from 
2011 to 2015, although it remains persistently above 0.45 (Table 1.6). Urban areas were found to have 
slightly higher income inequality than the rural areas.  
Compared to other upper middle-income countries from 2004 to 2012, the Gini coefficient for Thailand 
reflects the lower inequality than Malaysia and China with the Gini coefficients of above 0.4 and 0.45, 
respectively accordingly the database provided by World Development Indicator by the World Bank 
(Figure 1.8). However, the Gini coefficients of Thailand provided by the NESDB were found to be 
comparatively the same as those two countries.  Compared with selected developed countries, income 
inequality in Thailand was found to be relatively larger than the UK, and comparatively lower than than 
in the USA (after 2007).  Amongst the lower middle-income countries, the greatest progress in reducing 
income inequality can be seen in Cambodia where the Gini coefficient decreases dramatically between 
2008 and 2012. Therefore, income inequality in Cambodia were found to be a significant lower than there 
were in Thailand after 2007.  Vietnam (after 2008) and the Philippines have higher income inequality 
than Thailand and the respective Gini coefficients were found to have increased (Vietnam) and to be 
stable (Philippines).   
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Figure 1.7: Gini Coefficient in Thailand (1998-2015) 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
Figure 1.8: Gini Coefficients (2004-2012) by Country   
 
Data: Databank, World Development Indicator by the World Bank  
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The NESDB categorised income groups into 5 quintile groups. The poorest income groups constitute the 
first 20% of individuals. Figure 1.9 presents the average income by quintile from 1988 to 2015 according 
to the National Labour Force Survey provided by the NSO.  The average income of each income group 
increases over time in accordance with the increase in inflation, economic growth and the national 
minimum wage. In 2015, the average monthly income of the poorest Q(0.20) and the poor Q(0.40) 
income groups were below 5,000 Thai Baht (147 USD or 100 GBP). For the Q(0.60) and Q(0.80) income 
quintiles, the average income was below 10,000 Thai Baht (294 USD or 200 GBP). The richest income 
group Q(1) received approximately 20,000 to 25,000 Thai Baht a month (588-735 USD or 400-£500 
GBP).  
More importantly, over 50 percent of the total income in Thailand was concentrated in the wealthiest 
income group. In contrast, the proportion of income for the poorest 20 percent was only 5 percent, and for 
the poor 9 percent.  
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Figure 1.9: Monthly Income and Income Share in Thailand (1988, 1998, 2009 and 2015 ) by Quintile 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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1.1.4 The Educational System in Thailand 
Figure 1.10: The Education System of Thailand 
 
According to the 1999 National Education Act (NEA) section 16, the formal education system in 
Thailand consists of two levels; basic education and higher education (Figure 1.10).  Basic education 
covers a wide array of topics, including science, mathematics, art, religion, and culture, Thai and English 
languages (NEA, Chapter 4). Higher education is provided in universities and colleges, and is divided 
into two main levels: lower-than-degree level (Diploma certificate), and degree level (Bachelor’s, 
Master’s, and Doctorate degrees)2. The estimations of the impact of education on income and income 
inequality rely on both average years of schooling and the level of education (from Primary to Doctorate).  
This project focuses exclusively on reforms in compulsory basic education (12 years in school)3. The 
school year in Thailand was divided into two semesters. The first semester begins on 16th May and 
finishes by 11th October.  The second semester covers the periods 1st November to 1st April every year.    
Basic education is divided into three categories. Primary education consists of 6 years of schooling for 
children typically aged 6 to 12. Figure 1.11 illustrates the proportion of pupils in Thailand who have 
completed primary education by age group over the period 2001-2014.  Over 90 percent of 11 years old 
pupils completed primary education.  The second component, Secondary education, is itself divided into 
two parts: Lower-secondary (12-15 years of age), and Upper-secondary (15-18 years of age) (National 
Education Act, 1999).  The lower-secondary level consists of 3 years of study.  Given the number of 
pupils who finish primary education, it appears that about 10 percent of pupils drop out before they finish 
                                                            
 
2 National Education Act 1999, amended in 2002 
3 Basic education institutions: state schools, private schools and institutions that are under jurisdiction of Buddhist, or 
other religious groups.  
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lower-secondary education (Figure 1.11).  There were approximately 84 percent of pupils by their age 
group who obtained the lower-secondary education level.  
Upper-secondary education, which is not mandatory, consists of two main tracks: general and vocational 
education. Pupils are able to decide whether to continue with a general or vocational syllabus. The 
difference is that the vocational education is geared towards practical training, whereas general education 
pursues an academic curriculum. Vocational education mostly focuses on trade and industry, agriculture, 
home economics, fisheries, business and tourism, arts and crafts, textiles and commerce (the Ministry of 
Education). From 2007 to 2014, only 64 per cent of pupils by cohort completed upper-secondary 
education level. After finishing the lower-secondary education level, pupils tend to opt for general rather 
than vocational education (Figure 1.11). 
 
Figure 1.11: The Proportion of Pupils who Completed the Basic Education Levels by Year 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board Thailand  
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1.1.5 The Evolution of the Education System in Thailand 
Thai citizens  traditionally learned by studying in the temples where monks were the teachers. The school 
system was first established in 1887 by the Department of Education whose priority was to extend 
primary education (Sinchai, 1982, as cited in Sangnapaboworn, 2007, p261).  During that period, children 
who wanted to study were able to choose whether to attend school or obtain education in temples.  The 
former provided an academic curriculum (i.e. science and mathematics), the latter provided religious 
teaching. The first Primary Education Act was established on October 1st, 1921. The law required that 
every child of 7 years-old and over by December of that school year should attend school until they finish 
the 3rd grade. In 1932, compulsory schooling was extended from 3 to 4 years (Sangnapaboworn, 2007, pp. 
262-263)4. This remained unchanged until 1978. Prior to that year the education curriculum was mainly 
geared towards an improvement in academic and occupation skills in the primary education syllabus 
(Sangnapaboworn, 2007).  
Compulsory schooling was extended from 4 to 6 years by the Primary Education Act (1978) on 3rd April 
1978.  Section 6 stated that pupils who were at least 7 years old by December of that school year (31st 
December 1978) must attend school until they finish the 6th grade of Primary education. The first 
academic year affected by this law began in May 1978.  Pupils born on and after 31st December 1971 
were thus subject to the 6-year compulsory schooling law whereas those born before 31st December 1971 
were subject to the 4-year compulsory schooling law.  Figure 1.12 illustrates the 1978 schooling reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
4 In this study we do not analyse the impact of the 1932 (from 3 to 4 years of the compulsory schooling) reform as 
there is inadequate data to do so.  
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Figure 1.12: The 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reforms in 1978 
 
In 1999, the Office of the National Education Commission and the Prime Minister’s Office established 
the National Education Act B.E. 2542 (1999), known as the Education Law.  The main policy change was 
the introduction of 9-year of compulsory education. The compulsory schooling policy aimed at promoting 
equality amongst students in rural and urban areas by forcing them to complete at least lower secondary 
education (Fry and Bi, 2013, p. 295; Kotkam, 2000, p. 203).  The National Education Act 1999 stipulated 
that children in their 6th year of life on May 16th (academic start day) would enrol in schools until they 
were 16 years-old or had completed the 9th grade (section 17 in the National Education Act 1999).  
Therefore, pupils born on 16th May 1994 or later were subject to the 9-year compulsory schooling reform, 
while pupils born before 16th May 1994 were subject to the 6-year compulsory schooling law.   
This 9-year compulsory schooling reform is illustrated in Figure 1.13.  Since the law of 2000, the number 
of pupils completing Lower-secondary education (the 9th grade) has increased over years from 2004 to 
2014 (Figure 1.11).  Again, only 84 percent of the individuals enrolled in the first grade completed lower-
secondary education, suggesting that some pupils dropped out of school after finishing the 6th  grade even 
though 9-year compulsory schooling was imposed more than a decade ago. Approximately 16 percent of 
pupils have not completed at least the Lower-secondary education required by the law. This may be 
because those pupils struggle with the cost of education, opportunities to access schooling, or decisions of 
their parents which oblige them to drop out of school contrary to the law, as discussed in Becker (2009). 
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Therefore, it is essential to examine how far the compulsory schooling laws benefit not only individual 
incomes, but also affect the country’s income inequality and poverty. This thesis could provide evidence 
to enable policy makers to identify how to ‘rescue’ the 16 percent of pupils who have dropped out prior to 
completing compulsory schooling (9th grade). According to Fry (2002), there were two major educational 
policies in Thailand. First, the bilingual education program for the student who completed the Primary 
education in the late 1980s. The participative schools provide half a day’s teaching in Thai and another in 
English. However, the program was provided by selected public schools in Bangkok. Second, the 
numbers of international schools and college have dramatically increased after the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis because of the support of the Office of the Private Education Commission. However, this solely 
benefited the advantaged students who had opportunities to complete the high school and who tend to go 
studying abroad. Significantly, there was no other exogenous shock to the educational system that would 
have affected the number of years of schooling of individuals between 1978 and 2000 besides the 6-year 
and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms (Fry and Bi, 2013). 
Figure 1.13: The 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reforms in 2000 
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infrastructure.  Poverty reduction policies were the focus in the fifth (1982-1986) and sixth (1987-1991) 
plans. Public infrastructure investment was concentrated in the rural areas. These plans also targeted 
employment in rural areas by supporting job creation especially in the labour-intensive products such as 
traditional textiles (i.e. silk).  Improving income distribution became the main goal in the seventh NESDB 
(1992-1996). Extra subsidies for poor students were initiated, such as free lunch, and a direct cash 
transfer of 400 THB/person/year (12 USD/10 GBP) 5 . This transfer was increased to 1,000 
THB/person/year (29 USD/23 GBP) for primary education and 3,000 THB/person/year ($87/£68)  for 
lower-secondary education in 2015. 
There were 3 main inequality-reducing programmes supported before the 1997 financial crisis, namely: 
cash transfers, small-scale low interest rate loans and in-kind transfers (such as free healthcare services 
and free school lunch schemes). Then, after the East Asian financial crisis, the poverty alleviation 
programme was re-oriented to supporting the unemployed, especially those affected by the crisis, in 
accordance with the eighth NESDP (1997-2001). These included the introduction of the 12-year free 
education scheme and the expansion of social welfare for the elderly.  Increasing incomes and improving 
living standards were the main objectives in the ninth (2002-2006) and tenth (2007-2011) NESDPs. 
Income inequality has become a key objective again in the eleventh NESDP (2012-2016), focusing on 
strategies to reduce income inequality and promote equal access to funding and social services. 
Significantly, education has become an essential tool in balancing income inequality in the current 
development agenda (the twelfth NESBD for 2017 to 2021).  The strategy aims at ensuring access to 
education of equal quantity and quality to all pupils.  
Although economic growth continues to be a significant aim for Thailand, poverty and income inequality 
remain the key challenge for Thailand’s development process. To achieve the national development 
goals, understanding the causal link between education and income and income distribution is vital. Such 
evidence gives a better understanding of the context of educational attainments and why income 
inequality may not potentially reduce over the past decades, while economic growth has been impressive.  
                                                            
 
5 Currency rate on average in September, 2016 to September, 2017: 1 US dollar = 34.5 THB and 1 GBP = 44 THB 
provided by http://www.xe.com/company/ 
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The inclusion of self-selection bias in the discussion gives us a better understanding of decisions 
concerning the investment in education by individuals across income groups. By focusing on the 
compulsory schooling laws, we study the extent of educational opportunities amongst pupils in different 
income groups and whether they obtain the same access to education.  
1.2 Research questions 
The main research questions of this dissertation are: 
1) How much does an extra year of schooling increase the mean income of individuals in Thailand?  
2) How much does the additional schooling increase (decrease) income of the individuals in the different 
income groups ? 
3) To what extent does education affect poverty in Thailand? 
For the first question, although existing studies confirm that there is a positive relationship between 
education and national average income growth in Thailand (Blaug, 2002; Chiswick, 1976; Hawley, 2004; 
Warunsiri and Mcnown, 2010), the investigation of the causal link, especially for these recent years 
(2006-2015), has not been explored elsewhere. More importantly, the achievements of the compulsory 
schooling reforms with regard to income and income inequality are explored for the first time in this 
dissertation. The second question focuses on investigation of the causal link between education and 
income across the different income groups. The estimation of returns to education on income distribution 
provides a better understanding of how educational attainment relates to income inequality. As a 
consequence, the results could indicate how far education might exacerbate income distribution 
inequalities in Thailand.  
The returns to education (in terms of income and income distribution) are used to answer the last question 
on the incidence of poverty in Thailand. This could offer insights on the extent of the relationship 
between poverty, economic growth and income distribution in Thailand. The analysis will indicate 
whether education could be a key tool affecting income growth and income inequality, and thereby 
contribute to increasing or decreasing poverty in Thailand. Finally, the findings of this dissertation may 
have relevance for other developing countries, especially those which have experienced high growth 
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rates, and yet where income inequality persists at a high level, as in Malaysia and China.  
This investigation analyses the impact of education solely in terms of the quantity of education (i.e. 
educational attainment).  The quality of schools and schoolteachers are assumed to be equal across 
provinces and regions.  Geographical (i.e. province or regions) fixed effects estimations are, thus, 
included.   
1.3 Objectives of the study 
1. To study the impact of education on income, income inequality and poverty in Thailand. 
2. To address heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns through conventional linear regression of 
education on average income and income for different earnings distribution in determining the 
returns to schooling in Thailand. 
3. To construct econometric models to estimate the causal effects of education on average income 
and income at different earnings distribution, taking two compulsory education law changes as 
treatment effects. 
4. To evaluate the compulsory schooling reforms policy in Thailand in terms of the returns to 
schooling in Thailand. 
5. To examine the productivity and equity causally affected by additional education obtained by the 
individuals on the incidence poverty in Thailand. 
1.4 Report Outline 
This dissertation consists of five chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This first chapter explains the motivation of the study and the background context in Thailand. A brief 
overview of policies regarding economic growth, poverty, income inequality and the educational system 
are provided. The research question and objective of the study also presented in this chapter.   
Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Previous empirical studies on the impact of education on income, income inequality and poverty are 
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reviewed in the second chapter. This chapter begins with studies of the importance of education in 
developing economies.  Then, studies of the impact of education on income are reviewed together with 
discussion of the endogeneity problem regarding the results derived from past studies. The studies of the 
impact of education on income at different earnings distribution are next examined. The studies are 
discussed in the context of the heterogeneity and endogeneity bias ( given the unobservable impact on 
schooling and income, i.e. ability). The last section reviews studies of the relationship between education 
and poverty.  
Chapter 3: Data, Model Identification and Methodology 
The third chapter presents the model identification strategies regarding the compulsory schooling reforms 
in Thailand, including descriptive statistics from the National Labour Force Survey (2006-2015). The 
theoretical frameworks to gauge the importance of heterogeneity and endogeneity biases, the reasons for 
selecting a conventional linear regression and an ordinary quantile regression are discussed, and the 
applications of the natural experimental design is investigated. The econometric models for the causal 
impact of education on income (and income for different income groups) are presented in the following 
section.  The main methodologies applied in this dissertation are the Instrumental Variable, Instrumental 
Variable Quantile Regression, and Difference-in-Differences methods.  
Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
The fourth chapter presents our empirical results relating to the impact of education on income, income 
inequality and poverty, respectively. The average returns to education and the returns to each level of 
education are presented at both an aggregated level (pooled repeated cross sections) and disaggregated 
level (income groups). The correlation and causality impacts are also discussed, along with the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns in the assessment of the exogenous shocks in Thailand’s 
educational system. The returns to education on income (and income for different quantiles groups) are 
also analysed in order to offer insights into the relationship between the expansion of educational policies 
and poverty incidence in Thailand.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, Policy Recommendations and Directions for Future Research  
The final chapter summarises the main findings and the general conclusion of this dissertation.  
Suggestions for future studies are drawn from the analysis and policy recommendations are also included 
in this chapter.  
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Table 1.1: The Annual Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product per Capita by Country 
Year/  
Country 
High income Upper middle-income  Lower middle-income 
UK USA Singapore Thailand Malaysia China Myanmar Vietnam Philippines Indonesia Cambodia 
1995 2.24 1.50 3.83 7.05 7.10 9.75 5.65 7.76 2.28 6.56 3.06 
1996 2.29 2.60 3.25 4.49 7.24 8.78 5.09 7.60 3.46 6.22 2.28 
1997 2.86 3.24 4.72 -3.89 4.63 8.12 4.27 6.48 2.86 3.20 2.67 
1998 2.89 3.24 -5.49 -8.73 -9.66 6.81 4.48 4.15 -2.74 -14.35 2.28 
1999 2.94 3.49 5.25 3.38 3.59 6.74 9.53 3.21 0.86 -0.61 9.22 
2000 3.37 2.94 7.03 3.37 6.37 7.64 12.37 5.36 2.19 3.47 6.36 
2001 2.33 -0.02 -3.59 2.49 -1.66 7.56 10.07 4.86 0.73 2.21 5.97 
2002 1.96 0.85 3.26 5.27 3.21 8.40 10.81 5.09 1.50 3.06 4.62 
2003 2.99 1.93 5.99 6.39 3.69 9.35 12.69 5.66 2.85 3.34 6.66 
2004 1.95 2.83 8.19 5.56 4.72 9.46 12.50 6.26 4.62 3.59 8.56 
2005 2.27 2.40 4.99 3.51 3.34 10.74 12.61 6.30 2.84 4.25 11.49 
2006 1.75 1.68 5.51 4.33 3.63 12.09 12.23 5.80 3.40 4.07 9.09 
2007 1.76 0.82 4.66 4.84 7.45 13.64 11.25 5.98 4.84 4.91 8.58 
2008 -1.41 -1.23 -3.49 1.19 1.47 9.09 9.57 4.54 2.48 4.59 5.12 
2009 -5.05 -3.62 -3.56 -1.19 -4.27 8.86 9.84 4.29 -0.46 3.24 -1.40 
2010 1.12 1.68 13.22 6.99 5.05 10.10 8.86 5.31 5.90 4.83 4.34 
2011 0.72 0.85 4.03 0.36 3.37 9.01 4.76 5.12 1.97 4.79 5.38 
2012 0.61 1.46 1.35 6.75 3.54 7.33 6.42 4.12 4.93 4.68 5.58 
2013 1.23 0.97 3.31 2.28 2.80 7.23 7.45 4.31 5.31 4.24 5.67 
2014 2.30 1.61 2.24 0.51 4.18 6.76 7.00 4.85 4.43 3.73 5.33 
2015 1.39 1.85 0.73 2.58 3.28 6.36 6.31 5.53 4.38 3.64 5.33 
2016 1.02 0.91 0.68 2.92 2.69 6.12 5.53 5.08 5.26 3.83 5.22 
Average 1.52 1.45 3.00 2.75 2.99 8.63 8.61 5.35 2.90 3.07 5.52 
Data: Databank, World Development Indicator by the World Bank 
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Table 1.2 :Percentage of Gross Domestic Product by Sector of Production 
Year/Sector Manufacturing Wholesale and retail trade 
Agriculture, hunting 
and forestry 
1995 26% 18% 7% 
1996 26% 18% 7% 
1997 27% 18% 7% 
1998 27% 18% 8% 
1999 28% 18% 7% 
2000 29% 17% 6% 
2001 28% 17% 6% 
2002 29% 16% 7% 
2003 30% 15% 8% 
2004 30% 15% 8% 
2005 30% 15% 8% 
2006 30% 15% 8% 
2007 31% 14% 8% 
2008 31% 14% 9% 
2009 30% 15% 9% 
2010 31% 15% 10% 
2011 29% 14% 11% 
2012 28% 14% 11% 
2013 28% 14% 11% 
2014 28% 14% 9% 
2015 28% 15% 8% 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
Note: Wholesale and retail trade include repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
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Table 1.3: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Thailand (2000 to 2015) by Region 
 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year/Region Whole Kingdom Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
2000 42.33 5.86 28.75 49.08 59.28 41.7 
2002 32.44 6.35 23.42 41.03 44.16 29.2 
2004 26.76 4.07 18.8 33.29 38.97 22.89 
2006 21.94 2.88 12.85 26.11 35.32 19.84 
2007 20.04 3.51 12.15 25.99 30.24 19.33 
2008 20.43 2.33 12.83 29.05 31.19 16.77 
2009 17.88 2.36 11.18 23.38 27.71 17.03 
2010 16.37 2.25 10.77 22.33 25.26 14.24 
2011 13.22 7.74 10.36 16.09 18.11 10.12 
2012 12.64 1.91 6.94 17.4 19.79 13.32 
2013 10.94 1.06 5.4 16.76 17.37 10.96 
2014 10.53 1.64 4.95 13.19 17.04 13.79 
2015 7.21 2.01 4.3 8.78 10.3 9.92 
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Table 1.4: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Thailand (1988 to 2015) by Area of Residence 
Year/Area Urban area Rural area 
1988 43.35 73.97 
1990 38.53 66.08 
1992 26.53 59.97 
1994 23.93 50.51 
1996 19.09 42.25 
1998 20.34 46.68 
2000 22.21 51.43 
2002 17.03 40.22 
2004 14.60 33.62 
2006 11.83 28.31 
2007 11.34 25.85 
2008 10.69 27.31 
2009 10.23 23.59 
2010 8.69 22.44 
2011 9.00 16.71 
2012 8.80 15.96 
2013 7.70 13.89 
2014 7.12 13.76 
2015 5.49 8.91 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Table 1.5: Poverty Headcount Ratio in Thailand (1988 to 2015) by Level of Education 
Year           
/Education 
No 
Education 
Pre-
primary Primary 
Lower-
secondary 
Upper-
secondary Diploma Bachelor's Master's Doctorate 
2007 39.65 27.93 25.27 15.23 7.93 2.85 0.93 0.01 0.00 
2008 44.12 27.64 25.86 16.13 8.61 3.77 0.77 0.00 0.00 
2009 39.10 25.56 22.62 14.90 8.07 3.33 1.04 0.02 0.00 
2010 35.96 23.92 20.89 12.97 7.78 2.64 0.72 0.00 0.00 
2011 29.17 19.70 16.62 11.57 5.92 2.83 0.76 0.00 0.00 
2012 32.36 18.01 16.17 10.34 6.06 1.97 0.63 0.00 0.00 
2013 28.64 14.26 14.11 8.89 4.39 1.52 0.52 0.00 0.00 
2014 27.62 16.28 13.76 8.58 4.67 1.45 0.49 0.00 0.00 
2015 20.20 12.05 9.35 5.95 2.79 0.92 0.38 0.05 0.00 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Table 1.6: Gini Coefficient in Thailand (1998 to 2015) 
Year/Region Whole Kingdom Bangkok Central North Northeast South 
1998 0.487 0.388 0.435 0.439 0.454 0.463 
2000 0.515 0.42 0.48 0.468 0.434 0.469 
2002 0.536 0.457 0.462 0.476 0.471 0.481 
2004 0.52 0.405 0.461 0.468 0.472 0.498 
2005 0.513 0.401 0.468 0.458 0.47 0.47 
2006 0.507 0.415 0.443 0.462 0.46 0.491 
2007 0.522 0.417 0.448 0.47 0.484 0.476 
2008 0.508 0.438 0.44 0.47 0.471 0.464 
2009 0.493 0.422 0.432 0.482 0.454 0.447 
2010 0.514 0.457 0.44 0.488 0.508 0.477 
2011 0.499 0.468 0.418 0.474 0.483 0.464 
2012 0.49 0.47 0.412 0.452 0.486 0.478 
2013 0.484 0.514 0.395 0.441 0.464 0.462 
2014 0.465 0.451 0.397 0.433 0.442 0.443 
2015 0.445 0.397 0.396 0.388 0.432 0.451 
Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Table 1.7: Gini Coefficient in Thailand (1998 to 2015) by Area of Residence 
Year/Region Urban area Rural area 
1998 0.434 0.439 
2000 0.478 0.447 
2002 0.494 0.439 
2004 0.473 0.457 
2005 0.479 0.44 
2006 0.465 0.45 
2007 0.471 0.468 
2008 0.472 0.447 
2009 0.459 0.445 
2010 0.479 0.478 
2011 0.471 0.456 
2012 0.474 0.442 
2013 0.485 0.426 
2014 0.452 0.445 
2015 0.434 0.412 
  Data: The Office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review  
This chapter reviews a broad range of scholarly contributions on the effects of education on income, 
income inequality and poverty reduction, using repeated cross-sectional data analysis. The chapter 
comprises four sections. The importance of education to economic development and studies of the impact 
of education on income are explained in the first section. Research on the relationship between education 
and income inequality will then be examined in the second section. Thirdly, the specifications and 
influence of education on factors related to poverty are discussed before we provide a concluding section.   
2.1 Education and income effects 
According to Kindleberger and Herrick (1977), economic development is theoretically defined as an 
improvement in the population’s welfare (especially the poor), a reduction in poverty and a shift from an 
agricultural to an industrial economic base. In this study, we focus exclusively on development in terms 
of economic growth, income inequality and poverty in Thailand. Thailand has serious concerns about the 
level of income inequality, while poverty persists in the country. Yet, according to the Sustainable 
Development Goals, poverty eradication, income inequality reduction and sustained economic growth are 
highlighted as goals to pursue to 2030 (UNDP, 2015). The World Bank (2016) has suggested that 
eliminating poverty will increase growth and improve income inequality, although there may be a trade-
off between inequality and growth. Economic growth, for example, could worsen inequality if the 
distribution of wealth is highly concentrated (The World Bank, 2000; Zaman and Ahmad, 2013). 
Therefore, The World Bank (2000, p. 45) argues that it is necessary to understand factors such as policies, 
institutions and history that underlie economic growth and income inequality in a country. This study, 
therefore, focuses on education as a driving factor in developing human capital, which can be an 
alternative way of improving Thailand’s economic development. The relationship between growth, 
income inequality and poverty reduction is discussed in the last section.  
The World Bank (1995, p19) suggested that education is an important element from both the economic 
and social dimensions of a country. For the individual, living standards, fertility control and healthcare 
could be improved by investment in education. This could also benefit the nation by advancing economic 
growth, tackling income inequality, and by poverty alleviation. Therefore, education is identified as the 
main contributor to improving economic development in this study. Moreover, the diffusion of scientific 
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and technological knowledge could be improved by providing elementary school education, which would 
in turn increase access to high school and tertiary education for all the society’s strata (Becker, 2009). 
Therefore, in this study it is necessary to explore the impact of education on income first, in order to 
establish its impact upon economic growth and poverty reduction. The literature on the relationships 
between education and income, income inequality and poverty is reviewed respectively. 
According to endogenous growth theory, economic growth is a function of human capital (usually 
proxied by educational attainment), and physical capital (Wickens, 2008, Chapter 3). However, the 
empirical study of Bils and Klenow (2000) on a cross-national dataset, found a weak relationship between 
educational attainment and growth. The economic growth was estimated by using total factor productivity 
(TFP) function. Significantly, the results do not account for the endogeneity on schooling. According to 
another empirical study on the America and Latin-America cross-national dataset, Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) also found that educational attainment has no direct effect on economic growth when taking 
human capital as a standard input in the production function. This is because conventional growth models 
understate labour productivity, that is, the ability to absorb new technology (Romer, 1989; Benhabib and 
Spiegel, 1994). As a result, the estimation of the impact on labour productivity of investments in 
education is warranted (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; The World Bank, 1995).  
According to theoretical studies on human capital, human capital can be defined as how a person’s 
characteristics and ability enable them to raise their income generating capacity (Becker, 2009, p.15). An 
investment in human capital can be an expenditure on education, training or medical care (Becker, 2009). 
However, Becker (2009) concluded that the most important investments in human capital are those 
geared towards education and training.  In addition, an individual’s future income is based on investment 
choices in human capital that aim to maximise welfare. Theoretically, the optimum is when the marginal 
cost and marginal returns are equal (Becker and Chiswick, 1966; Becker, 1975, 2009). Therefore, an 
investment in human capital (i.e. schooling and on-the-job-training) improves the productivity of labour 
and other inputs of production, thus leading to growth in individual incomes (Becker, 1975). 
Additionally, the theoretical studies of Becker (1975), Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Schultz (1960) 
suggest that investment in human capital is a precondition for growth in developing countries, since it not 
only improves an individuals’ productivity (and increases their income), but also leads to an improved 
economic performance. 
  
 
34 
As an expansion of scientific and technological knowledge, in theory, can raise the productivity of labour 
and other inputs of production (Barro, 1991; Becker, 2009; The World Bank, 1995). In other words, the 
production of goods and services in a country could be improved by increasing education, technical 
schooling and on-the-job training, since this enhances the capacity to absorb technological changes 
transferred from the developed countries (Barro 1991; Becker 2009). In addition, Becker (2009, p.25) 
stated that even in countries where the production of good and services are concentrated in the 
agricultural sector, the knowledge of the farmers should be treated as equal to that of industrial workers 
(i.e. skilled labour). This is because education can also heighten the value of farming goods such as 
improving hybrids, new breeding methods and fertilisers as well as knowledge relating  to the use of 
complex equipment, and enhanced marketability. Becker (2009) concluded that the gains from education 
are relatively higher in developing countries than in developed countries.  
According to the empirical study of Patrinos et al. (2006), the authors studied the returns to education for 
individuals (aged 25-65 year-old) in developed and developing countries. Patrinos et al. (2006) applied 
the OLS estimation where the income of the individual depends solely on years of schooling and 
experience of the individuals. The heterogeneity and endogeity biases on the choice of schooling that may 
have an effect on income are not implemented. They found that the developing countries had the higher 
returns to primary education, while returns to tertiary education are higher in developed countries. It has 
been shown that more education is conducive to higher earnings (Becker, 2009; Mincer, 1974). On the 
other hand, Schultz (1960) empically studied the rate of return to education in the 1900s in the United 
States and found that human capital developed more through having paid jobs than by attending schools. 
Theoretically, families and students were more likely to enter the job market rather than attend schools as 
they have to take the responsibility of the cost of education themselves; the poorer families face a higher 
opportunity costs of schooling than the wealthier (Becker, 2009). The aim of this dissertation is to analyse 
the impact of education on these outcomes, especially the compulsory schooling curriculum, which seeks 
to eliminate the self-selection bias of investment in education. 
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Mincer’s Earnings approach has often been used to estimate the returns to education. The monthly 
income of an individual depends on the number of years of education, under the assumption of identical 
abilities and opportunities among individuals (Mincer, 1974). In deciding the optimal choice of 
education, individuals weigh the expected increment in lifetime earnings against the costs of schooling 
(Becker, 1975; Card, 1999; Mincer, 1974). Yet, as Card (1999) emphasises, heterogeneity across 
individuals implies differences in marginal costs and benefits of schooling, resulting in differences in the 
optimal choice of schooling. Differences in abilities could be estimated by comparing the different 
earnings of individuals with the same education level (Becker,1975), but since higher ability individuals 
are likely to self-select to higher education levels, this approach is not fully satisfactory. Another source 
of endogeneity when trying to estimate the effect of education on income is to be found in income taxes 
and tuition fees which, besides influencing education decisions, tend to directly correlate with income as 
well, producing overestimation bias (Heckman, Lochner and Todd 2008).  
In his empirical study on the rate of return to investment in education, Psacharopoulos (1994) shows that 
the highest returns are generated by investments in primary rather than secondary or tertiary education. 
However, that study does not account for unobserved determinants of education that also influence the 
income of the individual. Psacharopoulos (1994) employed the application of the Mincer’s earnings 
function where the effect on income of the individual depends solely on the number of years of schooling 
and experience. Moreover, low and middle-income countries have been shown to yield the highest returns 
to education (compared with the high-income countries), despite the former countries exhibiting fewer 
average years of schooling (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The empirical study of Contreras (2003) 
estimated a Mincer wage equation on average years of schooling, work experience and age in Chile in 
1990 and 1996, and found that an additional year of schooling increases incomes by approximately 10 
percent. Therefore, the correlation of the investment in education on income of the individual was 
observed without the implementation of the endogenous on schooling.  
Park (2011) empirically considered rates of returns to education for individuals who return to school after 
having actively participated in the job market. The effect on income of the individual in his estimation 
depends on the years of schooling, age and age squared of the individual. There could be omitted 
variables biases due to individual characteristics that may have an effect on income. The heterogeneity 
and endogeneity biases are, thus, not implemented.  
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In his correlation estimation, Park (2011) found an extra year of tertiary education was found to increase 
incomes by approximately 3.5 percent. Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) tested the return to education of 
495 adult twins in the USA who reported their own and their twin’s educational and professional 
attainment. Therefore, the omitted ability bias was corrected by exploiting the similar family backgrounds 
and the twins’ characteristics. However, the endogenous on schooling was not observed. The authors 
concluded that an additional year in school increases incomes by 12 to 16 percent. 
Even though these articles mentioned above empirically estimated returns to education while controlling 
for a large number of observable characteristics (e.g. occupation, residence area, gender, marital status), 
the endogeneity bias is not corrected. The error term is likely to be correlated with explanatory variables 
because of omitted unobservable characteristics such as ability, quality of education, work experience, 
family background, or expectations regarding economic indicators and earnings (Ashenfelter, Harmon, 
and Oosterbeek, 1999; Card, 1999; Griliches, 1977; Harmon, Oosterbeek, and Walker, 2003). In addition, 
rich and poor families differ in their opportunities to both recieve high quality education and to perform 
well on the job market. According to Becker (2009), richer families are usually able to pay for schooling 
costs, despite the foregone earnings of their children. Poorer families could also have the same 
opportunities-conditional on the existence of perfect credit markets- allowing households to smooth their 
consumption through time. Indeed, parents could borrow the required amounts to fund education under 
the anticipation that their children would be able to pay back in later periods. Consequently, analyses 
disregarding this possibility may fail to capture the true causal relationship between educational levels 
and income. A last source of endogeneity is rooted in the unobserved differences in the innate abilities of 
individuals (Mwabu and Schultz, 1996).  
Existing literature confirms a positive relationship between schooling and the income of individuals. This 
correlation gives an under estimate of the true causal rate of returns to education (Card, 1993), and there 
are only a few studies that implied a causality impact of obtaining a higher level of education on an 
individual’s wages. Since correlation does not necessarily imply causation, the aim of this paper is to 
explore more systematically the effect of education on income in Thailand by exploiting a natural and a 
natural quasi-experiments in the educational system of Thailand. The existing literature systematically 
points at a robust correlation between education levels and incomes, yet most of the findings are prone to 
important endogeneity concerns.  
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To overcome the limitations of the former studies, the instrumental variable estimation (IV) is employed 
in order to control for differences in an individual’s observable characteristics. The effect of an 
exogenous shock on schooling can assessed by dividing the cohort into sub-groups i.e. treatment and 
control groups (Harmon et al., 2003). The exogenous shock has to be correlated to years of education but 
uncorrelated to income (Cerulli, 2015, p. 163). Therefore, a comparison of the outcomes between 
individuals who are affected and who are not affected by the shocks is undertaken. Card (1993) studied 
the returns to education of young male nationals (aged 14-24) from 1966 to 1981.  That empirical study 
considered whether individuals’ area of residence was close to college (or not) as an instrument. 
Therefore, the endogenous on schooling was observed by the differnt decision on choice of schooling that 
could depend on the individuals’ area of residence. The additional education increases the income of the 
individuals by approximately 10 to 14 percent.  
Angrist and Krueger (1991) used an IV method to determine the impact of a compulsory schooling law 
on incomes in the United States. Since the compulsory schooling law determines the minimal legal 
dropout age independently of the years spent in school, Angrist and Krueger (1991) use the quarter of 
birth as an instrument for education: hypothesising that children born earlier in the year are more likely to 
drop out earlier from school. Their findings reveal that the students who were compelled to attend school 
longer earned higher wages. The endogeneity bias in the estimation of the returns to education is tackled 
by the distinction of choice of schooling that depends solely on whether the individual is covered by the 
compulsory schooling reform or not. The same conclusion was reached in the empirical study of Harmon 
and Walker (1999) which used the compulsory schooling laws (1947 and 1973) as an instrument to study 
the returns to education in the UK from 1948 to 1987. Harmon and Walker (1999) found that the returns 
to education of those who were covered by the laws were higher than of those who were not. Gounder 
and Xing (2012) empirically studied the causal effects of education on household incomes in Fiji by 
implementing an instrumental variable (IV) method. The authors employed three distinct instrumental 
variables; namely, the free primary education scheme, being the head of household before completing the 
secondary school, and being a disabled person. The self-selection bias on choice of schooling, is thus, 
corrected. The authors confirmed that there are positive marginal returns to formal education in terms of 
the annual income of households for all income quartiles. 
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To date few empirical studies have investigated the effect of education on individual earnings in 
Thailand, and even fewer articles have established a causal link. Blaug (2002) investigated the age-
specific income stream for each additional year of education in Bangkok, the capital of Thailand. The 
author found that the marginal rate of return on income for the first 4 years of primary education among 
children in a cohort yielded the highest return to education levels. He found the rate of return to education 
in Thailand in the 1970s to be 27 percent for primary education, as compared to 8 percent for higher 
education. Chiswick (1976) found an 11 percentage points increase in incomes for an additional year of 
schooling for Thais (aged over 15 years) residing in Bangkok in 1971. The investment in schooling 
depends solely on the marginal costs and marginal returns to education. Hawley (2004) further analysed 
the correlation between education and earnings of Thai workers (aged 24 to 35) in 1985, 1995 and 1998. 
The income of the individual is a function of education and experience, as well as of control variables 
such as area of residence (urban/rural), region of residence and a dummy variable for whether the 
individual works either in a private or public employment. The author found that the returns to university 
education yielded the highest rates, becoming progressively smaller for lower levels of education. On 
average, an additional year of education increased incomes by 11 to 12 percent (Hawley, 2004). 
Therefore, the empirical studies of Blaug (2002), Chiswick (1976) and Hawley (2004) mentioned above 
do not correct for the endogeneity bias. The decision on schooling in which could have an impact on 
income are not implemented.  
Warunsiri and Mcnown (2010) establish a causal link between education and incomes of Thai workers 
who were born between 1946 and 1967. The authors made use of a pseudo-panel approach employing the 
Thailand National Labour Force Survey (1986 to 2005) in order to overcome the endogeneity bias. The 
cohorts’ mean incomes is mainly captured by age, however, this age variable could not entirely indicate 
income levels (Mincer, 1974, p. 47).  A pseudo-panel approach, including cohort-specific fixed effects is 
employed in order to control for different behavior, attitudes and opportunities to enter the job market. 
The results show significant and positive effects of approximately 14 to 16 percent of years of schooling 
on earnings. An instrumental variable is also applied to confirm the strength of their estimation, taking 
provinces that have a university and/or a teacher training collage as the instrument. However, some 
results from the IV estimation were found to be implausible, since the standard errors provided by the IV 
remain large while the standard errors provided in the pseudo-panel approach become smaller when the 
data is disaggregated into the demographic characteristics. However, the returns to education given in the 
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pseudo-panel approach and the instrumental variable are relatively the same.   
This dissertation is the first attempt to exploit a natural and a quasi-natural experiments in the context of 
two educational reforms (1978 and 2000) in Thailand, in order to explore the impact of education on 
income. Both reforms imposed certain years of compulsory schooling (6 and 9, respectively) on pupils 
born after a threshold date. By comparing individuals born shortly before the cutoff date (control group) 
and after (treatment group), we are able to control for all types of heterogeneity across individuals (such 
as ability or motivation, for instance). Concerns related to post school investment that can typically bias 
results can, therefore, safely be dismissed in our approach as we consider a “same-age” analysis. We 
exploit this random allocation of individuals (subject to different lengths of compulsory education) to 
distinct groups, and adopt an instrumental variable approach. Aside from allowing us to gauge the impact 
of schooling on income, our study is the first to evaluate the economic consequences of the compulsory 
schooling laws in Thailand. The causal link between the education and income of the middle-aged Thai 
population has been inferred in the study of Warunsiri and Mcnown (2010). However, that concluded the 
rate of returns to education of situation of Thailand a decade ago (1986-2005).  This study examines the 
rate of returns to education from 2006-2015. 
2.2 Education and income inequality   
It is widely accepted by many studies that education is a key tool for improving individual incomes.  As 
we have seen in the previous section, existing studies confirm that the more education obtained, the 
higher the wages earned. However, each individual may benefit differently from education accumulated 
in various ways, thus contributing to income inequality in society. Theoretically, Card (1999, p 1841) 
concluded that heterogeneity bias is the most serious concern in the estimations of the returns to 
education as there is an unequal access to schooling for individuals due to an ability bias. Education 
could, therefore, not only be an essential tool for economic growth, but could also worsen/lessen income 
inequality (Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala, 2003, p. 26). According to the empirical cross-country 
analysis, Gregorio and Lee (2002) concluded that higher and wider educational attainment could play an 
important role in promoting income inequality (measured by the variance of the log of income). The 
linear regression is implemented by taking the variance of education as a function of the variance of 
income. The endogenous schooling is not corrected in that study. 
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On the other hand, Foley and Green (2011) conclude that education has only a slight effect in reducing 
income inequality. That empirical study analysed the decomposition of income inequality in Canada from 
1980 to 2013, finding negative outcomes of education on income inequality could occur in a developed 
country when the skilled labour market has been fully filled by university graduates. Therefore, ability 
and on-the-job-training become more necessary in developed countries than in developing countries 
(where university degrees have been far more scarce). The study of Foley and Green (2011) accounted for 
the heterogeneity bias by exploiting the observed ability of the individuals using the decile index. On the 
other hand the endogeneity of schooling was disregarded. Therefore, this paper focuses on the causal 
impact of education on income distribution in Thailand, where most of the population have only obtained 
primary and lower-secondary education (and there is excess demand in the skilled-labour market). Knight 
and Sabot (1983), however, theoretically concluded that income inequality can be reduced through an 
increased level of education, when there is an excess supply of educated workers and excess demand for 
less-educated workers. The wages of the former go down while the wages of the latter goes up.  
According to the World Bank Development Research Group, the distribution of income or consumption 
expenditures of individuals is commonly measured by the Gini index. The coefficient varies between 0 
and 100, where the lower bound represents complete equality and the upper bound indicating inequality. 
The Gini index measures the area below the Lorenz curve, which captures the relationship between the 
cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of the poorest to the 
richest individuals. Theoretically, consideration of the different incomes of each person in society is 
claimed to be a precise measurement of income inequality by Champernowne (1973, p. 58). Income 
inequality, as measured by the variation in income and consumption variables, could also be defined as an 
aspect of relative poverty (Coudouel, Hentschel, and Wodon, 2002, p. 47). Ravallion and Datt (1991, p. 
15) also suggest measuring changes in poverty rates by reference to income distribution, rather than by a 
conventional inequality index, i.e. Gini coefficient. In this study, we focus on the differences in income 
distribution effects rather than the conventional inequality measurement. The different effects on income 
distribution allow us not only to investigate returns to education for each income group, but also to trace 
the transition from income inequality effects to poverty circumstance.  
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A number of empirical studies show that there is a close relationship between education and income 
inequality. The trends across income groups according to education levels is varied across countries 
because the supply of educated individuals in the labour market also varies across countries. It is essential 
to examine this in the case of Thailand, where causality has not been explored. This subsection examines 
the literature regarding the effects of education on income inequality, including both correlation and 
causality impacts. 
There are two main ways in which income inequality can be improved in particular through education: 
increasing the opportunity to undertake education and increasing the rate of return to education. First, an 
expansion of educational opportunities is one of the development tools to improve income inequality 
proposed in the MDGs and SDGs (UNDP, 2015; UNDP, 2014). Enhancing educational attainment is the 
goal of many schemes such as universal primary education, free education, compulsory schooling, and 
the “Education for All” schemes (Bruns et al., 2003). Some studies have found that an expansion in 
schooling opportunities can reduce income inequality. Becker and Chiswick (1966) studied the variance 
in log of earnings and proxies of income inequality on the opportunity to obtain education across regions 
in the United States. The authors found that the more disparity in the opportunity to access to schooling, 
the higher income inequality in the country.  
In addition, the empirical cross-country study by Gregorio and Lee (2002) found an increase in 
educational attainment could reduce income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. In addition, 
income inequality could also be reduced by extending opportunities in schools for the poor (Balestra and 
Backes-gellner, 2013; Bruns et al., 2003). Chiswick (1971) concluded that compulsory schooling 
regulations and/or an increase in subsidies, especially for the poor, could reduce income inequality. 
However, it is argued by Arias, Hallock, and Sosa-Escudero (2001) that the wealthier still benefit more 
than the poor, even if they obtained the same level of education. This is because the former gain from a 
better background environment, whether in terms of the quality of school or family background (Martins 
and Pereira, 2004).  
Recent empirical studies have examined how the rate of return to education varies across the income 
distribution. Income inequality becomes more equalised if the returns to education of the lower income 
groups are found to be higher than the top quantile groups, since the income gap is narrowed down (Arias 
et al., 2001; Balestra and Backes-gellner, 2013; Harmon et al., 2003; Mwabu and Schultz, 1996; Wang, 
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2013). This literature is first examined by reference to the correlation relationship, followed by the studies 
that consider the causality impact.  
To find the correlation between education and income distribution, many studies have applied the 
quantile regression methods (QR) such as those investigated Koenker and Bassett (1978). QR estimation 
allows us to see how various explanatory variables differentially affect different parts of the income 
distribution (Wooldridge, 2008, p. 453). Martins and Pereira (2004) applied QR methods in order to see 
the impact of education on wages in 16 developed countries. They found that the returns to education 
increased over the wage distribution. Additionally, increasing returns to education in the case of Portugal 
(from 1982 to 1992) over the income groups was also empirically found by Hartog, Pereira and Vieira 
(2001) using the QR estimation. The empirical study of Nguyen, Albrecht, Vroman and Westbrook 
(2007) that applied the QR also found the same trend in returns to education in Vietnam. The returns to 
education of the head of household on income distribution were investigated. The control variables 
included age, size of household and occupations. Even though the heterogeneity bias is overcome by 
making use of the observed quintile index, the endogeneity regarding schooling is not. In the case of the 
OECD countries and Singapore, Patrinos and Ridao-Cano (2006) empirically found an increasing returns 
to education trend over income groups. The effect of education on income distribution in the UK (from 
1980 to 1995) was investigated by Harmon et al. (2003) applying the QR estimation. Here, again, the 
returns to education were found to be greater for the higher than for the lower quantile groups.  
On the other hand, the empirical study of Patrinos and Ridao-Cano (2006) studied the returns to education 
in the East Asian countries of Mongolia, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, China and the 
Philippines. The quantile regression was used to estimate Mincer’s earning function. The income of the 
individual depends on his/her education and experience. Therefore, the results of Patrinos and Ridao-
Cano (2006) accounted only for the heterogeneity bias, but not for the endogeneity of schooling. They 
found that returns decrease with quantiles. Gounder and Xing (2012) also applied ordinary quantile 
regression and found that as returns to education in Fiji decreased for the higher income groups, this 
improves income inequality. The returns to one extra year of schooling on income distribution were 
estimated by controlling for the observed variables of the household heads’ such as age, ethnicity, gender. 
However, the endogeneity of schooling was not corrected for. In the case of Thailand, Kakwani and Son 
(2008) reported that the benefits of education in Thailand are not reaching the poor. The authors also 
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concluded that there is a significant difference between the poor and non-poor for the average completed 
years of schooling. Patrinos and Ridao-Cano (2006) studied the impact of education on earnings in 
Thailand. According to the quantile regression estimation, it appears that Thailand has a markedly 
decreasing trend in the returns to education across income groups. In other words, the highest returns to 
education accrue to the lowest income groups and decrease among the upper income groups.   
According to the ordinary quantile regression (QR) literature above, it may be true that quantile 
regression eliminates heterogeneity according to the different characteristics among the income groups 
(Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2004). However, the endogeneity problems due to omitted variable bias have 
not been solved (Angrist, Chernozhukov and Fernandez-Val, 2006). Theoretically, the marginal costs and 
benefits of schooling may vary across individuals, affecting the optimal choice of schooling differently 
(Card,1999). In addition, Becker (2009) concluded that more able individuals might acquire more 
education, as the costs of schooling are lower, thus earning more income than less able individuals. The 
less able may opt to drop out of school due to self-selection bias. The empirical study of Mincer (1996) 
found increasing income inequality in the U.S. from 1970 to 1990 was mainly due to within-group 
inequality. At the same level of education, marginal productivity and marginal costs differ across 
individuals, resulting in a difference in the marginal rates of return to education. Therefore, a rise in 
endogeneity bias may also be due to ability differences across income quantiles. The failure to consider 
differences among individuals due to ability differences may also cause an upward bias in the ordinary 
quantile regression.  
Many studies have explored the relationship between returns to schooling and ability. According to the 
theoretical studies, ability is defined in terms of an innate ability and/or personal characteristics (Becker 
and Chiswick, 1966). Champernowne (1973, p.59) stated that persons have a differential ability to earn 
income based on their innate ability and their purchased ability (i.e. exclusive education or training that 
could raise one’s productivity). Chiswick (1971) concluded that unequal returns to education depend on 
ability differences between individuals, and the quantile index could capture ability levels of individuals 
for different quantiles, where the wealthier have a  higher ability (Arias et al., 2001; Becker, 2009; 
Mwabu and Schultz, 1996). This is because those with higher ability obtain more wealth which provides 
a wider availability of funds for education (Chiswick, 1971, p.22). Mwabu and Schultz (1996) concluded 
that there is a negative relationship between the rate of return on education and ability. The rate of return 
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to education of low-ability individuals would be higher than for high-ability individuals. Existing 
empirical studies have found both negative and positive correlations between ability and the returns to 
education. Therefore, there is a controversy as to whether an increase in the education level of individuals 
would either reduce or exacerbate income inequality given the relationship between ability and returns to 
education.  
Theoretically, Becker and Chiswick (1966) pointed out that a reduction in income equality occurs when 
there is a negative relationship between ability and returns to education.  Mwabu and Schultz (1996) and 
Arias et al. (2001) pustulated that the relationship between ability and returns to education can be 
substitutive and complementary. A decreasing trend in returns to schooling by quantile is evidence of 
substitutability between education and ability. Conversely, complementarity between education and 
ability causes increasing returns by quantile. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and De Fraja (2002) also 
hypothesised that investment in human capital could reduce income inequality if education and ability are 
substitutable.  On the other hand, income inequality worsens when education is complemented by ability, 
as the rich are better off as a consequence of their increased education obtained. This relationship has 
been studied in the case of Thailand by Patrinos and Ridao-Cano (2006), the authors finding a 
substitution effect between ability and education. Thus, investment in education could decrease the level 
of income inequality.  
Therefore, a traditional quantile regression suffered from induced bias due to the ambiguous relationship 
between ability and returns to education. This could be overcome by using an IV identification strategy in 
the QR (Newton et al., 2010). However, another unobservable characteristic (family background) might 
also correlate to income distribution. Becker (2009) stated that a drawback of estimating the impact of 
education on income and income inequality is that (unobserved) family background might also cause 
endogeneity concerns, since it could not be eliminated from the estimation. Newton et al. (2010, p. 425) 
instead suggested that the Quantile Treatment Effects (QTEs) are an intuitive way to estimate the 
distributional impact of a treatment.  
The Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression approach (IVQR) proposed by Chernozhukov and Hansen 
(2008) allows us to uncover heterogeneous effects across the earnings distribution and to take into 
account the endogeneity problem. Many studies made use of IVQR to estimate how the causal effects of a 
particular treatments translate into income distribution. For example, Bang, Mitra and Wunnava (2016) 
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explored the impact of remittances on household expenditure distribution. Abadie, Angrist and Imbens 
(2002) estimated the impact of a subsidised training programme on the distribution of earnings by using 
the IVQR method to measure programme impact on quantiles.  
However, only a few empirical studies have explored the causal effects of education on income 
inequality. Chernozhukov, Hansen and Jansson (2007) applied the QR and IVQR to the study of Card 
(1995).  The authors found a decreasing return over quantile groups of young men (aged 14-24). 
Chernozhukov, Hansen and Jansson (2007) used the distance to college was used as an instrument on the 
returns to education, and concluded that the QR provided an under estimation given the heterogeneity in 
the returns to schooling. Girma and Kedir (2005) studied the returns to education across income 
distribution in Ethiopia in the 1990s. The IVQR is used as a main estimation. The completed level of 
education of parents is used as an instrument. The returns to education are found to diminish over income 
groups, with the income of the 10th quantile increasing by over 18 percent for an extra year of schooling. 
Wang (2013) studied the causal effect of education on incomes in China in 1995 and 2002, employing 
IVQR. Spouse education was used as an instrument. The author concluded that education reduces 
earnings inequality since the returns to education are found to be larger in the poorer income groups than 
in the rich groups.  
Balestra and Backes-Gellner (2013) also estimated the causal relationship using IVQR, taking the 
extension of the compulsory education as an instrument. The returns to education exhibited a decreasing 
trend over quantile groups. In other words, the lower quantile groups gain higher income effects than the 
top quantile groups. Moreover, the rich are more likely to receive higher wages when they obtain an 
academic education compared to a vocational education. On the other hand, graduating from a vocational 
education was more beneficial to the lower quantile groups than completing academic education. 
Brunello, Fort and Weber (2009) studied the relationship between education and income inequality in 12 
European countries during the WWII period. The authors applied IVQR, taking the exogenous variation 
provided by the minimum school leaving age laws as an instrument. Taking compulsory education age as 
exogenous, they found education contributes an increase in income inequality. On the other hand, the 
return to education was found to be concentrated in the lowest quantiles when allowing for the 
endogeneity that education only depends on ability.  
Chiswick (1971) concluded that the level of investment (and its dispersion), and the returns to investment 
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(and its differences) cause income inequality. As a result, study across two distinct dimensions the 
dispersion in educational opportunity and the rate of return on investment is necessary.  In this study, we 
focus on the different returns to education among income groups. In addition we examine the equity of 
opportunity offered by the Education for All scheme in Thailand as evidenced through the compulsory 
schooling reforms6. Following the 6-year compulsory schooling law, primary education may no longer be 
sufficient to reduce income inequality, since the incidence of income inequality has remained stable for 
over a decade, despite the law coming into being. We hypothesise that the new threshold of education 
level aiming at more equitable opportunity is the 9-year compulsory schooling law.  
Income inequality effects are different across context and countries. The returns to education for income 
distribution in the case of Thailand has not been causally explored to date. Thus a study of the causal 
relationship between returns to education and income distribution in Thailand, is necessary. Previous 
studies on causality have investigated the impact of an additional year of schooling on income for 
different income groups. However, the effects of an extra year of schooling on earnings may not have as 
much effect on the rate of earnings as the type of degree received (Card, 1999, p. 1806; Harmon et al., 
2003, p. 127). Therefore, in this study we also investigate the impact of each level of education that 
individuals completed: from primary, to lower-secondary, to upper-secondary, to diploma, to masters, and 
to doctorate. Heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns regarding the ability of individuals will be resolved 
by taking the compulsory schooling reforms as the instrument. However, we are unable to control for 
unobservable family background in this study.  
 
 
                                                            
 
6 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling compels pupils to complete at least the primary education and lower-secondary education, 
respectively. 
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2.3 Education and poverty reduction 
Poverty measurement 
The two main approaches to poverty measurement are the monetary and the non-monetary approach.  The 
former focuses on the lack of basic needs for survival (Coudouel et al., 2002; Murray, Evans, and 
Schwab, 1998; The World Bank, 2000).  The latter can be measured by health, nutrition, and literacy.  
The lack of social relations, insecurity, low self-esteem, and powerlessness are also characteristics 
associated with poverty (Coudouel et al., 2002). However, there is a difficulty in identifying “basic 
needs” because the cost of such needs might be different across regions and time. For example, 
expenditures across regions/individuals are different, as rural and urban prices different according to 
agricultural seasons and economic performance (Kakwani and Krongkaew, 2000; Kakwani, 1993; Lipton 
and Ravallion, 1995, p. 2567). 
The incidence of poverty can be measured by the size of the population who have less than the bundle of 
necessary goods and services deemed a minimum survival requirement for daily life (Hayami and Godo, 
2005; Stitt, 1994). The poverty line is also defined as the mean income of the income distribution 
(Ravallion and Datt, 1991, p. 3). The poverty line defines the minimum acceptable standard of living of a 
society, and can also be generated from the cost of food energy intake (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, p. 
2576). The poverty line is used to determine the degree of poverty and identify whether the household is 
in poverty or not. The monthly threshold requirement for a household or an individual can be measured 
by using consumption expenditures or income (Coudouel et al., 2002; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; 
Ravallion and Datt, 1991).  
In this study we focus on the reduction of poverty based solely on the monetary approach.  The monetary 
approach can be examined by either income or consumption expenditures of households or individuals  
(Coudouel et al., 2002; Lipton & Ravallion, 1995; World Bank, 2014). It has been suggested by Coudouel 
et al. (2002) and Lipton and Ravallion (1995) that the consumption variable is a better indicator for 
estimating poverty than income, since it better reflects the average standard of living of the individual.  In 
addition, an income indicator might fluctuate more sharply, especially in agriculture since this depends on 
the harvest cycle and on natural phenomena (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995). However, Lipton and 
Ravallion (1995) argue that income approaches are preferred over consumption when estimating long-
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term living standards, as unequal borrowing opportunities (for the poor and non-poor) produce 
differential constraints over their life-cycles. The selection of an income indicator for poverty 
measurement also depends on the availability of data (Coudouel et al., 2002, p. 30). Significantly, 
datasets from Thailand’s National Labour Force Survey (NLFS) can provide the wages of individuals and 
their characteristics. Moreover, Coudouel et al. (2002, p. 30) suggested that taking income as the main 
dependent variable, offers advantages in assessing poverty: for example, this enables us to differentiate 
between different sources of income. In other words, this allows us to specify the extent of the linkage 
between investment in human capital and poverty alleviation. In this study, we consider the potential of 
investment in education in addressing poverty through the returns to education. The determinants of 
poverty are discussed in the following section.   
Determinants of poverty  
Figure 2.1: Poverty, Economic Growth and Income Inequality: a Triangular Relationship 
 
 
A change in poverty is determined from both microeconomic and macroeconomic directions (Coudouel et 
al., 2002). In microeconomic terms, with reference to (as discussed in the previous section) causal impact 
of education on an individual’s income. From the  macroeconomic direction it is commonly assumed that 
the degree of poverty is determined by two main components, namely, economic growth and the degree 
of income inequality. An increase in the average level of income, economic growth and/or a decrease in 
income inequality imply poverty reduction (Bils and Klenow, 2000; Contreras, 2003; Deolalikar, 2002; 
Ferreira, Leite and Ravallion, 2010; Foster, Greer & Thorbecke, 2010; Fosu, 2009; Kakwani and Son, 
2008; Kakwani, 1993; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Ravallion and Datt, 1991; Robalino and Warr, 2006; 
The World Bank, 2014; Warr, 2009). In this study an application on poverty, based specifically on the 
causality impact of investment in human capital (on both individuals and the macroeconomy) in the 
kingdom of Thailand, is analysed.   
Poverty
Economic Growth Income Inequality
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Economic growth effects 
Many empirical studies have concluded that the higher the income growth, the lower the poverty rate. 
Hayami and Godo (2005) and Kakwani (1993) found that there is a strong relationship between a rise in 
GDP per capita and/or the average level of income and a reduction in poverty incidence (for example. 
headcount ratio, or poverty gap) over time. The poverty rate could be reduced when there is an increase in 
income per capita if inequality in income distribution, usually measured by the Gini coefficient, is stable 
(Hayami and Godo, 2005; Kakwani, 1993).  
In a case study in Côte D’Ivoire, Kakwani (1993) finds that poverty is highly sensitive to economic 
growth.  The pure growth effect on poverty was estimated from changes in average income separately 
from another component (income inequality). That article suggests that poverty rates should reduce 
relatively faster than income growth. Fosu (2009) also examined the impact of an increase in economic 
growth on poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), comparing SSA countries with other 
developing countries in a panel of 86 countries. It is assumed that poverty could be reduced (albeit at a 
decreasing rate) mainly by increasing income growth while keeping the inequality index constant. 
Inequality is kept constant because it is assumed that the different income groups benefit proportionally 
from economic growth.  
A cross-country study of 44 countries involving a linear and a quadratic analysis by Hayami and Godo 
(2005) also found that an increase in GDP per capita tends to lead to a decrease in poverty incidence (as 
measured by the poverty headcount and the poverty gap index). Contreras (2003) described the effect of 
average income and proxies for economic growth on poverty in Chile from 1990 to 1996.  In that context, 
poverty alleviation was significant, whereas inequality remained relatively constant through a period of 
rapid economic growth. To study the impact of economic growth on poverty the author applied the Datt-
Ravallion poverty decomposition measurement by holding the Lorenz curve, an inequality indicator, 
constant at its initial level. This is because the initial date of the measurement period is a natural choice of 
reference since this is independent of the decomposition (Ravallion and Datt, 1991, p. 5). Consequently, 
Contreras (2003) reported that the major causes of poverty changes in Chile during the period were from 
the effects of economic growth, while the impact of income inequality on poverty was not explored.  
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In the case of Thailand, Kakwani and Krongkaew (2000) found that poverty (from 1990 to 1996) was 
highly sensitive to economic growth. However, the authors only summarised the possibility of a  
correlation between the changes in the number of the poor, the severity of poverty and the growth index. 
Sen (1976) and Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984), in contrast, focused on how changes in the poor’s 
income and income distribution components affected the degree of poverty. These studies concluded that 
poverty could worsen when the income of the poor falls and/or there is a transfer to the rich. 
Income inequality effects 
To determine the impact of income inequality on poverty, the redistribution component is estimated by 
keeping the aggregate mean income constant at the reference level (Contreras, 2003; Ravallion and Datt, 
1991, pp. 3–6). Many studies show that higher income inequality leads to a rise in poverty rates 
(Contreras, 2003; Fosu, 2009; Kakwani, 1993; Ravallion and Datt, 1991), and this linkage between 
income effects and poverty will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. The evolution of poverty 
in India and Brazil in the 1980s was studied by Ravallion and Datt (1991) using the decomposition of 
poverty. The poverty headcount, the poverty gap index and the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke indices were used 
to measure poverty in both countries. However, the distributions used for India and Brazil were different 
as there was a limitation in the availability of data. The data for India was captured by consumption 
expenditures while Brazil’s income inequality data was measured with respect to households’ income per 
capita. In India, the growth factor was found to be a major impact affecting the poverty alleviation rather 
than the distribution factor. Additionally, it was suggested that the poverty rate in India could be reduced 
despite income inequality remaining stable. On the other hand, growth and inequality both strongly 
affected poverty for Brazil. Moreover, the incidence of poverty rose significantly following an increase in 
redistribution while the growth rate was reduced (Ravallion and Datt, 1991). In addition, an increase in 
income inequality correlated with an increase in poverty incidence in Thailand (Hayami and Godo, 2005).   
A Triangular Relationship 
Existing empirical studies found a triangular relationship between growth, income inequality and poverty 
(Figure 2.1). Poverty could be directly reduced by increasing growth and decreasing income inequality.  
Economic growth and income inequality components are also found to have an effect on each other. 
Income inequality exacerbates income growth, while little effect was found vice versa (Ravallion, 2001).  
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A case study of Côte D’Ivoire by Kakwani (1993) concluded the (dominant) impacts on poverty changes 
could be estimated from the average level of income, proxies of growth, and income inequality. 
Additionally, poverty rates could be worsened through a rise in inequality, since this reduces the mean 
income growth elasticity of poverty (Fosu, 2009).  
Kakwani and Son (2008) empirically studied the distribution in the benefits from economic performance 
accruing to the poor and the non-poor in Brazil (from 1995 to 2005). A pro-poor growth pattern was 
found during periods of negative growth, with the poor benefiting proportionally more from the (lack of) 
economic growth than the non-poor. In India, Ravallion and Datt (1991) found that a rise in economic 
growth did not benefit the poor in the 1980s as the distribution of that growth was stable during the 
recovery period of 1983 to 1985. Ravallion (1997, p. 51) stated that in developing countries income 
inequality diverts the benefits of economic growth from poverty reduction. Kakwani (1993) found that 
poverty rates could be worsened by a high inequality rate, even when there is positive economic growth, 
as poverty incidence was found to be more elastic to changes in inequality. Adams (2004) studied the 
links between growth, income inequality and poverty in 60 developing countries. A rise in income 
inequality was found to have a smaller impact than economic growth with respect to poverty reduction. 
Fosu's (2009) studies in sub-Saharan Africa confirmed that poverty rates can be exacerbated by a rise in 
income inequality itself, and by its impact on worsening the income growth elasticity of poverty.  
Hayami and Godo (2005, pp. 204–205) used a linear equation to estimate the determinants of poverty in 
Thailand from 1962 to 2001. They found that increases in average income per capita led to a lower 
poverty headcount. The quadratic regression suggested poverty tends to rise after a GDP per capita 
threshold value is reached (approximately 45,000 USD). More importantly, the poverty headcount index 
declined sharply, even though there was a significant increase in the Gini coefficient during a period of 
rapid economic growth (1962-1992) in Thailand. Thereafter, the Gini coefficient began to fall again, with 
a steady decline in the poverty headcount from 88 to 10 percent within four decades after 1962 (Hayami 
and Godo, 2005, p. 208) in line with the Kuznets hypothesis. The authors reported that income inequality 
became narrower over time.  
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An empirical study of Deolalikar (2002) concluded that poverty reduction in Thailand from 1992 to 1999 
was affected by income inequality in two ways: firstly, increased inequality was associated with increased 
poverty, after controlling for economic growth; and, secondly, high levels of initial inequality reduced 
future growth rates in the economy, thus hampering poverty reduction despite the presence of rapid 
growth.  Therefore, the improvement of income distribution does not only fosters growth, but also 
reduces poverty.  
Many studies have applied conventional measurements (i.e. poverty head-count, poverty line, GDP per 
capita, and the Gini coefficient) as elements in the determination of poverty changes. In this study, on the 
other hand, we use income source as a key indicator impacting upon poverty determinants: namely, 
economic growth and income inequality. Significantly, the changes in these two components are derived 
separately from the causal impact of the investment in education on monthly wages and its distribution. 
Therefore, the returns to education are estimated at an aggregate mean income level and for different 
income groups of the Thai population. An improvement in income inequality is expected when returns to 
education are more concentrated amongst the poor than the non-poor and vice versa. The linkage between 
education and income, economic growth and income inequality are discussed in the following section.  
Education has the potential to improve individual productivity, especially for the poor, in many ways.  It 
can lead to a higher income and awareness of healthcare; subsequently resulting in the better living 
standards (The World Bank, 1995, p. 19). As a macroeconomic component, a more educated population 
and a lower incidence of poverty will contribute towards economic growth (Barro, 1991; Gounder and 
Xing, 2012).  According to the relationship between human capital and economic growth, human capital 
growth can affect growth not only directly (through an augmented human capital stock) but also 
indirectly (through the level of technology) (Bils and Klenow, 2000).  Gounder and Xing (2012) and 
Litschig and Morrison (2013) confirmed that positive income effects, leading to a rise in years of 
schooling, has a positive impact on poverty reduction. Additionally, equality in the opportunity to access 
education yields reduced income inequality (Barro, 1991; The World Bank, 1995).  
An empirical study of Bils and Klenow (2000) showed that investment in human capital could grow with 
a rise in school attainment, positively affecting economic growth. In that study, the income effects on the 
demand for schooling were analysed, along with the opportunity cost of student time (for the last year 
spent in school). The estimation suggested that school attainment would increase when there is a higher 
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expected growth in wages per unit of human capital. Castelló-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013) further 
studied the impact of education on economic growth at a disaggregated level for 16 states in India from 
1961 to 2001. Secondary and tertiary education was found to have a positive impact on growth via the 
industry and services sectors, respectively. On the other hand, universal primary education had no 
discernible effect on growth compared with tertiary education. 
The correlation of education of household heads with household welfare and poverty (from 1988 to 1996) 
in Thailand was studied by Kakwani and Krongkaew (2008). They found that the education of household 
heads was highly correlated to poverty. In 1996, on average poor household heads had completed only 
3.6 years of schooling, while non- poor household heads had completed 5.5 years of schooling. The paper 
further compared the average level of school attainment across communities, namely; municipal areas and 
villages. The educational level in villages was very low. In 1996, the average years of schooling in the 
villages among the non-poor households was only 4.5 years, compared to 8.3 years on average in 
municipal areas. Even among poor households, households in municipal areas had a higher educational 
level than those in the villages. 
The contribution of this dissertation is to devise ways to reduce poverty in Thailand by focusing on how 
to improve income and to reduce income inequality via education, as past studies have not explored the 
full causal impact of education on poverty rates, only commenting upon the trend and probability of 
education contributing to reducing poverty rates.  
2.4 Conclusion 
The results from many studies lead to the conclusion that improving the efficiency of education in 
Thailand could be an element that could help in decreasing the level of poverty, and ultimately enabling 
Thailand to meet the SDGs. The United Nations Development Programme (2015) has confirmed that 
education is an essential dimension of human capital and a core element of the SDGs.  Most studies 
confirmed that human capital is one of the most important elements in fostering growth and reducing 
income inequality, thus resulting in poverty alleviation. Thailand has already experienced a high growth 
rate over the past decades, which should have had an impact on income inequality. Therefore, higher 
education access opportunities would not only have a positive effect on an individual’s income, but 
would also be another driving force for economic growth, thereby reducing poverty rates in Thailand. The 
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return to 6- and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms in Thailand in 1978 and 2000 are identified. Pupils, 
especially those from disadvantaged families, would have received a higher level of education through 
being compelled by law.  This enables us to discern whether or not the better opportunities to accumulate 
education for disadvantaged pupils has a significant impact on poverty and income inequality. In this 
thesis, the effect of education on income (and income inequality) and the determinants of poverty are 
estimated. The impact of compulsory schooling (used as an instrument) on poverty reduction is, thus, 
independently analysed.  Education is expected to have both positive and negative impacts on the income 
of individuals and income inequality, respectively.  
To date, there are few studies that have investigated the causal relationship between education and 
income and income inequality. Therefore, the Instrumental Variable (IV), Instrumental Variable Quantile 
Regression (IVQR) and the Difference-in-Differences (DD) will be employed since these methods can 
not only estimate the casual link between educational investment and income and income inequality, but 
they can also help us evaluate Thailand’s education policy reforms. The treatment will take into account 
the free basic education and the compulsory education law reforms. The Thai government aims to foster 
economic growth mainly through investment in transport infrastructure projects (Office of National 
Economic and Social Development Board, 2014). This thesis, however, will examine whether basic 
education is also a key factor in economic growth, income inequality and poverty reduction. If education 
is proved to have a significant impact on economic growth and income inequality reduction, the evidence 
of this thesis could encourage a higher capital disbursement budget assigned to education in Thailand. 
Therefore, the benefits of schooling increase welfare, both by increasing ability to acquire higher income 
and by positively influencing socio-economic outcomes.  
The next chapter presents the data, identification strategy and methodology that are applied in this study. 
Estimations using repeated cross-sectional data methods are employed, along with consideration of  
heterogeneity and endogeneity biases. The correlation relationship and the causality impact of education 
on income and income inequality, are thus examined. In addition, the exogenous shocks in Thailand’s 
education system are also explained in order to justify the instrument employed.  
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Chapter 3 Data, Model Identification and Methodology 
In Chapter 2 we reviewed the literature exploring the linkages between education, income, income 
inequality and poverty. The returns to education on income and income inequality are the main interest of 
our study.  Then, these income and income inequality effects are analysed for the purpose of addressing 
poverty reduction in Thailand.  This chapter describes the design of our study on the causal impact of 
education on individual income and on the entire income distribution. Our aim is to tackle the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity biases that are present in most of the earlier literature. This chapter is 
divided into three main sections; the data, model identification and methodologies. The nature of the 
National Labour Force Survey in Thailand is first explained. The identification strategy with the 
considerations along the Thailand’s education system and the compulsory schooling reform is primarily 
discussed in the second section. The eligibility of cohorts as regards the two compulsory reforms in 
Thailand in the 1978 and 2000 are then examined in the following part. The third section identifies the 
methodologies and the baseline equation employed to estimate the returns to education on individual 
income and on the income of different quantiles.  
To gauge the importance of heterogeneity and endogeneity biases, we begin by estimating a conventional 
linear regression, before comparing our results with repeated cross sectional data methods, an ordinary 
quantile regression and natural experiments exploited with an Instrumental variable, Instrumental variable 
quantile regression, and a Difference-in-Differences methods. 
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3.1 Thailand National Labour Force Survey (2006-2015) 
In this paper, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the data of the National Labour Force Survey (NLFS) 
of Thailand from 2006 to 2015.  The Labour Force Survey has been undertaken by the National Statistical 
Office since 1963.  The NFLS contains individual data on several variables for a representative sample of 
Thai residents on an annual basis (Table 3.1).  The Survey is conducted monthly, and three months’ data 
are combined to create quarterly data. According to section 44 of the Labour Protection Act 1998, the 
labour force is defined as individuals 15 years of age and over. In this study, we focus on individuals aged 
15 (legal working age) to 60 (retirement age), resulting in 1,887,178 individual observations in the NLFS 
over the 2006-2015 period. The main dependent variable in this project is the individual log of nominal 
income in time period t.  The currency used in the NLFS is the Thai Baht7.  The nominal wage is deflated 
by the Thai Consumer Price Index (CPI)8. We consider the natural log of wages because the distribution 
of wages is skewed to the left (Appendix 1).  The list of 11 control variables for individual i at time t (the 
survey year from 2006 to 2015) are examined in the following section.  
The data used in this study comes from the National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO); it is highly 
sensitive and ought to be handled with precaution.  A confidentiality and ethical agreement has already 
been signed.  The agreement states that the data can be used from the 3rd July 2015 to the 31st January 
2019.  Any research undertaken using this database will be subjected to the ethical committee of the 
University of Portsmouth prior to being made public. Moreover, the study will only present statistical 
results at the aggregate level, and will not include any information that could potentially raise ethical 
issues. 
The descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3.1.  The summary 
statistics of individuals (15 -60 years old) according to the National Labour Force Survey (2006-2015) are 
provided in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.1.  The explanatory variables are as follows:  
 
                                                            
 
7 Currency rate (on average) 2007 to 2015: 1 US dollar = 32.5 THB and 1 GBP = 48 THB provided by 
http://www.xe.com/company/ 
8 The CPI indices take 2015 as the base year.  The data are from the Bureau of Trade and Economic Indices, Ministry 
of Commerce, Thailand 
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1. Education of an individual i  defines the highest level of education completed at the time of the 
survey.  This variable ranges from no education to the doctorate level.  To estimate the mean 
effect of additional years of schooling, the Number of years of schooling is deduced from the 
highest education completed.  Our conversion grid of schooling to normal number of years in 
school is as follows: 0 = no education, 3 = pre-primary, 9=primary, 12=lower-secondary, 
15=upper-secondary, 17=Diploma certificate, 19=Bachelor degree, 21=Master’s degree and 
24=Doctorate degree. On average, individuals aged 15-60 have approximately 13 years of 
schooling, 95% CI [13.26, 13.28].  
2. Age defines the age of individual i at the time of the survey t. On average, the individuals were 
approximately 38 years old [95% CI 37.56 - 37.59].  The time-invariant variable year of birth of 
the individual is thus deduced by extrapolation. The Year of birth variable is a necessary 
information for determining which individuals are subject to the compulsory schooling laws 
imposed in 1978 and 2000, respectively. 
3. Male is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for males and 0 for females, 95% CI [0.535 -
0.536]. The data is spread equally across genders.    
4. Urban and rural areas classifies whether the individual lives in a municipal or non-municipal 
area, respectively. The distinction between urban and rural area (sanitary districts) is 
distinguished by local administration. The value of this variable is equal to 1 if individuals reside 
in an urban area and 0 otherwise.  The individuals are more likely to live in urban area (65%, 
95% CI [0.645 - 0.646]) than in rural areas.  
5. Married status is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is married and 0 
otherwise.  The variable is recoded from the Marital status data which is divided into seven 
categories including never been married, married, widowed, divorced, separated, and married 
with unknown status.  Approximately 66 percent, 95% CI [0.662 - 0.664], of the individuals 
were married.  
6. Head of household is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is the head of the 
household, and 0 otherwise.  The dummy variable is recoded from the Relationship status of 
the individual with the head of household. There are nine categories, namely, head of 
household, husband or wife, unmarried child, married child, in-law child, child of child, parents, 
cousin and others.  
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7. Occupation defines the occupation of an individual.  The ten categories considered are the 
following; senior officials, professionals, technicians, clerks, service workers, skilled 
agricultural, craft, plant operators, elementary occupations, and unknown.  We make use of this 
variable to construct a Skilled-labour variable, taking a value of 1 if the individual works as 
skilled-labour (senior officials, professionals, technicians and clerks), and 0 otherwise.  The 
majority of the observations (67%) belong to unskilled-labour (33% skilled-labour, 95% CI 
[0.333 - 0.334]). 
8. Region defines the region of residence of an individual.  Thailand is divided into four regions 
namely, central, northern, northeastern and southern regions. 
9. Province defines the province of residence of an individual. There are 76 provinces in Thailand. 
10. Year indicates the year that the survey is conducted.  Therefore, t indexes time periods from 
2006 to 2015.  
 
To provide a first taste of this relationship in the context of Thailand, on Figure 3.1 we plot educational 
achievements against average income levels for the 2006-2015 period, and observe a prediction on 
marginal earnings for each level of education. The predictive margins were computed for fixed values of 
covariates such as occupation, rural or urban area of residence, gender, marital status, and a head of 
household dummy. In line with previous findings, therefore, these correlations indicate a positive 
correlation between education and incomes in the specific context of Thailand. 
In addition, age and income are positively correlated (Figure 3.2). At this stage, we observe a prediction 
on marginal earnings for age of individuals. This reveals that working experience could be one of the 
main factors contributing to the income of the individuals: the older the individuals, the higher the income 
obtained controlling for observable variables such as occupation, area of residence, gender etc. 
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Figure 3.1: The Predictive Marginal Returns to Different Level of Education 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Income Life-Cycle of the Individuals from the Repeated Cross-sectional Data of Labour Force 
Survey (2006 to 2015) 
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3.2 Model Identification  
This section gives the model identification strategies respecting two educational reforms in Thailand. The 
compulsory schooling laws were implemented to increase the years of schooling of the pupils. The 
eligibility criterion for being affected by these policies is the date of birth of the individuals. First, the 6-
year compulsory schooling law was imposed in 1978 to compel the pupils to complete at least the 
Primary education (6th grade). Second, the enactment of 9-year compulsory schooling law in 2000 
attempted to increase the minimum level of education of the pupils from completing Primary education 
(6th grade) to the Lower-secondary education (9th grade). The eligibility criterion for being affected by 
these policies is the date of birth of individuals. Significantly, the treatment and control groups in our 
dissertation are identified by the year of birth of the indiviuduals who born before and after the cutoff 
year of birth, respectively. 
Our identification exploits the proximity of birth of the treatment and control groups, which guarantees 
that these two groups will only differ in the extent to which they were differentially affected by the 
policy. The compulsory schooling law reforms are the main treatment that we use to estimate the 
outcome. Significantly, there was no other reform that would affect the choice of schooling of the 
individuals during the period covered by the compulsory reforms ( i.e. 1978 and 2000). This exogenous 
factor affecting education is hypothesised to have no direct impact on labour productivity and on the rate 
of return of education. More importantly, it is expected that the methodologies developed in this paper 
will apply to other developing countries. The identification strategies are examined in the section below. 
3.2.1 Description of the Treatment  
Our identification strategy exploits the reform in education by comparing treated (i.e. affected by the 
reform) to non-treated cohorts that are sufficiently close in age so as to be able to assume that the two 
population groups are statistically the same. In the year the compulsory schooling reforms were 
implemented, a student who was not affected by the policy will be included in the control group.  The 
cohorts that were affected by the reforms constitute the treatment group. 
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For confidentiality and ethical reasons, the exact date of birth of individuals could not be given by the 
National Statistical Office of Thailand (NSO).  We instead had to rely on the year of birth.  This paper 
therefore compares samples selected by year of birth criteria near the cutoff level.  Specifically, for both 
reforms (1978 & 2000), we sample the population born around the threshold year the reform came into 
application, defining the change in compulsory schooling years into a control group (population born 
around but before the threshold) and a treated group (population born around but after the threshold). The 
control and treatment groups for the 6-year compulsory schooling reform (i.e. 1978 reform) will be 
labeled as “Control6” and “Treatment6”, respectively. Similarly, for the 9-year compulsory schooling 
reform (i.e. 2000 reform) we label the groups “Control9” and “Treatment9”, respectively. 
3.2.2 6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Figure 3.3: Description of the Treatment6 Group 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented (1978) 
 
The 6-year compulsory schooling reform came into effect on 16th  May 1978.  Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
cohorts that were studying at each level in the 1978 academic year.  The cutoff date of the age 
calculations is that the pupils must be between 7 to 8 years old by 31st December 1978.  Therefore, 
individuals in each cohort may have two possible years of birth. For example, pupils born between the 
31st December 1970 to 31st  December 1971 were the youngest cohorts in the primary education system, 
the first grade, in the 1978 school year. The oldest cohorts were the pupils who were in the 4th  grade in 
1978, hence born after 1967. Therefore, the first pupils to be affected by the reform are the ones who 
were in the 4th grade in May 1978, namely pupils born between 1967 and 1968. Pupils born in 1967 were 
either in the 5th grade or had already dropped out of school. The 6-year compulsory schooling did not 
apply to the latter cohorts. Because of the limitation on date of birth information explained above, we are 
unable to categorize individuals born in 1967 as being either subjected to the schooling reform or not. 
Given the data availability constraints, we opt for a second best solution of comparing individuals born in 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (1978)
(7-8 year-old)
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th    
6-year Compulsory Education 
1971-1970    1970-1969    1969-1968    1968-1967    1967-1966    1966-1965    1965-1964    1964-1963    and    Older
Treatment6: Born after 1967
(6-7 year-old)
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (2000)
1994-1993    1993-1992    1992-1991    1991-1990    1990-1989    1989-1988    1988-1987    1987-1986    1986-1985   and    Older
Treatment9: Born after 1988
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th           9th                      
4-year Compulsory Education 
9-year Compulsory Education 6-year Compulsory Education 
Grade
Year of Birth
Grade
Year of Birth
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1966 (Control6) to individuals born in 1968 (Treatment6). Accordingly, the first cohorts that were 
subject to the 6-year compulsory schooling law were pupils who were studying in the 4th grade and 
younger.  Therefore, we included in the Control6 group individuals born in or before 1966, and in the 
Treatment6 group individuals born in or after 1968 (Figure 3.3).   
According to the pooled repeated cross sections of the NLFS (2006-2015), Table 3.1 (Coumn 5 and 6) 
and Table 3.2 review the characteristics of the 6-year compulsory schooling groups.  The data contains 
126,359 and 131,615 observations born in the 1966 and 1968, respectively. After dropping some missing 
values9, there are 48,933 and 53,394 observations left for the Control6 and Treatment6 groups, 
respectively. The Control6 and Treatment6 groups were 38 to 49 year-old from 2006 to 2015. Both 
groups have an average of 9 years of schooling. However, the average monthly wages of the Treatment6 
group was lower (not statistically significant) than the Control6 group. The ratio of males to females is 
about 50:50.  Both Treatment6 and Control6 individuals were more likely to be married (78%, 95% CI 
[0.776 - 0.783]). These individuals are more likely to live in urban areas (64 percent) earning relatively 
higher incomes than those living in the rural areas. Moreover, the married individuals’ earnings are 
slightly higher than unmarried ones’. The head of household is found to earn more than other members of 
the family. Additionally, approximately 50 percent of the Control6 and Treatment6 are head of 
household. The average income of skilled-labour is significantly higher than the average income of 
unskilled-labour. However, the majority of Treatment6 and Control6 are unskilled-labour.  
Income is found to increase with the level of education at an increasing rate. Overall, the majority of both 
Control6 and Treatment6 have completed at least the minimum level required by the 6-year compulsory 
schooling reform. A higher percentage of the Treatment6 group individuals (88%) completed at least 
Primary education10 as compared to the Control6 group (81%).  Educational attainment of the Treatment6 
group is as follows: 24 percent, have only Primary education followed by the Lower-secondary (19%), 
Upper-secondary (14%), and Bachelor’s degree (13%) (Column 4 and 6 in Table 3.2). Figure 3.4 
illustrates the proportion of Control6 and Treatment6 individuals completing each level of education. 
                                                            
 
9 The drop in the sample size is mainly due to missing values regarding the monthly income of the individuals.  
10 This is the minimum requirement level of education imposed by the 6-year compulsory schooling law 
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Figure 3.4: The Educational Achievement of the Control6 and Treatment6 Groups 
 
 
Looking at the linear predictive margin on monthly wages between the Control6 group versus 
Treatment6 group (aged 38 to 49), the former seems to receive a slightly higher wage than the latter for 
the same level of education (Figure 3.5). However, the difference on income between these groups is not 
significant. The Control6 individuals are likely to have more working experience than the Treatment6 
ones since the year of birth of the former is two years higher than the latter. We conclude that there is no 
correlation between being eligible for the compulsory schooling law and the income received. The 
Treatment6 group would receive a relatively higher income compared to the Control6 group if there was 
a correlation between the instrument and monthly wages.  
The age earning profile of the sample considered for the 6-year compulsory schooling reform is shown in 
Figure 3.6, where we distinguish individual earnings according to their treatment. Overall, the income of 
both the Control6 and Treatment6 individuals increases with age, which in turn imposes us to compare 
same-age individuals for the exclusion restriction not to be violated. When compared at the same age, the 
Treatment6 group obtained a relatively higher income (statistically significantly) than the Control6 group 
for all age categories spanning for 38 to 49 years-old. 
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Figure 3.5: The Predictive Marginal Returns to Different Level of Education of Control6 VS Treatment6 
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Figure 3.6: Income Life Cycle of Control6 and Treatment6 
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3.2.3 9-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Figure 3.7: Description of the Treatment9 Group 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented (2000) 
 
The 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was imposed on the 14th August 1999 following the National 
Education Act. Therefore, the first academic year when the policy came into practice and compulsory 
schooling was extended from 6 to 9 years was the school year 2000.  The pupils affected by the law are 
compelled to complete at least the 9th grade/ Lower-secondary level of education.  Pupils who were 
studying in the 6th grade in the year the reform came into practice (i.e. 2000) were individuals who were 
born around 1988 and 1989 (Figure 3.7).  Individuals born before 1988 had either already passed the 7th 
grade, or had left school by the time of the reform. In other words, the policy cannot compel that cohort to 
either continue studying or come back and complete the 9th grade. Since our database only contains the 
year of birth rather than the precise date of birth (where the cutoff date is the 16th of May 1988), an 
individual born early that specific year will typically be in a higher level of education than an individual 
born late the same year.  By extension, and since we do not know the precise date of birth of individuals, 
we are unable to determine which individuals born in 1988 are actually affected by the reform, and 
therefore need to adjust our identification strategy accordingly. Therefore, in line with the 6-years 
compulsory schooling classification into Control6 and Treatment6, we included in the Control9 group 
individuals born in or before 1987, and in the Treatment9 individuals born in or after 1989 (Figure 3.7).  
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.4 show the mean income and the number of individuals 
considered in connection with the 9-year compulsory schooling reform.  According to the pooled repeated 
cross sections of the NLFS (2006-2015), the data contains 82,969 and 86,861 observations born in the 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (1978)
(7-8 year-old)
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th    
6-year Compulsory Education 
1971-1970    1970-1969    1969-1968    1968-1967    1967-1966    1966-1965    1965-1964    1964-1963    and    Older
Treatment6: Born after 1967
(6-7 year-old)
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (2000)
1994-1993    1993-1992    1992-1991    1991-1990    1990-1989    1989-1988    1988-1987    1987-1986    1986-1985   and    Older
Treatment9: Born after 1988
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th           9th                      
4-year Compulsory Education 
9-year Compulsory Education 6-year Compulsory Education 
Grade
Year of Birth
Grade
Year of Birth
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1987 and 1989, respectively. The remaining observations for the Control9 and Treatment9 groups are 
respectively 38,094 and 29,830 individuals when the missing values are dropped11. The Control9 and 
Treatment9 groups were 17 to 28 years old in 2006 to 2015.  There is an equal proportion by gender, and 
females earn slightly more than males in both groups. Living in an urban area yields a higher income for 
both groups than living in the rural areas.  The Treatment9 and Control9 who are married earn less than 
those who are not. Even though the head of household earns a significantly higher income than other 
members of the family, they represent only 18 percent (95% CI [0.182 - 0.189]) and 15 percent (95% CI 
[0.149 - 0.157]) of Control9 and Treatment9, respectively. This set of individuals might be too young to 
become the head of household as on average they were 22 to 24 year-old. More individuals tend to work 
as unskilled rather than skilled labour even though the income for the latter is much higher than the 
former.  
The descriptive statistics of the Control9 and Treatment9 are presented in Column 9 and 10 in Table 3.1 
and Table 3.4.  The majority of the Treatment9 (82%) and Control9 (83%) groups individuals completed 
at least Lower-secondary education12 (Column 4 and 6 in Table 3.4).  Income increases with the level of 
education at an increasing rate. Figure 3.8 illustrates the proportion of the individuals at each level of 
education achievement.  The proportion of the Control9 individuals is higher than the Treatment9 ones 
for each level of educational achievement. However, the Treatment9 individuals are 2 years younger than 
the Control9 ones.  Therefore, the Treatment9 might still be in the educational system while the Control9 
could have left the educational system. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
11 Here again, although we have information regarding the occupation of individuals, their montly income were found 
to be missing in the survey.  
12 The minimum requirement level of education of the 9-year compulsory schooling law. 
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Figure 3.8: The Educational Achievement of the Control9 and Treatment9 groups 
 
Taking the predictive margin of income and education of the Control9 and Treatment9 (aged 17 to 29), 
there is no statistically significant difference in income between these two groups (Figure 3.9). Therefore, 
there is no correlation between being eligible for the 9-year compulsory schooling reform and income. 
More importantly, the income of Control9 and Treatment9 individuals decreases with age (17 to 28 year-
old). In addition, the Control9 group earns a relatively higher income (statistically significant) than the 
Treatment9 (Upper graph in Figure 3.10). This is probably due to an omitted variable bias according to 
the downward sloping of age-earning profile of these cohorts, as discussed in Angrist and Krueger 
(1991). Counterintuitively, the older individuals, the lower income receieved. This might be because of 
the unobservable characterristic on the individuals’ employment contracts (i.e. full-time or part-time). 
The older individuals could have a part-time job while they were studying, and earn less than those who 
are younger who were working as a full-time employment.  
Bearing in mind that the youngest individuals affected by the reform had just completed high school, a 
fringe of the Treatment9 individuals were probably still in the education system at the University or 
college (aged 18) or had just graduated (aged 22).  On the other hand, the Control9 individuals may have 
dropped out of school prior to the Treatment9 individuals. In other words, the Treatment9 may continue 
their studies after completing the Lower-secondary education, as compelled by the law, while the 
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probability of continue studying to high school or higher for Control9 individuals is smaller than for 
Treatment9 individuals. To overcome the income life-cycle bias, we focus exclusively on the age-
category that contains both groups (19 to 26 year-old) instead of pooled repeated cross-sectional data (17 
to 28 years-old). We found the income of the Treatment9 individuals increased more than the income of 
the Control9 individuals, and to be statistically significant (Lower graph in Figure 3.10). 
 
Figure 3.9:  The Predictive Marginal Returns to Different Levels of Education of Control9 VS Treatment9 
Groups (aged 17-29) 
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Figure 3.10: Income life cycle of Control9 and Treatment9 Groups 
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In this section, we found that there is a significant difference in incomes between the Control and 
Treatment groups when we compare the monthly income when those individuals were the same age (but 
born in different years). Significantly, we found the Treatment group individuals earn more than the 
Control group ones (with P-Value of 0.000 to 0.002), for both compulsory schooling reforms. However, 
there is no significant difference in income between these groups when we do not compare same age 
individuals. More importantly, we found no correlation between the treatment dummy and the observable 
characteristics (Appendix 2). The correlation between the treatment dummy and age becomes more 
significant when we narrow down the age-groups (Lower graph in Figure 3.6 and 3.10). This is likely to 
be because there is a correlation between earnings and age-earning profiles within pooled repeated cross-
sectional data (Angrist and Krueger, 1991, pp. 997-1002). In addition, using a quarter (of the year) of 
birth as the instrument yielded the same returns to schooling.  We can primarily conclude that the 
compulsory schooling reforms correlate with the education attainment, thereby enabling treated 
individuals to earn a relatively higher income than those who are not. In other words, individuals who are 
covered by the law should have a higher number of years of schooling than those who are not. This 
statement is confirmed in the following section from the first-stage IV regression. 
3.3 Methodology 
We now present the baseline equation employed to estimate the returns to education in terms of income 
and income inequality. We aim to estimate the correlations and causal impact of education on both the 
mean income and the income distribution. The importance of the heterogeneity and endogeneity biases, 
which are likely to contaminate standard OLS regressions, is the main focus of this project.  Accordingly, 
we employ techniques that are able to address these concerns. We first estimate a conventional linear 
regression model that will serve as a benchmark. To overcome endogeneity concerns we adopt an 
instrumental variable approach and a difference-in-differences method.  In addition to the selection bias 
issues, we also tackle the heterogeneity concerns of the returns to education. To that end, the correlation 
between education and income distribution is examined using ordinary quantile regression.   
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3.3.1 Ordinary Linear Regression Analysis  
Repeated Cross-sectional Data Methods 
A cross-section analysis would allow us to exploit all the observable characteristics in explaining the 
level of education and income of the studied populations. The time-invariant and time-varying observable 
variables include gender, marital status, and information on the head of household, including type of 
occupation (i.e. skilled or unskilled-labour). Our information on the level of education of individuals 
consists in identifying the highest level of education attained by each individual from pre-primary school 
to the doctorate. For data availability reasons, we could not use a continuous scale for the number of years 
of schooling of individuals, but instead had to use the following categories according to the highest level 
of education obtained as: 0, 3, 9, 12, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 24 years of schooling.  The proposed methods are 
constructed around the returns to education, which will mainly be measured by the log of nominal 
monthly income.  
According to Mincer (1974), the monthly income of an individual i depends on the number of years of 
education, on age and on work experience. We augment Mincer's earnings equation by controlling for 
observable characteristics (see equation 1.1). However, the error term may still be correlated with 
explanatory variables because of omitted unobservable characteristics such as ability, quality of 
education, work experience and family background.  Therefore, because of endogeneity concerns, the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is likely to be biased (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Card, 
1999). 
The Augmented Mincer’s Earning Equation: Linear regression 
!"#$_!!"# = !! + !!!"#$$%&'(!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"#!"! + !! + !! + !!"#         (1.1)  
As a first step, consider the linear regression (1.1) where wage is being regressed on the variable of 
interest, !"#$$%&'(!" alongside with a series of control variables that include geographic (province) 
fixed effects, as well as aggregate time fixed effects, !!. The control variables in our estimation are age, 
age squared, gender, area of residence, marital status and head of household status.  Including age and age 
squared allows us to control for incomes rising with age. The age and age-squared are used as proxies of 
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work experience as in the studies of Card (1993), Warunsiri and Mcnown (2010) and Harmon and Walker 
(1995) and taking the square of age allows our specification to capture potential non-linear effects on 
incomes. 
Secondly, the dummy variable male controls for the gender gap in incomes which has been show to 
matter by Psacharopoulos (1994). To capture different consumption prices, expenditures and living 
standards across urban and rural areas (Kakwani, 1996; Kakwani, 1993; Lipton & Ravallion, 1995, p. 
2567), we include a third dummy variable, !"#!!, capturing the area of residence (urban/rural).  This 
variable eliminates the differences in incomes that may arise from various area-specific activities i.e. 
agricultural activities.  This also allows us to control for economic activity that is highly concentrated in 
urban areas.  Fourthly, marital status, !"##$%&!, might correlate to earnings since being married could 
affect working time and/or productivity. Fifthly, a dummy capturing the head of household 
status, !"#$%&'(!, is included in order to control for personal motivation: heads of household may have a 
higher incentive to work harder.  
The tenure and industry sector of occupations are excluded from the covariates in some studies since 
those are potentially endogenous and determined by education itself (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
However, the inclusion of skilled labour removes other capacity/opportunity related biases from the 
estimation, hence removing heterogeneities in abilities across individuals from our regression.  Technical 
abilities or skills could be different between the skilled and unskilled-labour, reflecting for instance 
different cognitive abilities. The time dummy, !!, allows us to control for changes in the macroeconomic 
context such as inflation and productivity (Boockmann and Steiner, 2006; Wooldridge, 2008).  This 
eliminates from the study nation-wide changes influencing incomes that may have occurred over the 
2006-2015 decade.  Furthermore, the time fixed effects allow us to capture the change in minimum wages 
policy which occurred in 2012 and led to an increase in the minimal wage from 215 THB (4.3 GBP or 6.7 
USD) to 300 THB (6 GBP or 9.4 USD)13 per day (Labour Protection Act 1998 No.3).  
To reduce the omitted variables problem, since the data contains information on the region and province 
                                                            
 
13  Currency rate on average in 2012: 1 US dollar = 32 THB and 1 GBP = 50.48 THB provided by 
http://www.xe.com/company/ 
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of residence of each interviewed individual, we introduce geographic (i.e. province- subscription p) fixed 
effects, thereby designing an identification strategy capturing time-invariant unobserved characteristics. 
The unobservable characteristics that change over time, !!"#, might serially correlate to the outcome 
variable (Wooldridge, 2008). The inclusion of the unobserved time-invariant variable, !!, captures the 
region-specific heterogeneity, thus, allowing this to be correlated arbitrarily with !!"#. 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression (1.1) aims at estimating the correlation between an 
extra year of schooling and the mean income of individuals.  We use pooled repeated cross-sectional data 
of individuals aged 15 to 60 to estimate the relationship with province fixed-effects. In Chapter 4 we 
improve our identification strategy by considering random effects and fixed effects. Given the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity biases that are likely to be present in our study we later implement a 
quantile regression, as well as an instrumental variable approach, both of which are presented in the 
following section.  
Dealing with the endogeneity of the returns to education 
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable Methods 
Theoretical Framework 
Figure 3.11: Instrumental Variable Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
  
 
75 
Figure 3.14 presents a general identification with an IV where the exogenous variable Z is included in the 
estimation of the dependent variable Y via the observable variable X (Baum, 2006; Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009; Hill, Griffiths, and Lim, 2011; Wooldridge, 2008). The observable exogenous variable, Z, is 
employed in order to estimate the impact of the explanatory variable, X, on the outcome variable, Y.  The 
instrument is assumed to be orthogonal to the error terms and to the outcome variable, Y.  Additionally, Z 
is assumed to have a direct correlation with X.  To instrument the endogenous level of education, in this 
study we exploit the 1978 and 2000 compulsory schooling reforms that differentially impact the number 
of schooling years of pupils depending on their date of birth.  
In this section, we explain and justify the methodology for the estimation of the effects of the two 
schooling reforms on incomes and on income inequality using an IV approach. Firstly, a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) model with Province fixed-effects estimates the effect of education on income using data 
from the National Labour Force Survey (2006 – 2015).  Secondly, the IV approach is extended to the 
quantile regression to further explore differential effects across income categories. The Instrumental 
Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) is applied to estimate the effect of the return to education on 
income distribution using the same sample. We adopt an IV approach to overcome endogeneity concerns 
when investigating the causal link of education on income and income distribution (Figure 3.14).  The 
effects of extending the number of years of compulsory education on the actual number of years of 
schooling will then be used as an instrument (Z) for income and income distribution (Y): this policy 
shock directly affected education, which itself impacts the individuals’ years of schooling (X).  However, 
this exogenous shock has had no direct impact on the outcome variable. 
The compulsory schooling variable is denoted by COMPY where Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory 
schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling).  Notice that we can credibly claim that the exclusion 
restriction is satisfied since the change in policy was unexpected and affected the entire population in an 
indiscriminate way. This exogenous variation in education is then used to estimate the changes in income 
and income distribution. Additionally, the instrument selected is continuous and does not correlate with 
individual-specific characteristics. The eligibility criterion for being subject to these compulsory 
schooling laws is the age of birth. We therefore exploit the differences in the impact of education on 
incomes of Control6 and Treatment6 individuals for the 6-year compulsory schooling law, and of 
Control9 and Treatment9 individuals for the 9-year compulsory schooling law. The expected values of 
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the years of schooling are estimated with the above-described instruments, and are then used in the 
second stage in order to estimate the impact on individuals’ income and income distribution. Therefore, 
the estimation of the causal impact of education on income and its distribution is explored. The validity of 
the instrument is first examined in the next section, followed by a discussion of the effect of education on 
both income and income inequality. 
The Validity of the Instruments 
For our IV estimation that exploits the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, we concentrate on 
individuals born in 1966 (Control6, not affected by the reform) and 1968 (Treatment6, affected). The 
Control6 VS Treatment6 individuals were 38 to 49 years old over the 2006-2015 period we consider. 
Second, the 9-year compulsory schooling reform is estimated by comparing Control9 (born in 1987) to 
Treatment9 (born in 1989) individuals. We independently estimate the returns to education of the 6-year 
and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms. Given the data availability, the effect of the former reform will 
be evaluated on the middle age group, 38-49 years old, while the effect of the latter will be evaluated for 
individuals having recently graduated (17-28 year-old). By comparing treated and non-treated individuals 
who are born close to each other, we can hypothesise that any within-individuals differences such as 
ability are eliminated. Moreover, we include in our regression province fixed-effects and time fixed-
effects By clustering standard errors at the region level, !!, we capture the region-specific heterogeneity. 
Therefore, time- and geographical- effects are captured in the estimations of income and income 
inequality.  
In this study, the Control groups are expected to obtain fewer years of schooling than the Treatment 
groups. We first test whether those in the Treatment group obtain relatively more years of schooling than 
the Control groups by estimating the pooled repeated cross-sectional linear regression of a dummy 
variable, on years of schooling (see equation 1.2). The control variables included are gender, age 
dummies and age-square, regional dummy variables (urban vs rural), head of household, marital status 
and skilled-labour.  
The First Stage IV regression  
!"#$$%&'(!"# =   !! + !!!"#!"!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"#!! + !! + !! + !!"#   (1.2) 
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There is a correlation between year of birth and years of schooling since the compulsory schooling laws 
require pupils to attend school until they reach the level of education criteria. Angrist and Krueger (1991), 
and Harmon and Walker (1999) confirmed that individuals who are subjected to such reforms obtain a 
higher level of education than those who have a choice in dropping out of school. 
3.3.3 Instrumental Variable Regression (IV) 
Education and Income Effects 
As explained earlier, the pooled repeated cross-sectional linear regression (equation 1.1) cannot be relied 
upon to draw causal links because of individual heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns.  The 
unobservable variables such as ability, motivation and family background might correlate with the 
explanatory variables, thus biasing the OLS estimates. To overcome these limitations we proceed to an IV 
estimation, while controlling for province fixed effects alongside a series of observable characteristics.  
We therefore estimate Equation (1.3), where schooling is instrumented following Equation (1.2).  
First-stage regression  
!"#$$%&'(!"# =   !! + !!!"#$%!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"#!! + !! + !! + !!"#    (1.2) 
Second stage: The Instrumental Variable Regression (IV) 
!"#$_!!"# = !! + !!!"#$$%&'(!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"#!"! + !! + !! + !!"# (1.3) 
The second stage equation of our 2SLS (equation 1.3) captures the returns to schooling where the 
education variable is the predicted value of the years of schooling, !"#$$%&'(!"instead of the actual 
value of the years of schooling in (1.1). The predicted values are estimated with the help of the First-stage 
regression (equation 1.2). The number of years of schooling are associated with the instrument, !"#$%!, 
where Y takes the value of 6 or 9 reflecting 6-year compulsory schooling and 9-year compulsory 
schooling reforms, respectively. The instrument takes the value of 1 if individuals are Treated and 0 if 
Non-treated. Significantly, unobservable time-varying variables are not correlated to the instrument 
(!"#$%!). One potential concern is that the error term in (1.3), !!"#, may be correlated with individual 
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work experience because of the age structure of the treated versus control groups.  Indeed, given the two 
year gap separating the two groups of individuals, in any year t the control group should ceteris paribus 
have more work experience than the treated individuals, and should then be expected to earn a higher 
income for the same level of education.  The working experiences of those individuals may have a major 
impact on incomes, and could thus mitigate the effect of education.  The true causal effect of income on 
education may not therefore be fully measured.  For this reason, the populations of interest are compared 
when they are the same age.  For example, Treatment6 in 2015 was considered alongside Control6 in 
2013 in order to discount for the two-years’ differential working experiences of the different age groups.  
Therefore, we re-estimate our IV specification when the treated and control groups are the same age. 
3.3.4 Difference-in-Differences Approach (DD) 
The Difference-in-Differences method has been widely used in evaluating the effect of exposure to 
policies (Ashenfelter, 2001; Cerulli, 2015; Falch, 2011; Hastings, 2004; LaLonde, 1986; Mendola and 
Simtowe, 2015). The methodology consists in analysing the average outcome between the control and 
treatment groups before and after an exogenous shock randomly affects part of the population. In other 
words, the object of interest is a comparison of the two outcomes for the same unit when subjected and 
when not subjected to the treatment.  The initial step consists in analysing the difference between pre-
policy and post-policy outcomes and the post-policy outcomes for each group, i.e. the treated and the 
non-treated (Cerulli, 2015, Chapter 3; Gertler et.al., 2016, Chapter 7).  In this section, we explore the 
reduced-form effect of the compulsory schooling reforms on income and income inequality for Thai 
citizens, with a quasi-experimental design.  
By applying a difference-in-differences approach, we shield the analysis from potential unobservable 
characteristics that might be correlated with the omitted variable.  An experimental method such as an IV 
method may create an upward bias, an omitted variables bias, or other endogeneity biases like, for 
instance, the endogeneity of political decisions to socio-economic factors (Meyer, 1995). In other words, 
there could be other policy changes occurring between the pre- and post- interventions that affect 
individuals’ income, or parents’ choice of schooling. In addition, there could also be other exogenous 
effects on the choice of schooling. For instance, the investment in schooling could depend on the 
individual’s rational expectations regarding their future income, which in turn may be related to the 
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access to capital and to the individuals’ imperfect knowledge (Becker, 2009).  The other drawback of 
implementing an IV is that the results focus exclusively on post policy evaluations.  On the other hand, 
the DD approach takes baseline outcomes into account and allows us to evaluate the effect of the policy 
net of the trend on the outcome variable (Meyer, 1995). We focus on the growth in individuals’ wages for 
a specific age range.  
For the Difference-in-Differences approach we require either longitudinal data or repeated cross section 
data for its estimation, since the pool of individuals subjected to the treatment must be homogeneous 
along all relevant dimensions (Cerulli, 2015; Gertler et al., 2016). Even though our control and treatment 
groups are not perfectly homogeneous, as they are born two years apart, we consider the year of birth 
difference to be small enough for individuals’ relevant characteristics to be considered identical.  The 
Compulsory Schooling Reforms were used as a discrete change in order to reduce the omitted variables 
bias problem in estimating the effects of the other factors that might have an effect on income rather than 
the policy changes.  
For the 6-year (9-year) Compulsory Schooling Reform, the age range of individuals that were affected by 
the reforms for which we have data is 38 to 49 years old (17 to 28 years-old). However, for the purpose of 
this study, we require control and treated individuals to be born as close as possible, thus compelling us 
to restrict the analysis to the 43 to 47 age group (22 to 26 years old). 
Identification Strategy  
This section will explain the selection of the treatment and control groups. To carry out the DD estimation 
we decompose our sample into four distinct groups, a Pre-control and a Post-control, a Pre-treatment 
and a Post-treatment group.  We borrow the cohorts from the Control and Treatment groups from the 
instrumental variable methods to construct and substitute to the Pre-treatment and Post-treatment groups 
for the DD estimation, respectively. The Pre-treatment group is therefore two years older than the Post-
treatment group. The pre- prefix refers to the period preceding the policy implementation, regrouping 
therefore individuals who have not received the treatment. The post- refers to the period following the 
policy implementation. Applying the same strategy as for the Treatment and Control groups, the Pre-
control group is selected from those who are two years older than the Post-control group.  To sum up, the 
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Post-treatment received the treatment solely according to eligibility for the treatment while the Pre-
treatment individuals were those who were close to being eligible but were nevertheless not eligible.  To 
construct the double differences, requires having comparison groups who have not received the treatment 
in order to eliminate the time-trend effects.  The comparison groups are, thus, selected from individuals 
who were born close to the Pre- and Post-treatment groups in order to capture the individuals’ 
heterogeneity.  The Post-control group are just one year older than the Pre-treatment cohort.  Therefore, 
the Pre-and Post-Control groups are cohorts who have not received the treatment and who are about five 
and three years older than the eligible cohorts, respectively.  
Thus, only the Post-treatment group is subject to the law modification. Significantly, there is permanent 
difference in individual-specific trends on the number years of schooling between the treatment and 
control cohorts that is their year of birth. In addition, the Control groups allow us to account for the trend 
that individuals would exhibit in the absence of the reform.  The normal differences of the treatment and 
control groups are observed.  The average gain in the control group is subtracted from the treatment 
group. The biases between the Post-treatment and Post-control are thus removed since there could be 
permanent differences between the control and treatment groups (Wooldridge, 2008).  Additionally, this 
could also eliminate the biases due to the comparison over time in the treatment group.  The distinction in 
the observation of interest is the year of birth that has been necessitated by the compulsory schooling 
reforms in 1978 and 2000, which had varying impacts on populations born in different years.  Moreover, 
the reform has been an exogenous shock and can thus be regarded as a random process when considering 
the identity of individuals being subjected to it.  
Given the timing of the reforms and the availability of data we cannot compare same-age individuals at 
the moment of the reform.  We constructed the 4 main groups of observations using their year of birth 
along with the rigor of the difference-in-differences method. 
Description of the Treatment  
This section examines the selection of the Pre-control and the Post-control, the Pre-treatment and the 
Post-treatment group using proximity by the year of birth of the individuals for both the 6- and 9-year 
compulsory schooling reforms. 
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6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Figure 3.12: Description of the Treatment Group: 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented (1978) 
 
Figure 3.15 shows the year of birth at different education levels in the year the 6-year compulsory 
schooling reform was first implemented.  The cutoff educational level was the 4th grade.  The 4th  grade 
pupils were the first generation that had to complete grade 6.  On the other hand, the 5th grade pupils were 
the last generation that was subjected to the 4-year compulsory schooling law.  As with the identification 
strategies in Section 3.2, those who were born before 1966 might have dropped out of school since they 
were only required to complete grade 4.  Some of the pupils, who were born in 1967 were covered by the 
6-year compulsory schooling law while others were covered by the 4-year compulsory schooling law.  
The cutoff year of birth thus is 1967, where the older cohort was non-treated and the younger were treated 
by the 6-year compulsory schooling law.  
The individuals who were born in 1968 are assigned to the Post-treatment6 group.  On the other hand, 
the individuals who were born in 1966 are assigned to the Pre-treatment6 group. Again, the Pre-
treatment6 and Post-treatment6 were born close to each other, and are thus assumed to have the same 
individual characteristics for both observable and unobservable characteristics in order to eliminate 
individual heterogeneity. Similarly, the Control group for the 6-year compulsory schooling (Control6) 
are initiated just a year older than the Treatment6 above.  We defined as Pre-control6 and Post-control6 
individuals born in 1963 and 1965, respectively (Figure 3.15).  These Control groups (Pre-control6 and 
Post-control6) were in the 7th  and 8th grade in the same academic year (i.e. 1978) to the Treatment 
groups (Pre-treatment6 and Post-treatment6).  According to the NLFS (2006 to 2015), these 4 cohorts 
were between 38 to 52 years old whereas the individuals in the age groups that include these 4 cohorts 
were aged of 43 to 47 year old.  For example, the Pre-control6, Post-control6, Pre-treatment6 and Post-
treatment6 are ranging from 43, the same youngest age of the cohorts (Pre-control6, in 2006, Post-
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control6, in 2008, Pre-treatment6, in 2009 and Post-treatment6, in 2011) to 47 years old.   
According to the descriptive statistics in Table 3.1, the data contains 22,218 individuals in the Post-
treatment6 group. This group is the only cohort that was subject to the 6-year compulsory schooling 
reform, compelling them to reach the 6th grade. On the other hand, the Pre-treatment6 (24,698 
individuals), Pre-control6 (25,536 individuals) and Post-control6 (25,871 individuals) were only 
required to complete the 4th grade of the primary education level.  The average years of schooling of the 
Pre/Post-Treatment6 are more than 12 years which is higher than the Pre/Post-Control6, 11.9 years, 
95% CI[11.882-12]. Under the 4-year compulsory schooling law, the percentages of the Pre-treatment6, 
Pre-control6, and Post-control6 that have completed at least the Primary education are approximately 
81%, 75% and 73%, respectively (Column 4 and 6 in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). On the other hand, we 
found approximately 88% of the Post-Treatment6 (only cohort being covered by the 6-year compulsory 
schooling law) to have completed at least Primary education.  
Significantly, it can be clearly seen that the Post-treatment6 cohort achieves higher levels of Lower-
Secondary education and Doctorate degree (Figure 3.16). Moreover, the number of the Post-treatment6 
graduates do not dramatically drop between the Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees compared with other 
groups. On the other hand, the proportion of the other groups pursuing studies beyond the Bachelor’s 
degree declines sharply. These evidences imply that the individuals in the Post-treatment6 cohort tend to 
choose graduating from the higher level of education instead of stopping at the Bachelor’s degree (or any 
lower level of education) compared to the other cohorts. 
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Figure 3.13: The Educational Achievement by Cohort 
 
 
9-year Compulsory Schooling  
Figure 3.14: Description of the Treatment Group: 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented (2000) 
 
The observation of interest for evaluating the 9-year compulsory schooling is constructed using the same 
strategies as the age structures above. The first cohort that is subjected to the 9-year compulsory 
schooling law are the individuals who were born in 1989.  This cohort is labeled as Post-treatment9. The 
individuals who were born just 2 years prior, in 1987, are labeled Pre-treatment9.  To find the pre- and 
post- policy control groups, we consider cohorts that have never been subject to this law and that were 
born close to the treatment cohorts.  The individuals who were born in 1984 and 1986 are therefore set as 
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Pre-control9 and Post-control9, respectively (Figure 3.17).  These 4 cohorts were between 17 to 31 years 
old according to the NLFS (2006 to 2015). We restricted the ages into the range that provides four 
cohorts, 22-26 years-old (Pre-control9 in 2006, Post-control9 in 2008, Pre-treatment9 in 2009 and Post-
treatment9 in 2011). The data contains observations as follows: Post-treatment9 (17,922) Pre-treatment9 
(23,090), Post-control9 (23,188) and Pre-control9 (24,736) (Table 3.1).  
Again, the 9-year compulsory schooling law required pupils who were born after 1988 to complete at 
least Lower-secondary level education. The average years of schooling for the Pre-Control9, Post-
control9, Pre-treatment9 and Post-treatment9 are 15 (95% CI [14.966-15.048]), 14.65 (95% CI [14.606    
14.696]), 14.3 (95% CI [14.334-14.428]),  and 13.78 (95% CI [13.73-13.834]) years, respectively in 2006 
to 2015 (Colunm 7 to 10 in Table 3.1). The majority of Pre-Control9, Post-control9, Pre-treatment9 and 
Post-treatment9 have completed at least the 9th grade over the period 2006-2015, with the respective 
percentage rates of completion being equal to 86%, 84%, 83%, and 82% (Column 4 and 6 in Table 3.4 
and Table 3.5). However, the Post-treatment9 is the group that exhibits the highest percentage of pupils 
to have completed a Master’s degree (Figure 3.18).  The number of Post-treatment9 pupils, especially for 
those who completed the Master’s degree, is lower compared to other groups.  One reason could be that 
individuals in this cohort were just 22 to 26 years-old at the time the data was collected, thus implying 
they may still be involved in their studies.  Additionally, this may imply that the Post-treatment9 tend to 
achieve the higher level of education than the other groups who have not received the treatment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
85 
Figure 3.15: Educational Achievement by Cohort 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
The comparison groups, the Pre-control6/9 and Post-control6/9, have been selected to control the general 
trend of earnings in the population over time in the absence of a policy change.  The Control groups and 
the Pre-treatment groups have never been affected by the policy reforms.  The difference-in-differences 
method is then used to evaluate the compulsory laws imposed in two main periods.  The dependent 
variable is the log of monthly income of individual d at time t under y-year compulsory schooling (!!"! ) as 
explained below. We equally control for province fixed effects and for robust standard errors. To adjust 
for the existence of any unexpected circumstances that may vary across 10 years, time fixed-effects are 
included. 
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!!"! = The log of monthly income of an individual d at time t under y-year compulsory schooling 
• Y (lnwa_m) : Log of monthly income of the individual i  
• t = 0  : Before the policy implemented  
• t = 1  : After the policy implemented  
• d = 0  : Control group 
• d = 1  : Treatment group 
• y = 6 or 9  : 6-year compulsory schooling and 9-year compulsory schooling  
Conditions on the difference-in-differences  
1. The 6-year compulsory schooling reform 
!!!!  (Post-treatment6) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1968 
!!"!  (Pre-treatment6) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1966 
!!"!  (Post-control6) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1965 
!!!!  (Pre-control6) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1963 
2. The 9-year compulsory schooling reform 
!!!!   (Post-treatment9) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1989 
!!"!  (Pre-treatment9) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1987 
!!"!  (Post-control9) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1986 
!!!!  (Pre-control9) = the log of monthly income of pupils who were born in 1984 
Even in the absence of a treatment, income grows with time: the older people become, the higher their 
income.  There is a positive correlation between education and income for the whole population over the 
period 2006 to 2015.  In accordance with the life-cycle hypothesis, incomes increase with age and start 
decreasing at the age of 60 (retirement).  Prior to the DD estimation, an assumption regarding the 
common-trend of income of the Pre-control6/9, Post-control6/9, Pre-treatment6/9 and Post-
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treatment6/9 groups is required (Cerulli, 2015, Chapter 3).  To test the common trend hypothesis, the 
correlation relationship between income and age, on the one hand, and income and education, on the 
other hand, is thus examined with regard to the 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms, 
respectively. 
Common trend for the 6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
The Post-treatment6 individuals were born in 1968, and were covered by the 6-year compulsory 
schooling law. However, the average income of this cohort is lower (not statistically significant) than the 
other groups (Column 3 and 5 in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). According to the marginal income of the 
individuals by age, this cohort, on the other hand, received the highest incomes compared with other 
cohorts that were covered by the 4-year compulsory schooling law (Figure 3.19). In addition, we found 
that income increases with age for all groups.  Significantly, there is a common trend in income with age 
for all groups.  Figure 3.20 illustrates the predictive margin of income by education.  As a result, the 
incomes of these 4 cohorts increase with the level of education with the same trend.  However, there is no 
significantly difference between these four cohorts regarding the average income received at all levels of 
education obtained.  
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Figure 3.16: Common Trend of Income on Age: the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
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Figure 3.17: Common Trend of Income on Education: the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
 
 
Common trend for the 9-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
The Post-treatment9 is the only cohort covered by the 9-year compulsory schooling law while the Pre-
control9, Post-control9, and Pre-treatment9 groups were covered by the 6-year compulsory schooling 
law.  According to the age earning profiles of these four groups, there is no significant trend in income 
over ages from 17 to 31 year-old (Upper graph in Figure 3.21). Significantly, the Post-treatment9 earns 
less than other cohorts (Column 3 and 5 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.5). This may imply that the greater the 
work experience, the higher the income received. Moreover, younger cohorts, especially the Post-
treatment9 group, may still be studying if aged below 26 years. Therefore, their income is relatively 
lower than the one of other cohorts who are not eligible. The latter cohorts, thus, benefit from entering 
earlier the job market, as they left school before the Post-treatment9 group. In addition, there is a positive 
correlation between income and education. More importantly, the income of the the Post-treatment9 were 
found significantly higher than other groups specifically when we look at the age-category that contains 
all four cohorts (Lower graph in Figure 3.21). In addition, the average earnings by level of education 
achievement of these four cohorts are not significantly different  (Figure 3.22). 
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Figure 3.18: Common Trend of Income on Age: the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
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Figure 3.19: Common Trend of Income on Education: the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
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(!!"!/!) and Post-treatment6/9 (!!!!/!) were estimated using the Difference-in-Differences method in order 
to find the causal impact of the compulsory schooling reforms on income and income distribution. The 
covariates of the model which generated the propensity score (Cerulli,2015, p219) are also included in the 
estimation because of the repeated cross section dataset estimated. There could be other individual-
specific trends (beside their year of birth) that might be different between the Treatment and Control 
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urban/rural area dummy, and occupation type dummy, i.e. whether their jobs were skilled or unskilled. 
These covariates are, thus, a source of omitted individual-specific trends between the treated and non-
treated groups. However, we do not control for the level of completed education of the observations. In 
other words, this estimation allows the highest level of education completed to be varying across the 
observation of interest in order to evaluate the impact of the educational reforms on the log of income.  
The returns to education on income are estimated with models (3.1) and (3.2).  
The returns to education on income distribution are also estimated with models (3.3) and (3.4).  We begin 
by estimating the normal difference (!!"!/! − !!!!/!) and (!!!!/! − !!"!/!).  The double differences, thus, 
gives true causal effects of the compulsory law reforms.  The causal impact is the average gain over time 
in the non-exposed (control) group that is subtracted from the gain over time of the exposed (treatment) 
group.  In other words, the normal differences represents the gain over time across otherwise similar 
cohorts. 
Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on Schooling 
In this section we estimate the impact of the compulsory schooling reforms on education by using the 
difference-in-differences method. For the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, individuals who were 
born in 1966 and 1968, respectively, are selected as the Control6 and Treatment6 groups (as in the 
estimation of the First and Second stages IV regression - see Section 3.3.3). Similarly, when we estimate 
the effect of the 9-year compulsory schooling reform on the years of schooling the Control9 and 
Treatment9 groups are those who were born in 1987 and 1989. The dependent variable, the years of 
schooling (!!"! ) of the individuals, is regressed on the set of cohort dummies and time indicators 
(including the set covariates of the model as in the previous section) in order to generate the propensity 
score. The time indicator (pre-/post- policy) in this estimation is indicated by selecting samples from 
particular years of the LFS14. The selection of the sample set  is a combination of the two surveys that are 
the furthest possible years apart. For example, LFS-2015 is combined with LFS-2006, LFS-2014 and 
LFS-2007.  
                                                            
 
14 LFS-2006 to LFS-2015 are provided by the NSO. 
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!!"! = The years of schooling of an individual d at time t under y-year compulsory schooling 
• S  : Years of schooling 
• t = 0  : The farthest available survey 
• t = 1  : The earliest available survey 
• d = 0  : Control group 
• d = 1  : Treatment group 
• y = 6 or 9  : 6-year compulsory schooling and 9-year compulsory schooling  
Conditions on the difference-in-differences  
1. The 6-year compulsory schooling reform 
!!!!  (Post-treatment6) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1968 in the earliest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2015) 
!!"!  (Pre-treatment6) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1968 in the farthest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2006) 
!!"!  (Post-control6) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1966 in the earliest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2015) 
!!!!  (Pre-control6) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1966 in the farthest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2006) 
2. The 9-year compulsory schooling reform 
!!!!   (Post-treatment9) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1989 in the earliest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2015) 
!!"!  (Pre-treatment9) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1989 in the farthest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2006) 
!!"!  (Post-control9) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1987 in the earliest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2015) 
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!!!!  (Pre-control9) = the years of schooling of pupils who were born in 1987 in the farthest 
available LFS (i.e LFS-2006) 
The normal difference of years of schooling between the Control and Treatment of the earliest available 
dataset (i.e. LFS-2015) and the latest (i.e. LFS-2006) are first estimated. Then, the double differences are 
estimated as in the following models.  
!!! = (!!!! − !!"! ) − (!!"! − !!!! )  (4.1)  6-year compulsory schooling reform   
!!! = (!!!! − !!"! ) − (!!"! − !!!! )  (4.2)  9-year compulsory schooling reform   
 
3.3.5 Quantile Regression (QR) 
The standard linear regression of the previous section allows to estimate the mean relationship between 
education and income (1.1). It is assumed that the personal characteristics, i.e. ability, motivation and 
family background, are identically distributed across the individuals. However, the correlation between 
these unobservable variables and the outcome variable may vary with individual characteristics, and thus 
across income groups (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). For the same level of education, the returns to 
education may prove different across individuals of different income groups because of individual 
heterogeneity, i.e. ability and family background, and the difference in marginal returns to education 
(Becker, 2009; Wooldridge, 2008). To correct for such biases, the returns to education at different points 
of a conditional distribution can be estimated using the conventional quantile regression method that deals 
with heterogeneity bias (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, Chapter 7; Wooldridge, 2008). Koenker and Bassett 
(1978) propose the quantile regression method in order to correct for individual heterogeneity biases. This 
estimation aims at solving the minimisation problem over the absolute least square where the dependent 
variable has a distribution function across the quantile sample that varies from zero to 1.  We thus re-
estimate Mincer’s earning function as specified in Equation 1.1, by considering the conditional quantile 
wage function.  The returns to education for different income quantiles are examined in Equation 2.1. 
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The Augmented Mincer’s Earning Equation: Quantile Regression 
!![!"#$_!!"#] = !!! + !!!!"#$%!" + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#!" + !!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#$%&'!!" + !! + !!"#                       (2.1)  
The !th conditional quantile of log of monthly wages, !![!"#$_!!"#], is a function of the highest level 
of education obtained by individual i in province p at time t.  The other control variables such as age, age-
squared, marital status, head of household and area of residence remain as in the previous estimation.  
The log of monthly income distribution, !![!"#$_!!"#], is ranked from 0 to 1 where subscript θ denotes 
the quantile index.  For example, the 0.50 quantile is the 50th percentile. Therefore, θ= 0.50 is the middle 
value that is given by a median regression (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).  Figure 3.11 illustrates the 
densities of populations by monthly income. The majority of the population earns less than 10,000 
THB/month. Figure 3.12 reviews the cumulative distribution function of the log of monthly wages on the 
fractions of the data (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, Chapter 7). The distribution of log of monthly income 
appears to be reasonably symmetric, at least for 0.05 < Q < 0.95. In other words, the values represented 
below Q = 0.05 (above Q=0.95) are disproportionately smaller (larger) than the rest of the distribution of 
income.  
Our quantile decomposition accounts for this symmetricity in the income distribution between the 5th and 
the 95th percentile. The first (last) quantile in our estimation is obtained by setting Q = 0.05 (0.95), which 
means the first 5 percent ( the last 95 percent) of individuals who receive the lowest (highest) monthly 
incomes constitute our “first quantile”, instead of setting the poorest to be the first 20th (100th) percentile. 
The log of monthly wages and average monthly income at the 1st, 5th, 25th , 50th , 75th, 90th, 95th and 99th 
percentiles are provided in Table 3.6. The individuals at the 10th and 25th  percentiles depict slightly 
different values of log of monthly wages and average monthly income as well as those at the  90th and 
95th percentiles. Therefore, we split individuals into 5 interested income groups as follows: the poorest 
(Q= 0.05), the poor (Q=0.25), the middle (Q=0.50), the rich (Q=0.75) and the richest (Q=0.95). The log 
of monthly wages (average monthly income) for these income groups are approximately 7.9, 95% CI 
[7.934-7.938] (2,500 THB), 8.6, 95% CI [8.565-8.566] (4,966 THB), 8.9, 95% CI [8.895-8.896] (7,020 
THB), 9.3, 95% CI [9.293-9.294] (12,000 THB), and 10.2, 95% CI [10.179-10.182] (30,900 THB), 
respectively. 
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Table 3.7 presents the poverty line and the average monthly income of the individuals in different 
quantile groups. The minimum monthly wages required for being non-poor were found to be close to the 
first 5th centile every year. Therefore, measuring the poorest income group as the first 5th income centile 
will allow us to capture the incidence of poverty in Thailand. Table 3.7 presents the descritptive statistics 
by income groups. The observations provided by the NLFS (2006-2015) contain 360,180, 446,509, 
328,502, 419,841 and 332,146 individuals per income group, respectively. The average income for these 
income groups are 3,035 THB, 95% CI [3031.587-3037.959] (89 USD or 61 GBP), 5,275 THB, 95% CI 
[5273.736-5276.906] (155 USD or 105.5 GBP), 7,322 THB, 95% CI [7319.796-7323.731] (215 USD or 
146 GBP) ,11,071 THB, 95% CI [11064.07-11077.34] (326 USD or 221 GBP), and 29,267 THB, 95% CI 
[29178.89-29354.63] (861 USD or 585 GBP). The average income of every income group is increasing 
every year (Figure 3.13). Importantly, the average income of each quanitle group was found to be 
significantly different across groups. For example, the average income of the poorest group Q(0.05) was 
below 5,000 THB while the income for the poor Q(0.25) is about 5,000 THB per month. For the middle 
Q(0.50) and the rich Q(0.75), the average monthly income were found to be below and above 10,000 
THB, respectively. The richest income group Q(0.95) received the average income of approximately 
30,000 THB, which is over twice the size than the rich income group. 
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Figure 3.20: The Density of the Populations and Income Distribution of the Individuals (15-60 year-old) 
 
Figure 3.21: The Cumulative Distribution Function of the Log of Monthly Wages the Individuals (15-60 year-
old)  
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Figure 3.22: The Avergae Monthly Income by Quantile Groups from 2006 to 2015 
 
 
According to the descriptive statistics in Table 3.8, the average years of schooling is increasing with 
quantile groups. However, the average years of schooling of the poorest Q(0.05) to the middle Q(0.50) 
are approximately at 8 to 9 years of schooling (i.e. completed the Lower-seondary education). The 
average years of schooling of the rich Q(0.75) and the richest Q(0.95) are 9.36 and 10.26 years, 
respectively. The individuals are more likely to live in the urban area than the rural area except for the 
poorest income group, with 48 percent of the poorest living in the urban area. All income groups tend to 
be married with an average figure of 65 percent of married individuals.  
We also include robust standard errors in our estimation to ensure that the error term,  !!"# , is 
independently and identically distributed (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). The quantile index, !, identifies 
individual ability. In line with the literature we hypothesise that a higher quantile index captures higher 
ability of individuals (Arias et al., 2001; Becker, 2009; Mwabu and Schultz, 1996). Ability can affect 
income directly, but also indirectly via its effect on educational attainment.  In the previous section, this 
term is omitted in the estimation of the mean returns to education by implicitly assuming that ability is 
identical across different individuals. Therefore, its inclusion in this estimation allows us to capture the 
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effect of ability on income (Arias et al., 2001). There could still be a selection bias, however: individuals 
with different levels of ability, i.e. belonging to different quantiles, may differently choose investing in 
education. The individuals choose investing in education by comparing marginal costs and returns in 
view of maximizing wages (Becker, 2009; Card, 1999). The more able individuals tend to obtain higher 
levels of education, and thus earn more than lower ability individuals (Table 3.8 and 3.9). However, the 
effect of ability on education is unobservable at this stage. Therefore, the conventional quantile regression 
allows us to explore solely the correlation between education and income distribution, without being at 
this stage able to draw causal links. 
To overcome any geographical bias, the conventional quantile regression is estimated by controlling for 
geographical characteristics by a province fixed effect, !"#$%&'(! . The time-fixed effects is also 
included, !!, as in the benchmark estimation (1.1) so as to capture the macroeconomic environment.  The 
quantile regression is estimated on a pooled repeated cross-section of individuals’ aged 15 to 60 using the 
National Labour Force Survey (2006-2015). It is confirmed by Wooldridge (2008, p. 459) that the full set 
of time intercepts is allowed in the pooled quantile regression estimator with the repeated cross-sectional 
data when the time-variant variables do not correlate to the unobservable time-varying error terms.  
According to (1.1), the returns to education are a function of the average years of schooling of the 
individual.  However, it is argued by Card (1999) and Harmon et al. (2003) that extra year of schooling 
may impact earnings differently depending on the degree received. Therefore, the returns to each level of 
education are investigated in this section. To evaluate the returns to each level of education, the variable 
measuring the highest level of education obtained, !"#$%!", is estimated instead of the number of years 
of schooling, !"#$$%&'(!". The highest level of education completed by an individual is a categorical 
variable ranking individuals as either having no education, or having completed Pre-primary, Primary, 
Lower-secondary, Upper-secondary, Diploma, Bachelor’s, Master’s or Doctorate levels of education. 
Taking the conventional quantile regression (2.1), the returns to education at each level of education 
completed is given by comparing with a reference value- the income if the individuals obtained no 
education (years of schooling = 0). Since we aim at estimating the returns to a higher level of education 
(Bachelor’s degree and above), the occupation variable, !"#$$%&!", is omitted allowing for the correlation 
between income and professional skills obtained by university. This is because occupation could be 
potentially determined by schooling, thus impacting the income of the individuals (Angrist and Pischke, 
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2009, Chapter 3; Wang, 2013). 
At this point, we can observe a correlation between education and income, but also between education 
and income inequality by using linear regression and quantile regression, respectively. The heterogeneity 
bias can be overcome by using income quantiles.  However, endogeneity biases persist because of other 
unobservable characteristics affecting the returns to education. In the next section, we present the 
methodologies dealing with the endogeneity biases. 
3.3.6 Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) 
Education and Income Inequality Effects 
In this section we consider an additional channel that may contaminate our estimations, namely the 
possibility that individual educational choices and attainment may also depend on unobservable personal 
characteristics.  Individuals may choose to invest in education according to marginal returns to education 
and ability (Becker, 2009), thus creating a self-selection bias.  For example, the individuals whose highest 
education is primary education level receive a low income.  Yet, these individuals may also have a low 
marginal return to higher levels of education, and thus have endogenously decided to drop out of school 
at the low level of education.  This leads them to earn relatively lower incomes than abler individuals 
both because of lower educational attainment, but also because of self-selection and ability biases.  The 
quantile regression does not account for the determination on schooling of the individuals due to their 
ability (Brunello et al., 2009). Therefore, the traditional quantile regression is biased because of the 
correlation of the unobservable ability with schooling. On the other hand, the IV approach on the entire 
distribution takes the schooling as an endogenous variable conditional on the covariates (Frolich and 
Melly, 2010). 
The use of the instrument, Z, allows us to overcome the dependence between the error term, !!"#, and 
education choice,  !"#$%!" . As a consequence, this estimation allows us to overcome both the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity biases by capturing individual ability with the quantile index, !!. The 
causal impact of education on the income distribution is estimated using an instrumental variable quantile 
regression proposed by (Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2008). The IV approach is implemented on the 
quantile regression (QR). The highest level education the individuals obtained, !"#$%!", in (2.1) is 
replaced by the predicted values of level of education associated with the instruments, the educational 
  
 
101 
achievement between the Treatment and Control groups, !"#$!!"! . Again, the instrument, !"#$%!"! , is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individuals are covered by the compulsory schooling laws 
and 0 otherwise. Significantly, the highest level of educational achievement, !"#$%!"! , is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the individuals obtained at least a particular level of education and 0 for those who 
obtained below that particular level of education. The superscript,e , identifies either Primary, Lower-
secondary, Upper-secondary, Diploma, Bachelor’s, Master’s, or Doctorate educational levels. The 
predicted values of these seven different educational achievements, !"#$%!"! , are first estimated in the 
First-stage regression (2.2), and then plugged in the second stage Equation (2.3). As a consequence, the 
returns to each level of education are estimated. The returns to education on income of the entire 
distribution are explored using the NLFS (2006-2015) with the use of the 2SLS estimation as following. 
First-stage regression  
!"#$%!"! = !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#$%&!" + !! + !!"#                           (2.2)  
!"#$%!"! , the dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual obtained at least a particular level of 
education and 0 if they did not.  
Second stage: The Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) 
!![!"#$_!!"#]! =  !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#$%&!" + !! + !!"#                                           (2.3)  
Comparable Quantile Regression (Equation 2.1 is augmented by !"#$%!! ) 
!![!"#$_!!"#] = !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#$%&'(!" + !! + !!"#      (2.4) 
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We implement the instrumental variable procedure by using the Quantile Treatment Effects (QTEs) 
approach proposed by Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) which relies on a weighted quantile 
regression. Abadie et al. (2002), investigate the methodology for assessing the causal impact on the 
treatment group where the treatment is held to be endogenous.  To overcome the endogeneity bias due to 
the self-selection problems mentioned above, we instrument education levels as in the previous section by 
exploiting the differences between Control and Treated individuals. Again, we separately investigate the 
impact on the income distribution of returns to education by level of completed education from the 
Primary (6th grade) to Doctorate levels.   
Equation 2.3 is the second stage equation of our 2SLS, estimating the impact of education on income 
distribution. The !th conditional quantile of the log of monthly wages of individual i in province p at time 
t, !![!"#!_!!"#]!, is set as a dependent variable on covariates that include the dummies of being male, 
living in the urban area, being married, and being a head of household, and the unordered control variable 
region of residence. We exclude the occupation variable (skilled and unskilled-labour dummy variable) 
from this estimation since occupation has an endogenous impact on income. The former effect is 
considered in order to overcome the heterogeneity bias. We, thus, allow for differences in ability across 
quantile indices to have a differential impact on income.  The endogeneity bias is overcome via the use of 
the instrumental variable, Z.  Notice that province fixed effects and income distributions are more 
correlated, unlike when we include region fixed-effects, potentially giving rise to a multi-collinearity 
problem across 76 provinces. Instead of province fixed effects, therefore, we include region fixed effects, !"#$%&! where provinces are grouped into 4 regions.  
We cannot include the variables age and age-squared in this estimation because the IVQR is a non-
parametric estimation of propensity weights.  The continuous covariates usually mismatch with the other 
discrete covariates (Abadie et al., 2002; Frolich and Melly, 2010).  The failure to control for age may 
cause a serious problem in the estimation since the data contains 10 different cohorts (i.e. 10 years) in the 
estimation of both 6- and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms. To overcome the aforementioned issues 
related to the age differences of the control and treatment groups we again consider individuals when they 
are the same age at the time of measuring incomes. 
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The Quantile regression (Equation 2.4) is augmented by substituting the education variable, !"#$%!", in 
Equation 2.1 with !"#$%!"!  equal to 1 if an individual obtained at least a particular level of education and 
0 if he/she has not (see  Equations 2.2 and 2.3). Therefore the results between the non-instrumented and 
instrumented methods are comparable.  
In the next section we present the identification strategies for the Placebo test with the Instrumental 
Variable and the Difference-in-Differences methods.  The placebo test provides the robustness checks for 
the validity of the implementation of the compulsory schooling reforms in Thailand.   
3.6 Robustness Checks  
Extending the age difference between control and treatment group from 2 to 4 years. 
For the second sensitivity test, we investigate the robustness of our results for both the 6-year and 9-year 
compulsory schooling reforms when considering different age variations around the introduction of the 
schooling reforms.  The age differences between Control and Treatment groups were extended from 2 to 
4 years. Significantly, the cohorts selected on the Control and Treatment for the robustness checks are 
similar to the benchmark estimation. In other words, each group contains individuals who were born the 
same year. The estimations in this section, thus, contain the individuals who born in just two different 
years. For the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, the treated and control groups’ ages were substituted 
with individuals who were born in 1969 and 1965, respectively. Similarly, for the 9-year compulsory 
schooling the years of birth for the treated and the control group were respectively substituted by 1990 
and 1986.  The IV with province fixed-effects was then estimated.  The results in this section are expected 
to follow the path of our benchmark analysis.   
6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Figure 3.23: Description of the Treatment6 
 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (1978)
(7-8 year-old)
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th    
6-year Compulsory Education 
1971-1970    1970-1969    1969-1968    1968-1967    1967-1966    1966-1965    1965-1964    1964-1963    and    Older
Treatment6: Born after 1967
(6-7 year-old)
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (2000)
1994-1993    1993-1992    1992-1991    1991-1990    1990-1989    1989-1988    1988-1987    1987-1986    1986-1985   and    Older
Treatment9: Born after 1988
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th           9th                      
4-year Compulsory Education 
9-year Compulsory Education 6-year Compulsory Education 
Grade
Year of Birth
Grade
Year of Birth
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We first explore the causal impact of an extra year of schooling on income taking the 6-year compulsory 
schooling as an instrument when the age difference between treated and controlled groups was 4 years.  
In 1978, the first year of implementation of the reform, we compare the pupils who were in the 3rd and 6th 
grades instead of the 4th and 5th grade, as we did earlier.  The year of birth of Control6 and Treatment6 
groups are substituted by 1965 and 1969, respectively (Figure 3.23).  The “same-age” analysis was 
applied to individuals when they were 41 to 45 years old.   
9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Figure 3.24: Description of the Treatment9 
 
Regarding the 9-year compulsory schooling reform, we previously considered pupils who were in the 6th 
and 7th grades.  We now modify the sample selection by considering individuals who were in the 5th  and 
8th grade in the first year the reform was implemented (Figure 3.24). In 2000, the individuals born in 1986 
were the ones covered by the previous 6-year compulsory schooling law. In contrast, those born in 1990 
were subject to the new 9-year compulsory schooling policy. Therefore, the Control9 versus Treatment9 
groups in section 3.2, who were born in 1987 and 1989, are then substituted by those who were born in 
1986 and 1990.   
3.7 Placebo test 
Five years before the implementation  
In this section we provide the model identification for the placebo test to provide an additional robustness 
check on assessment of the effectiveness of the compulsory schooling policies. The placebo tests are 
estimated five years before the implementation of the actual policies. We applied the Instrumental 
variable and the Difference-in-Differences methods both for the pooled repeated cross-sectional data and 
for the “same-age” analysis. Given that this is a placebo test, we should not expect any positive and 
significant differences. 
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 6-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (1978)
(7-8 year-old)
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th    
6-year Compulsory Education 
1971-1970    1970-1969    1969-1968    1968-1967    1967-1966    1966-1965    1965-1964    1964-1963    and    Older
Treatment6: Born after 1967
(6-7 year-old)
Year of Birth by School Grade when the 9-year Compulsory Schooling was implemented (2000)
1994-1993    1993-1992    1992-1991    1991-1990    1990-1989    1989-1988    1988-1987    1987-1986    1986-1985   and    Older
Treatment9: Born after 1988
 1st             2nd             3rd             4th             5th             6th              7th              8th           9th                      
4-year Compulsory Education 
9-year Compulsory Education 6-year Compulsory Education 
Grade
Year of Birth
Grade
Year of Birth
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Figure 3.25: Description of the Treatment Group (Placebo): 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Year of Birth by School Grade five years before the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented 
 
Figure 3.26: Description of the Treatment Group (Placebo): 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Year of Birth by School Grade five years before the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform was implemented 
 
The Instrumental Variable Methods 
The Control and Treated cohorts in the placebo test are five years older than the cohorts in the 
estimations of the actual policies. For the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, the Control6 and 
Treatment6 groups were born in 1966 and 1968 respectively. The placebo test is thus, estimated on the 
individuals born on 1961 and 1963, respectively (Figure 3.25).  Similar to the Control9 and Treatment9 
groups who were born on 1987 and 1989, respectively, the placebo cohorts are born in 1982 and 1984 
(Figure 3.26). The first- and second-stages of the IV regression are re-run using the instruments(Placebo) 
taking value of 1 for the individuals who are treated and 0 otherwise. We expect to find no significant 
difference on the years of schooling between the Treatment(placebo) and Control(placebo) since these 
two cohorts were covered by the same compulsory schooling law. For the placebo test on the 6-year 
compulsory schooling reform, the Treatment6(placebo) and Control6(placebo) were both covered by the 
4-year compulsory schooling law. Similarly, the Treatment9(placebo) and Control9(placebo) were 
covered by the 6-year compulsory schooling law. As a consequence, the decision on schooling between 
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the Treatment(placebo) and Control(placebo) should depend on the same factors since there is no 
exogenous shock on the determination on schooling amongst these two groups. The validity of the 
instruments in our estimations is thus confirmed if the placebo test is found to be insignificant.  
The Difference-in-Differences approach 
The Pre/Post-control and Pre/Post-treatment are investigated under the same strategies as in Section 
3.3.5 along with the placebo Control and Treatment cohorts above.  For the 6-year compulsory schooling, 
the Control6 (year of birth is 1961), and Treatment6 (year of birth is 1963) become Pre-treatment6 and 
Post-treatment6, respectively.  The Pre-control6 and Post-control6 are, therefore, the individuals who 
were born in 1958 and 1960, respectively (Figure 3.25).  The Control9 (year of birth 1982), and 
Treatment9 (year of birth 1984) also become Pre-treatment9 and Post-treatment9, respectively.  The 
comparison groups are selected from individuals born in 1979 and 1981 constituting the Pre-control9 and 
Post-control9, respectively (Figure 3.26). 
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3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter we discussed different methodologies and approaches allowing us to derive correlations as 
well as causal links between educational attainment and incomes. Our main interest consists in correcting 
for the biases induced by unobservable variables, such as ability. To evaluate the correlation between 
education and income we rely on pooled repeated cross-sectional data of individuals aged 15 to 60, while 
also including province fixed-effects in our estimation. However, the results could be contaminated by a 
correlation between unobservable characteristics and the outcome variable, wages, or the endogenous 
variable of interest, schooling. We then considered the ordinary quantile regression to eliminate the 
heterogeneity bias inherent in income differences. To deal with the endogeneity bias, we propose an 
Instrumental Variable approach.  
Our identification exploits the proximity of birth of the treatment and the control groups, which 
guarantees that these two groups will only differ in the extent to which they were differentially affected 
by the policy.  The compulsory schooling law reforms are the main treatment that we use to estimate the 
outcome.  This exogenous factor affecting education is hypothesised to have a positive impact on labour 
productivity and on the rate of return to education. As a result, the causal impact of education on the 
mean income is examined by implementing the Instrumental Variable method (IV).  However, there 
could be a correlation between the choice of level of education and ability, thus implying a self-selection 
bias.  More able individuals tend to obtain higher levels of education, and thus to earn higher incomes. In 
addition, the returns to each level of education are also investigated by relaxing the assumption on the 
returns to basic education as in the previous section. Therefore, the impact of education on income 
distribution using the IVQR is implemented. This estimation accounts for the impact of ability on income 
and schooling. Lastly we propose a Difference-in-Differences approach to further convince the reader of 
the strength of the instruments.   
Studying the effect of education on income and income inequality, eventually enables us to explore the 
impact of education on poverty. Education is expected to have positive and negative impacts on income 
and income inequality, respectively. As a result of the high level of income inequality and high incidence 
of poverty in Thailand, it is essential to explore the causal impacts of education on income and income 
inequality.  Significantly, it is expected that the methodologies developed in this dissertation will apply to 
other developing countries as well, especially in the presence of high income inequality.  
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The next section presents the empirical results of the returns to education in terms of income and income 
inequality following 4 estimation methods; the Ordinary Least Squares estimation with province fixed-
effects (FE), the Quantile Regression (QR), the Instrumental Variable Regression (IV) and the 
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR). 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics: The National Labour Force Survey (2006-1015) 
  
Total 6-year compulsory schooling reform 9-year compulsory schooling reform 
Year of birth  1946-2000 Observations 1963 1965 1966 1968 1984 1986 1987 1989 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Monthly wages 
(THB) 
10715.75               
(14133.07) 
1,887,178 
12787.8  
(16840.14) 
11742.83   
(16840.14) 
11042.65       
(4636.20) 
10884.00        
(13619.66) 
8268.03         
(10862.07) 
7850.70           
(10862.07) 
 7572.70         
(7799.89) 
 7068.56        
(9513.54) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
213.9117    
214.7183 
  
252.6566   
258.8555 
231.8275    
237.8859 
218.2593    
223.4467 
215.3694    
219.9904 
163.4614    
167.2598 
154.8372    
159.1907 
 149.8875    
153.0206 
139.2118    
143.5304 
Log of monthly wages 
9.04                                  
(0.77) 
1,887,178 
9.15               
(0.87) 
9.09                
(0.83) 
9.06                 
(0.80) 
9.06                 
(0.78) 
8.92                  
(0.54) 
8.87                   
(0.53) 
8.84                   
(0.53) 
8.76                   
(0.54) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
8.947848     
8.95007 
  
 9.053086    
9.069309 
 8.992835    
9.007856 
8.953646    
8.968078 
8.958158    
8.971529 
 8.839944     
8.84977 
8.785689    
8.796604 
8.762812    
8.774007 
8.690218    
8.703181 
Years of Schooling 
13.27                             
(5.82) 
1,887,178 
11.94               
(6.76) 
11.98                 
(6.44) 
12.19                  
(6.11) 
12.91                  
(5.55) 
  15.01                   
(4.72) 
14.65                    
(4.66) 
14.38                    
(4.68) 
13.78                     
(4.58) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
13.26482    
13.28142 
  
11.88204    
12.00651 
11.92494     
12.0402 
12.13768    
12.24591 
 12.86428    
12.95847 
14.9655    
15.04795 
14.60574    
14.69596 
14.33403    
14.42798 
 13.73019    
13.83414 
Age 
37.58                              
(0.85) 
1,887,178 
46.91               
(2.62) 
45.00                
(2.66) 
43.81                 
(2.69) 
43.81                 
(2.66) 
  26.44                  
(2.61) 
24.61                   
(2.56) 
23.75                    
(2.56) 
22.00                    
(2.58) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
37.56114    
37.59211 
  
46.88307    
46.93136 
44.97244    
45.02006 
43.78721    
43.83493 
 41.86083    
41.90592 
26.41736    
26.46299 
24.58195    
24.63157 
23.72458    
23.77592 
22.8333    
22.88859 
Male 
0.54                              
(0.50) 
1,887,178 
0.54               
(0.50) 
 0.54                
(0.50) 
0.54                 
(0.50) 
0.54                 
(0.50) 
 0.51                 
(0.50) 
 0.52                  
(0.50) 
0.53                  
(0.50) 
0.55                  
(0.50) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
.5354192    
.5368422 
  
.5345526     
.543727 
.5356241    
.5445452 
.5306388    
.5394775 
.536789    
.5452427 
.5045225    
.5132636 
 .5103843    
.5200561 
.5207901    
.5308191 
 .5412833    
.5525819 
Urban 
    0.65                              
(0.48) 
1,591,389 
0.65                                 
( 0.48) 
 0.64                             
( 0.48) 
0.64            
(0.48) 
0.64                
(0.48) 
0.65                
(0.48) 
0.64               
(0.48) 
0.62               
(0.49) 
0.60               
(0.49) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
.6450249     
.646511 
  
 .6419057    
.6514729 
 .6311829     
.640564 
.6312652    
.6404351 
.6317086    
.6406245 
.6449084    
.6540735 
.638105    
.6483689 
.613867    
.6247549 
.5954344    
.6080663 
Married 
0.66                              
(0.47) 
1,887,178 
0.79               
(0.41) 
 0.78               
(0.41) 
 0.78               
(0.41) 
 0.78               
(0.42) 
 0.50               
(0.50) 
 0.45              
(0.50) 
 0.43              
(0.50) 
 0.37              
(0.48) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
.6621909    
.6635399 
  
.7842377    
.7917604 
.7812102    
.7885652 
.7759443    
.7832898 
 .7739751    
.7810311 
.4972204    
.5059628 
.4413891    
.4510093 
.4281367    
.4380889 
.3685282    
.3795107 
Head of household 
0.41                              
(0.49) 
1,887,178 
0.55               
(0.50) 
 0.53               
(0.50) 
0.51               
(0.50) 
0.51               
(0.50) 
0.23               
(0.42) 
0.20                            
(0.40) 
0.19                          
(0.39) 
0.15                         
(0.36) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
.4049559     
.406357 
  
.543554    
.5527139 
.5293231    
.5382526 
.5080064    
.5168643 
.4891854     
.497667 
.2299074    
.2373057 
.1996331    
.2074249 
.1815591    
.1893655 
 .1489149    
.1570857 
Skilled-Labour 
0.33                              
(0.47) 
1,836,042 
0.37               
(0.48) 
 0.53               
(0.47) 
0.31                
(0.46) 
0.31                
(0.46) 
0.34                
(0.47) 
0.30                
(0.46) 
0.28                
(0.45) 
0.21                
(0.41) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
.332627    
.3339907 
  
.361597     
.370583 
.3271007    
.3356622 
.3094167    
.3177302 
.3040809     
.312031 
.3342458    
.3426351 
.2942623    
.3032492 
.2718551    
.2809759 
.2045784    
.2139178 
Region (4 regions) 
3.05            
(1.15) 
1,887,178 
3.10           
(1.11) 
3.09           
(1.12) 
3.07        
(1.13) 
3.07        
(1.14) 
3                      
(1.19) 
3.01                      
(1.19) 
3.04                      
(1.20) 
3.05                     
(1.21) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 3.048768    
3.052047 
  
 3.085453    
3.105936 
3.079711    
3.099768 
 3.063215    
3.083189 
 3.061718    
3.080994 
2.987801    
3.008538 
3.00128    
3.024359 
 3.030404    
3.054597 
3.038656    
3.066138 
Province (76 
provinces) 
47.6       
(27.54) 
1,887,178 
47.83             
(26.45) 
47.86             
(26.64) 
47.49            
(26.89) 
46.9           
(27.11) 
47.37           
(28.86) 
47.76          
(28.80) 
48.82          
(28.87) 
49.33          
(28.81) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
 47.56123    
47.63983 
  
47.58341    
48.07027 
47.6202    
48.09703 
 47.25372    
47.73032 
46.67245    
47.13229 
47.14013     
47.6448 
 47.48594    
48.04325 
48.53439    
49.11427 
49.00416    
49.65799 
Year (2006-2015) 
2010.07      
(2.67) 
1,887,178 
2009.91           
(2.62) 
2010             
(2.66) 
2009.81             
(2.69) 
2009.88            
(2.66) 
2010.44            
(2.61) 
2010.61         
(2.56) 
2010.75          
(2.56) 
2011        
(2.58) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
2010.066    
2010.073 
  
2009.883    
2009.931 
2009.972     
2010.02 
2009.787    
2009.835 
 2009.861    
2009.906 
 2010.417    
2010.463 
2010.582    
2010.632 
 2010.725    
2010.776 
2010.971    
2011.029 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Control6/Pre-treatment6 and Treatment6/Post-treatment6 [6-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 COMP6 
Control6/Pre-treatment6                                                       
Year of Birth = 1966 
Treatment6/Post-treatment6                                                                                            
Year of Birth = 1968 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education   
  
          
 Years of 
schooling  
10,715.8 
(14,133.1) 
10,959.9 
(14,115.1) 
10873.38    
11046.35 
11,042.6                   
(14,636.2) 
48,933     
100% 
10912.96    
11172.33 
10,884.0                   
(13,619.7) 
53,394           
100% 
10768.47    
10999.52 
No 
Education 
4,937.7 
(8,767.1) 
4,531.1 
(3,146.5) 
4394.57     
4667.61 
4,417.2 
(2,212.5) 
1,035      
2.12% 
4282.282    
4552.182 
4,648  
(3,875.9) 
1,008       
1.89% 
4408.439    
4887.555 
Pre-
primary 
5,376.9 
(6,972.6) 
5,169.1 
(4,123.9) 
5099.215    
5238.895 
5,161.3 
(3,973.3) 
8,257      
16.87% 
 5075.58    
5247.008 
5,181.5 
(4,355.3) 
  5,139    
9.62% 
5062.419     
5300.63 
Primary 
5,835.2                   
(10,045.0) 
5,897.4 
(12,019.0) 
5745.514    
6049.331 
5,972.1                    
(13,967.0) 
11,280   
23.05% 
 5714.321    
6229.874 
5,831.5                     
(9,987.2) 
12,770    
23.92% 
5658.224    
6004.697 
Lower-
secondary 
6,808.1                          
(8,287.7) 
6,813.4
(4,991.6) 
6738.118    
6888.735 
6,939.5                        
(5,046.5) 
6,793         
13.88% 
6819.465    
7059.523 
6,728.5                       
(4,952.7) 
10,086     
18.89% 
6631.852    
6825.187 
Upper-
secondary 
8,596.9                        
(11,142.0) 
9,670.6 
(11,106.3) 
 9482.063     
9859.22 
9,856.2                         
(14,554.3) 
6,052      
12.37% 
9489.406    
10222.92 
9,516.3                        
(7,050.8) 
7,275     
13.63% 
 9354.261    
9678.357 
Diploma 
10,570.6                          
(12,148.9) 
12,451.4
(8,824.2) 
12268.88    
12633.97 
12,621.9                         
(8,875.6) 
4,096         
8.37% 
 12349.97    
12893.75 
12,308.5                          
(8,779.3) 
4,883         
9.15% 
12062.16    
12554.76 
Bachelor's 
degree 
18,113.7                      
(16,329.6) 
20,683.2 
(17,596.2) 
20384.17    
20982.21 
 21,205.3                       
(17,459.1) 
6,635            
13.56 % 
 20785.16    
21625.51 
 20,163.8                       
(17,717.6) 
6,670        
12.49% 
19738.5    
20589.05 
Master's 
degree 
22,399.0                     
(19,485.5) 
24,865.9 
(16,557.5) 
24523.22    
25208.61 
25,331.5                       
(15,590.2) 
4,181            
8.54% 
24858.81    
25804.21 
24,459.4                      
(17,349.4) 
4,789        
8.97% 
23967.93    
24950.92 
Doctorate 
 33,065.4                   
(29,253.1) 
34,276.1 
(39,046.0) 
32212.72    
36339.51 
34,269.8                     
(34,363.4) 
604                     
1.23% 
31523.8    
37015.76 
34,281.1                     
(42,364.1) 
774                   
1.45% 
31291.86    
37270.27 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each 
variable by column.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Control6/Pre-treatment6 and Treatment6/Post-treatment6 [6-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform] (Cont.) 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 COMP6 
Control6/Pre-treatment6                                                       
Year of Birth = 1966 
Treatment6/Post-treatment6                                                                                            
Year of Birth = 1968 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Gender     		     		     		
Male 
10,854.8                     
( 17,970.2) 
11,341.1 
(14,459.1) 
11220.36     
11461.9 
 11,461.5                    
(15,868.4) 
26,182    
53.51% 
 11269.31    
11653.75 
11,232.0                   
(13,050.4) 
28,887       
54.10% 
11081.5     
11382.5 
Female  
10,555.1               
(13,514.5) 
10,515.6 
(10,515.6) 
10392.15    
10639.01 
10,560.6                   
(13,059.0) 
22,751   
46.49% 
10390.89    
10730.29 
 10,473.8                
(14,250.9) 
24,507    
45.90% 
10295.36    
10652.22 
Area of 
residence 
		 		   		     		     
Urban 
 11,805.3            
(15,454.3) 
12,149.6 
(14,709.4) 
12027.09    
12272.13 
 12,351.4                    
(15,778.4) 
26,906   
63.59% 
 12162.9    
12539.99 
11,958.8                  
(13,619.5) 
28,464     
63.62% 
11800.6    
12117.05 
Rural  
7,792.7                 
(10,864.2) 
7,837.3 
(11,485.4) 
7710.863    
7963.789 
7,813.3                   
(11,506.8) 
15,409      
36.41% 
7631.644    
7995.041 
7,860.0                    
(11,465.4) 
16,279      
36.38% 
7683.889    
8036.167 
Marital 
status 
		 		   		     		     
Married 
11,233.1                   
(14,594.9) 
11,029.5 
(14,389.6) 
10929.6    
11129.45 
11,154.5                    
(15,495.6) 
38,149    
77.96% 
10999.04    
11310.04 
10,914.6                 
(13,291.4) 
41,514   
77.75% 
10786.79    
11042.51 
Unmarried 
9,698.6                    
(13,118.6) 
10,715.0 
(13,101.9) 
10544.43    
10885.59 
10,646.8                   
(11,064.3) 
10,784     
22.04% 
10437.99    
10855.69 
10,776.9                  
(14,709.4) 
11,880     
22.25% 
10512.36    
11041.43 
Status in 
family 
		 		   		     		     
Head of 
household 
12,351.0                   
(15,413.7) 
11,606.1 
(13,067.8) 
11493.11    
11719.01 
11,725.2                     
(14,551.1) 
25,075      
51.24 % 
11545.04    
11905.27 
11,492.7                 
(11,478.6) 
26,346   
49.34% 
 11354.09    
11631.32 
Others 
9,599.6                   
(13,070.8) 
10,307.1 
(15,071.4) 
10176.21    
10438.06 
10,325.3                   
(14,691.3) 
23,858     
48.76% 
10138.9    
10511.76 
10,291.1                     
(15,399.1) 
27,048   
50.66% 
10107.56    
10474.61 
Occupation     		     		     		
Skilled-
Labour 
 18,562.4                  
(17,970.2) 
19,749.5 
(17,226.8) 
19557.65    
19941.37 
20,092.5                   
(17,273.1) 
15,007      
31.36% 
19816.08    
20368.84 
19,427.1                  
(17,177.5) 
15,965   
30.81% 
19160.67    
19693.62 
Unskilled-
Labour 
 6,804.8                   
(9,624.1) 
7,002.1 
(10,425.0) 
6924.174    
7080.074 
6,897.8                 
(11,171.7) 
32,851      
68.64% 
 6776.981    
7018.603 
7,097.7                  
(9,689.7) 
35,860   
69.19% 
6997.409    
7197.994 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Pre-control6 and Post-control6 [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
Pre/Post                                                
Control6 
Pre-Control6                                                   
Year of Birth = 1963 
Post-Control6                                                   
Year of Birth = 1965 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education                 
 Years of 
schooling  
10,715.8 
(14,133.1) 
12,250.8 
(16,890.9) 
12142.4    
12359.14 
12,787.8 
(16,840.1) 
45,363     
100% 
12632.83    
12942.77 
11,742.8 
(16,923.3) 
47,961       
100% 
11591.37    
11894.29 
No 
Education 
4,937.7 
(8,767.1) 
4,448.8 
(2,512.2) 
4337.216    
4560.478 
4,505.4 
(2,749.5) 
942                
2.08 % 
4329.584    
4681.199 
4,395.9 
(2,267.8) 
1,006           
2.10% 
 4255.594    
4536.205 
Pre-
primary 
5,376.9 
(6,972.6) 
5,244.1 
(4,165.5) 
5187.421    
5300.723 
5,340.3 
(4,547.1) 
10,782           
23.77% 
5254.509    
5426.184 
5,140.2 
(3,707.2) 
9,989        
20.83% 
5067.446    
5212.863 
Primary 
5,835.2                   
(10,045.0) 
6,348.9 
(10,045.0) 
6114.372    
6583.394 
6,406.2 
(16,637.7) 
9,156        
20.18% 
 6028.026    
6784.407 
6,297.3 
(14,808.3) 
10,182    
21.23% 
6009.661    
6584.992 
Lower-
secondary 
6,808.1                          
(8,287.7) 
7,714.3 
(11,544.8) 
7483.512    
7945.186 
8,039.3 
(6,144.0) 
3,976           
8.76 % 
 7848.259    
8230.324 
7,485.1 
(14,162.7) 
5,635        
11.17% 
7115.211    
7854.936 
Upper-
secondary 
8,596.9                        
(11,142.0) 
10,427.9 
(7,854.2) 
10271.41    
10584.46 
10,874.4 
(8,220.5) 
4,318        
9.52% 
10629.09    
11119.62 
10,068.1 
(7,527.5) 
3,715         
7.75% 
 9866.483    
10269.72 
Diploma 
10,570.6                          
(12,148.9) 
13,608.2
(15,292.2) 
13252.33    
13964.11 
13,983.7 
(10,171.8) 
3,380         
7.45% 
13640.7    
14326.78 
13,266.6 
(18,769.5) 
4,883         
9.15% 
12662.8    
13870.32 
Bachelor's 
degree 
18,113.7                      
(16,329.6) 
22,577.9 
(17,068.3) 
22295.25    
22860.52 
23,305.8 
(19,683.0) 
7,143    
15.75% 
22849.23    
23762.29 
21,821.0 
(13,795.6) 
6,869    
14.32% 
 21494.67    
22147.28 
Master's 
degree 
22,399.0                     
(19,485.5) 
27,707.7  
(23,853.0) 
27224.62    
28190.74 
28,199.6                         
(19,800.5) 
4,855    
10.70% 
 27642.5    
28756.71 
27,178.6 
(27,546.8) 
4,514         
9.41% 
26374.77     
27982.4 
Doctorate 
 33,065.4                   
(29,253.1) 
36,802.4 
(28,904.5) 
35340.93     
38263.9 
37,049.5  
(24,496.7) 
811                     
1.79% 
35360.98    
38737.93 
36,513.7 
(33,341.3) 
 694        
1.45% 
 34028.82    
38998.63 
 Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of the Pre-control6 and Post-control6 [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
(Cont.) 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
Pre/Post                                                
Control6 
Pre-Control6                                                   
Year of Birth = 1963 
Post-Control6                                                   
Year of Birth = 1965 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                          
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                          
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Gender     		     		     		
Male 
10,854.8                     
( 17,970.2) 
12,441.3 
(17,578.6) 
12287.78    
12594.84 
  12,948.3 
(18,760.0) 
26,182    
53.51% 
12713.17    
13183.43 
11,962.6 
(16,371.0) 
24,457  
53.91% 
11763.25    
12161.99 
Female  
10,555.1               
(13,514.5) 
12,027.4 
(16,044.7) 
11875.72    
12179.15 
12,600.0 
(14,268.1) 
20,906      
46.09 % 
12406.62    
12793.46 
11,484.7 
(17,546.5) 
22,058  
45.99% 
11253.17    
11716.31 
Area of 
residence 
		 		
 
		     		   
 
Urban 
 11,805.3            
(15,454.3) 
 13,657.4 
(18,538.9) 
13495.69    
13819.03 
14,087.4 
(17,164.3) 
24,807   
64.67% 
13873.76    
14300.97 
13,242.4 
(19,766.4) 
25,709   
63.59% 
13000.81    
13484.07 
Rural  
7,792.7                 
(10,864.2) 
8,514.5 
(12,798.8) 
8365.356    
8663.732 
8,899.5 
(13,554.3) 
13,553       
35.33 % 
8671.315    
9127.747 
8,160.1 
(12,051.1) 
14,722    
36.41% 
7965.443    
8354.809 
Marital 
status 
		 		
 
		     		   
 
Married 
11,233.1                   
(14,594.9) 
12,444.5 
(17,230.0) 
12319.8    
12569.12 
13,045.9 
(17,427.6) 
35,746     
78.80% 
 12865.27    
13226.61 
11,873.3 
(17,020.8) 
37,644   
78.49% 
11701.37    
12045.26 
Unmarried 
9,698.6                    
(13,118.6) 
11,537.7 
(15,558.7) 
11321.68    
11753.67 
11,828.3 
(14,409.2) 
9,617     
22.04% 
11540.29    
12116.33 
11,266.8 
(16,554.6) 
10,317    
22.25% 
10947.28    
11586.24 
Status in 
family 
		 		
 
		     		   
 
Head of 
household 
12,351.0                   
(15,413.7) 
12,753.0 
(16,775.0) 
12606.66    
12899.38 
13,267.0 
(17,035.7) 
24,865   
54.81% 
13055.29     
13478.8 
12,253.8 
(16,503.0) 
25,601   
53.38% 
 12051.61    
12455.93 
Others 
9,599.6                   
(13,070.8) 
11,659.4 
(17,007.5) 
11498.35    
11820.39 
12,206.5 
(16,581.7) 
20,498      
45.19% 
11979.45    
12433.47 
11,157.8  
(17,373.9) 
22,360   
46.62% 
10930.1    
11385.58 
Occupation     
	
    		     
	Skilled-
Labour 
18,562.4                  
(17,970.2) 
22,241.6 
(20,362.8) 
22016.94    
22466.26 
22,929.9 
(19,231.1) 
16,168    
36.61% 
22633.42    
23226.33 
21,518.7 
(21,464.3) 
15,393   
33.14% 
21179.57    
21857.79 
Unskilled-
Labour 
 6,804.8                   
(9,624.1) 
 6,905.9 
(11,602.1) 
6812.319    
6999.472 
6,920.0 
(11,859.5) 
27,996      
63.39% 
 6781.068     
7058.92 
6,893.2 
(11,365.2) 
31,058       
66.86% 
6766.785     
7019.59 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Control9/Pre-treatment9 and Treatment9/Post-treatment9  
[9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform]  
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
COMP6 
Control6/Pre-treatment9                                                      
Year of Birth = 1987 
Treatment6/Post-treatment9                                                                                           
Year of Birth = 1989 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                          
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                         
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                                         
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education             
  
 Years of 
schooling  
10,715.8 
(14,133.1) 
7,351.3                   
(8,598.2) 
7286.635     
7415.96 
7,572.7                   
(7,799.9) 
38,094  
100% 
7494.373    
7651.031 
7,068                 
(9,513.5) 
29,830                           
100% 
6960.592    
7176.521 
No 
Education 
4,937.7 
(8,767.1) 
5,629.0 
(3,213.0) 
5490.768     
5767.29 
5,537.6 
(2,082.8) 
1,149           
3.02% 
5417.06    
5658.171 
5,742.2 
(4,210.0) 
928          
3.11% 
5470.989    
6013.436 
Pre-
primary 
5,376.9 
(6,972.6) 
5,322.1 
(3,305.5) 
5163.91    
5480.267 
5,337.0 
(4,004.0) 
909           
2.39% 
5076.335    
5597.612 
5,304.5   
(2,218) 
771            
2.58% 
5147.73    
5461.349 
Primary 
5,835.2                   
(10,045.0) 
5,066.5 
(4,373.0) 
4968.975    
5163.952 
5,256.3                   
(5,187.8) 
4,025          
10.57% 
5095.97    
5416.601 
4,860.4                     
(3,254.1) 
3,707           
12.43% 
4755.57    
4965.144 
Lower-
secondary 
6,808.1                          
(8,287.7) 
5,654.9
(4,570.8) 
5584.636    
5725.076 
5,850.4                         
(4,978.8) 
8,365
21.96% 
5743.701    
5957.119 
5,448.2                       
(4,085.8) 
7,914                                 
26.53% 
5358.126     
5538.19 
Upper-
secondary 
8,596.9                        
(11,142.0) 
6,585.5
(11,850.9) 
6405.388    
6765.583 
6,654.0                          
(11,632.4) 
9,179
24.10% 
6416.014    
6892.014 
6,501.1                        
(12,114.7) 
7,457  
25.00% 
6226.12    
6776.142 
Diploma 
10,570.6                          
(12,148.9) 
7,714.2
(10,822.2) 
7500.367     
7927.99 
7,564.7                        
(4,093.9) 
5,644    
14.82% 
7457.898    
7671.553 
7,915.0                         
(15,873.0) 
4,200
14.08% 
7434.832    
8395.198 
Bachelor's 
degree 
18,113.7                      
(16,329.6) 
10,439.0 
(6,016.0) 
10305.97    
10571.96 
10,345.6                        
(6,277.4) 
5,440
14.28% 
10178.77    
10512.47 
10,648.5                        
(5,378.4) 
2,423
8.12% 
10434.28     
10862.8 
Master's 
degree 
22,399.0                     
(19,485.5) 
13,435.5 
(6,775.4) 
 13258.12    
13612.89 
13,561.1                      
(7,089.9) 
3,229    
8.48% 
13316.5    
13805.77 
13,264.9                    
(6,320.8) 
2,378    
7.97% 
13010.75     
13519.1 
Doctorate 
33,065.4                   
(29,253.1) 
22,129.5 
(10,809.3) 
20644.61    
23614.32 
21,582.3                    
(10,839.4) 
154           
0.40% 
19856.67    
23307.88 
23,750.0                      
(10,658.2) 
52                     
0.17% 
 20782.73    
26717.27 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of the Control9/Pre-treatment9 and Treatment9/Post-treatment9  
[9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] (Cont.) 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
COMP6 
Control9/Pre-treatment9                                                      
Year of Birth = 1987 
Treatment9/Post-treatment9                                                                                           
Year of Birth = 1989 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                          
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                         
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                                         
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Gender     		           		
Male 
10,854.8                     
(17,970.2) 
7,073.8 
(7,574.8) 
6995.957    
7151.711 
7,336.7                     
(9,186.2) 
20,030  
52.58% 
 
7209.505    
7463.954 
6,751.1                   
(4,902.2) 
16,315   
54.69% 
6675.85    
6826.304 
Female  
10,555.1               
(13,514.5) 
7,670.6 
(9,632.9) 
7564.389    
7776.885 
7,834.4                
(5,882.2) 
18,064    
47.42% 
7748.573    
7920.142 
7,451.8            
(13,057.4) 
13,515  
45.31% 
 7231.651    
7671.968 
Area of 
residence 
		 		  		 		 		 		 		  
Urban 
11,805.3            
(15,454.3) 
7,126.4 
(10,986.8) 
7007.561    
7245.309 
7,378.4                    
(9,357.3) 
18,928                      
61.93% 
7245.113     
7511.74 
6,783.0                                                       
(12,872.2) 
13,889
60.18% 
6568.926
6997.112 
Rural  
7,792.7                 
(10,864.2) 
6,074.8 
(4,942.1) 
6007.64    
6141.884 
6,312.4               
(5,492.9) 
11,635 
38.07% 
6212.578    
6412.214 
5,774.0                
(4,121.8) 
9,192  
39.82% 
5689.698    
5858.244 
Marital 
status 
		 		  		 		 		 		 		  
Married 
11,233.1                   
(14,594.9) 
7,033.3 
(4,722.3) 
6977.682    
7088.998 
7,109.6                     
(4,812.6) 
16,499  
43.31% 
 7036.18     
7183.06 
6,920.5                    
(4,583.4) 
11,157 
37.40% 
 6835.48    
7005.593 
Unmarried 
9,698.6                    
(13,118.6) 
7,569.7 
(10,453.4) 
7467.568    
7671.774 
7,926.5                  
(9,451.9) 
21,595 
56.69% 
7800.436    
8052.577 
7,157.0                  
(11,489.8) 
18,673  
62.60% 
6992.188    
7321.806 
Status in 
family 
		 		  		 		 		 		 		  
Head of 
household 
12,351.0                   
(15,413.7) 
8,385.6 
(5,787.6) 
 8280.429    
8490.833 
8,523.6                     
(5,821.1) 
7,065  
18.55% 
8387.835    
8659.354 
8,172.1                
(5,729.6) 
4,564  
15.30% 
8005.796    
8338.336 
Others 
9,599.6                   
(13,070.8) 
7,137.6 
(9,056.3) 
7062.821    
7212.445 
7,356.2                   
(8,168.5) 
31,029 
81.45% 
7265.302    
7447.085 
6,869.2                     
(10,033.4) 
25,266  
84.70% 
 6745.498    
6992.942 
Occupation     
	
  
 
		
  
	Skilled-
Labour 
18,562.4                  
(17,970.2) 
10,769.8 
(10,279.0) 
 10612.07    
10927.56 
10,742.3                   
(7,039.3) 
10,213  
27.64% 
10605.75    
10878.83 
10,815.9                   
(14,128.5) 
6,100  
20.92% 
10461.28    
11170.52 
Unskilled-
Labour 
6,804.8                   
(9,624.1) 
6,278.1 
(7,779.3) 
6209.815    
6346.484 
6,410.1                  
(17,842.6) 
26,735 
72.36% 
6316.111    
6504.138 
6,125.1              
(7,702.6) 
23,052   
79.08% 
6025.651    
6224.527 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Pre-control9 and Post-control9 [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform]  
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
Pre/Post                                                
Control9 
Pre-Control9                                                  
Year of Birth = 1984 
Post-Control9                                                  
Year of Birth = 1986 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Education       
 
    
   
Years of 
schooling  
10,715.8 
(14,133.1) 
8,080.5 
(11,039.0) 
8008.859    
8152.074 
8,268.0 
(10,862.1) 
57,221                
100% 
8173.069     
8362.99 
7,850.7 
(11,247.8) 
50,264  
100% 
7741.862    
7959.533 
No 
Education 
4,937.7 
(8,767.1) 
5,640.2        
(3,997.4) 
5481.772    
5798.564 
5,570.4 
(2,437.4) 
1,323        
2.63% 
5438.912    
5701.832 
5,722.2 
(5,270.4) 
1,126                                                    
2.74% 
5414.008
6030.343 
Pre-
primary 
5,376.9 
(6,972.6) 
5,976.5     
(22,265.8) 
5013.512    
6939.533 
5,595.5 
(3,856.9) 
1,114          
2.22% 
5368.812     
5822.28 
6,427.1 
(32,629.9) 
942             
2.30% 
4340.666     
8513.46 
Primary 
5,835.2                   
(10,045.0) 
5,326.0      
(7,062.8) 
5178.335    
5473.758 
5,381.5 
(4,438.0) 
4,715        
9.38% 
5254.791     
5508.21 
5,261.8 
(9,211.9) 
4,070       
9.92% 
4978.71    
5544.899 
Lower-
secondary 
6,808.1                          
(8,287.7) 
5,973.0  
(8,697.3) 
5844.371    
6101.608 
6,061.3 
(11,181.2) 
9,129     
18.16 % 
 5831.868    
6290.658 
5,877.5 
(4,713.9) 
8,439  
20.57% 
5776.911    
5978.087 
Upper-
secondary 
8,596.9                        
(11,142.0) 
6,653.9   
(6,868.4) 
6560.159    
6747.602 
6,776.6 
(8,362.0) 
10,993  
21.87% 
6620.253    
6932.918 
6,514.0 
(4,604.9) 
9,641  
23.50% 
 6422.037    
6605.899 
Diploma 
10,570.6                          
(12,148.9) 
7,711.3                        
(6,552.9) 
7602.51     
7820.15 
7,717.7 
(3,805.4) 
7,728  
15.37% 
7632.872    
7802.584 
7,703.4 
(8,854.2) 
6,204  
15.12% 
7482.992    
7923.728 
Bachelor's 
degree 
18,113.7                      
(16,329.6) 
10,868.0 
(17,413.1) 
10597.9    
11138.17 
10,895.2 
(16,477.4) 
9,437     
18.77 % 
10562.72    
11227.69 
10,828.7 
(18,684.5) 
6,527  
15.91% 
10375.38    
11282.12 
Master's 
degree 
22,399.0                     
(19,485.5) 
13,867.8 
(10,554.2) 
13653.81    
14081.72 
13,974.4      
(11,608.3) 
5,467    
10.88% 
13666.59    
14282.14 
13,717.7 
(8,859.3) 
3,883   
9.46% 
 13438.94    
13996.42 
Doctorate 
33,065.4                   
(29,253.1) 
21,528.9              
(13,188.5) 
20431.25    
22626.54 
22,124.7 
(12,167.8) 
358          
0.71% 
20860    
23389.44 
20,457.0 
(14,821.6) 
199                    
0.48% 
18385.05    
22528.97 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Pre-control9 and Post-control9 [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
(Cont.) 
Variable 
Individuals 
Aged 15-60 
Pre/Post                                                
Control9 
Pre-Control9                                                  
Year of Birth = 1984 
Post-Control9                                                  
Year of Birth = 1986 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Mean Income 
(THB) 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                                       
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
Mean 
Income 
(THB) 
Observations  
& Col %                     
95% 
Confidence 
Interval                                                        
for Mean 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Gender     		     		   
 
		
Male 
10,854.8                     
( 17,970.2) 
7,846.8        
(11,614.4) 
7741.432    
7952.071 
8,029.1 
(9,441.2) 
25,579   
50.89 % 
 7913.397    
8144.808 
7,626.1 
(13,790.4) 
21,140   
51.52% 
7440.203    
7812.019 
Female  
10,555.1               
(13,514.5) 
8,325.4 
(10,396.3) 
8228.904    
8421.931 
8,515.6 
(12,155.7) 
24,685  
49.11% 
8363.963    
8667.257 
8,089.4 
(7,664.6) 
19,891   
48.48% 
 7982.865    
8195.908 
Area of 
residence 
		 		
 
		 		   		 		
 
Urban 
11,805.3            
(15,454.3) 
7,975.5 
(10,458.2) 
7882.461    
8068.458 
8,271.8 
(11,368.7) 
27,050   
64.95% 
 8136.354    
8407.327 
7,603.1 
(9,174.2) 
21,533    
64.32% 
 7480.6    
7725.686 
Rural  
7,792.7                 
(10,864.2) 
6,743.7 
(12,100.4) 
6598.094    
6889.258 
6,802.2 
(8,027.3) 
14,598 
35.05% 
6671.936    
6932.393 
6,672.2 
(15,704.5) 
11,943   
35.68% 
6390.504    
6953.867 
Marital 
status 
		 		
 
		 		   		 		
 
Married 
11,233.1                   
(14,594.9) 
7,517.5 
(8,538.3) 
7437.263    
7597.705 
7,698.9 
(9,845.8) 
25,212 
50.16% 
7577.367    
7820.445 
7,267.6 
(6,300.6) 
18,308 
44.62% 
7176.375     
7358.92 
Unmarried 
9,698.6                    
(13,118.6) 
8,593.3 
(12,880.4) 
8477.807    
8708.811 
8,840.8 
(11,769.2) 
25,052    
49.84% 
 8695.043    
8986.535 
8,320.5 
(13,998.9) 
22,723   
55.38% 
8138.437    
8502.488 
Status in 
family 
		 		
 
		 		   		 		
 
Head of 
household 
12,351.0                   
(15,413.7) 
8,781.2 
(8,980.2) 
8656.989    
8905.341 
8,856.3 
(9,103.3) 
11,742   
23.36% 
8691.632    
9020.978 
8,675.5 
(8,803.6) 
8,351     
20.35% 
8486.67    
8864.356 
Others 
9,599.6                   
(13,070.8) 
7,882.7 
(11,546.1) 
7797.922    
7967.542 
8,088.7 
(11,338.1) 
38,522   
76.64% 
7975.49    
8201.942 
7,639.9 
(11,782.2) 
32,680   
79.65% 
7512.178    
7767.672 
Occupation     
	
    		     
	
Skilled-
Labour 
18,562.4                  
(17,970.2) 
11,337.4 
(15,350.3) 
11159.06    
11515.79 
11,582.4 
(17,355.0) 
16,545   
33.84% 
11317.98    
11846.91 
10,997.0 
(12,015.1) 
11,909  
29.88% 
10781.22    
11212.85 
Unskilled-
Labour 
6,804.8                   
(9,624.1) 
6,566.8        
(7,702.2) 
6505.336    
6628.296 
6,595.6 
(4,447.7) 
32,341  
66.16% 
6547.098    
6644.048 
6,533.5 
(10,250.5) 
27,953   
70.12% 
6413.374    
6653.715 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses  
The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Table 3.6: Log of Monthly Income and Average Monthly Income by Percentiles 
Percentiles  
Log of 
monthly 
wages  
Monthly 
wages (THB) 
1st 7 1,050 
5th  7.9 2,500 
10th  8.2 3,160 
25th  8.6 4,966 
50th  9 7,020 
75th  9.5 12,000 
90th  10 23,000 
95th  10 30,900 
 
99th  
 
11 
 
50,000 
 
 
Table 3.7: Average Monthly Income in Thai Baht by Quantile and Poverty Line in 2006 to 2015 
Year Poverty line 
Quantiles 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
2006 1934 2985.42 5148.99 7248.83 11341.75 28341.86 
2007 2006 3004.29 5184.42 7255.65 11311.35 28791.18 
2008 2172 3048.62 5222.01 7258.79 11278.59 29130.08 
2009 2174 3020.89 5233.16 7235.65 11185.87 28046.45 
2010 2285 3078.34 5264.78 7250.71 11101.21 29174.95 
2011 2415 3107.45 5315.71 7261.25 11027.31 29995.97 
2012 2492 3058.41 5370.22 7290.4 10976.21 30513 
2013 2572 3034.33 5439 7450.12 10913.36 29837.1 
2014 2647 3050.85 5460.75 7483.31 10922.96 29292.02 
2015 2644 3066.2 5464.87 7477.33 10950.75 29298.64 
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics by Quantile Groups 
Variable 
Qunatiles 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
Monthly wages 
(THB) 
3034.77               
(975.52) 
5275.32                
(540.24) 
 7321.76              
(575.30) 
11070.70                
(2193.67) 
29266.76             
(25838.09) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
3031.587    
3037.959 
5273.736    
5276.906 
7319.796    
7323.731 
11064.07    
11077.34 
29178.89    
29354.63 
Log of monthly 
wages 
7.94                      
(0.47) 
8.57                      
(0.11) 
8.89                       
(0.10) 
9.29                      
(0.10) 
10.18                     
(0.40) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
7.934588    
7.937669 
8.565245    
8.565847 
8.895171    
8.895718 
 9.292587    
9.293752 
10.1792    
10.18188 
Years of 
Schooling 
 8.75                        
(0.47) 
 10.78                      
(0.11) 
12.88                    
(0.10) 
 15.58                       
(0.10) 
19.00                     
(0.40) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
8.734455    
8.766161 
10.76562    
10.79468 
12.85793    
12.89277 
 15.56827     
15.5967 
18.99268    
19.01394 
Age 
 37.47                            
(11.98) 
 35.41                        
(10.89) 
35.02                          
(10.11) 
36.31                             
(9.36) 
44.73                             
(8.74) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
37.43462    
37.51286 
35.37594    
35.43985 
 34.98206    
35.05119 
36.28586    
36.34249 
44.70162    
44.76104 
Male 
0.48                            
(0.50) 
0.55                              
(0.50) 
0.56                             
(0.50) 
0.56                            
(0.50) 
0.52                              
(0.50) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
.4779953    
.4812584 
.546164    
.5490838 
.5632784    
.5666691 
.5579005     
.560904 
.5223121     
.525709 
Urban 
    0.49                          
(0.48) 
    0.59                              
(0.48) 
    0.65                              
(0.48) 
0.72                          
(0.48) 
    0.82                            
(0.48) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
.4917358    
.4951126 
.5916272     
.594663 
.647794    
.6514476 
.7204                   
.7235142 
.8179196    
.8208103 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses and the proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each 
variable by row.  
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics by Quantile Group (Cont.) 
Variable 
Qunatiles 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
Married 
0.65                              
(0.48) 
0.65                              
(0.48) 
0.64                            
(0.48) 
0.65                              
(0.48) 
0.75                              
(0.44) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
.6483756    
.6514911 
.6471308    
.6499315 
.6352192    
.6385082 
.6447817    
.6476743 
.741419    
.7443915 
Head of 
household 
0.34                            
(0.48) 
0.36                                                        
(0.48) 
0.38                            
(0.48) 
0.43                           
(0.49) 
0.54                            
(0.50) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
.3432753    
.3463799 
.3555036    
.3583141 
.3735262    
.3768376 
.4242846    
.4272759 
.5401606    
.5435495 
Skilled-Labour 
0.04                           
(0.21) 
0.12                          
(0.32) 
0.24                           
(0.42) 
0.47                              
(0.50) 
0.86                         
(0.34) 
95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Mean 
.0433008    
.0446579 
 .1161393    
.1180574 
 .2350737    
.2380204 
.4640883    
.4671408 
.8621041    
.8644716 
Observation  
360,180                   
19.09% 
446,509                          
23.66% 
328,502                         
17.41% 
419,841                  
22.25% 
323,146                 
17.60% 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses and the proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each 
variable by row.  
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Table 3.9: Educational Achievement by Quantile Groups 
Level of Education 
Qunatiles 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
No Education 
20,419          
5.67 % 
14,504           
3.25% 
7,816          
2.38% 
2,515           
0.60% 
150           
0.05% 
Pre-Primary  
90,636          
25.16% 
69,269           
15.51% 
29,758          
9.06% 
19,429           
4.63% 
2,961            
0.89% 
Primary 
113,125          
31.41% 
 114,278 
25.59% 
57,101          
17.38% 
38,702           
9.22% 
4,448            
1.34% 
Lower-secondary 
75,821          
21.05% 
 106,873            
23.94% 
68,617          
20.89% 
54,495            
12.98% 
10,693            
3.22% 
Upper-secondary 
41,518          
11.53% 
82,613           
18.50% 
68,878                    
20.97% 
74,910           
17.84 %   
24,586           
7.40% 
Diploma 
13,854           
3.85% 
    37,257       
8.34% 
43,771          
13.32% 
  66,907            
15.94% 
 26,770           
8.06% 
Bachelor’s Degree 
3,762          
1.04% 
17,015           
3.81% 
39,306          
11.97% 
103,864           
24.74% 
133,011           
40.05% 
Master’s Degree 
1,015          
0.28% 
4,667            
1.05% 
13,073          
3.98% 
56,440           
13.44% 
108,365           
32.63% 
Doctorate  
30                    
0.01% 
33                     
0.01% 
182                   
0.06% 
2,579           
0.61% 
21,162           
6.37% 
Observation  
360,180      
100% 
446,509       
100% 
328,502      
100%  
419,841       
100% 
332,146      
100%  
Data: The office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
Note: The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by column.  
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results  
This chapter is structured around the empirical results concerning the correlation and causality 
relationships between education, income, income inequality and poverty in Thailand.  The investigation 
of the returns on education in terms of income and income inequality is first explored employing the 
natural and quasi-natural experimental methods that were presented in the previous chapter. The 
discussion of the impact of education on poverty derives from our analysis of the  effect of education on 
income and income inequality.  
 
The first section examines the correlation between education and income. The results given in this section 
are from the construction of a conventional linear regression. There are potential problems of endogeneity 
and heterogeneity with this method. To overcome these biases we applied the Instrumental Variable (IV) 
and the Difference-in-Differences (DD) methods. The exogenous shocks on Thailand’s education system 
in 1978 and 2000 are used as the main model identification strategies. The year of birth of the Control 
and Treatment groups are selected in accordance with the legal requirements of the compulsory schooling 
reforms in Thailand, but also in light of the data limitation regarding the exact date of birth of individuals.  
An assessment of the effect of those reforms on years of education of the Control and Treatment groups 
is provided by the results of the first-stage IV regression in the second section. The third section is 
structured around the impact of education on income using the Instrumental Variable (IV) and the 
Difference-in-Differences (DD) methods. In the fourth section, the correlation and causal effect of 
education on income inequality is investigated using the conventional Quantile Regression (QR) and 
Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR), including the Difference-in-Differences (DD) 
methods, respectively.  
 
The fifth section concerns the relationship between education and poverty.  In this section, we make use 
of the results on the returns to education in terms of income and income distribution from the previous 
sections. The impact on poverty is inferred from the average income growth and the trend on income 
inequality, themselves explained by the rising level of education of individuals. Lastly, robustness checks 
regarding the model identification strategies employed in this dissertation are provided.  The placebo test 
on the individuals, who are not subjected to the reforms, is constructed using the Instrument Variable (IV) 
and the Difference-in-Differences (DD) methods. 
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4.1 Results of the Estimation of the Correlation Relationship  
This section is structured around the results of a conventional linear regression analysis.  We observe the 
trend of the linkage between education and both income, and income inequality.  The correlation between 
education and income is explored with the help of repeated cross-sectional data methods such as the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), Fixed-Effects (FE) and Random Effects (RE) estimations.  In addition, the 
results exploring the correlation between education and income inequality are obtained by implementing 
a conventional quantile regression (QR). 
4.1.1 Results of the Linear Regression Methods  
The Augmented Mincer Earnings Equation: Linear regression 
!!"#_!!"# = !! + !!!"#$$%&'(!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!" + !!!"#!"! + !! + !! + !!"           (1.1)  
Estimating (1.1) with a linear regression on a pooled repeated cross sections of individuals aged 15 to 60 
years-old on schooling contained in Table 4.1, which would yield consistent results when the error terms 
do not correlate to any explanatory variables in any time periods. Additionally, we assume that the 
individuals’ heterogeneity such as ability and family background are identically affecting the outcomes 
across individuals (Cameron, Trivedi, and Cameron, 2009; Hill, Griffiths, Lim, and Lim, 2011; 
Wooldridge, 2008).  However, economic heterogeneity across the regions, such as farm productivity or 
instability vary over time.  Therefore, region cluster-robust standard errors are included in order to allow 
for any change in time-series observations within the region where individuals live (Hill et al., 2011, p. 
542). In addition, Wooldridge (2008) concludes that robust inference allow us to avoid general serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity. Our OLS estimation reveals that an extra year of education improves 
individual earnings on average by 5.9 percent.  
At this point, we found that there is a positive correlation between schooling years and earned wages 
according to the cross-sectional linear regression. However, there should be a within-province correlation 
that lead the coefficeints (from the OLS estimation) to be upwardly biased. Along with the OLS 
estimation, the random-effects and fixed-effects models are, thus implemented and considered to verify 
whether there is a correlation between province-specific and independent variables (or not).  
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In Table 4.1 we present the estimation results of equation 1.1.  In the first column, we control for a series 
of observable individual characteristics. That estimation does not correct, however, for the bias of time 
invariant unobserved characteristics such as geography. To correct for that bias, we therefore include in 
the second model province dummies capturing province-level time invariant unobserved characteristics. 
The Random-Effects model (RE) is also employed to test whether there is a correlation between the error 
term and the observable characteristics. If the error term (!!"#) is uncorrelated with the observable 
variables, then the RE estimation provides lower standard errors.  The RE model assumes that there is no 
correlation between the explanatory variables and unobservable provinces characteristics.  In other words, 
the covariation between a composition of the error terms (!! and !!"#) and observable explanatory 
variables, both time-variant and time-invariant, is equal to zero (Cameron et al., 2009; Hill et al., 2011; 
Wooldridge, 2008). On the other hand, the Fixed-Effects model (FE) relaxes the assumption on the 
correlation between !! and the observable time-invariant variables. Therefore, we test whether there is 
any effect of province heterogeneity on income of individuals by comparing the linear regression from 
using RE and FE in columns 3 and 2 in Table 4.1, respectively.  
Since the standard error of the schooling coefficient is the same (9.57) in the RE and the FE models, we 
can dismiss potential correlation between the error term and observable characteristics by using the FE. 
According to the Hausman test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the different provinces show an 
equal impact on incomes (Appendix 3). Since there is a correlation of provinces’ effects on the 
independent variable, employing province fixed-effects enables us to eliminate a key source of omitted 
variable bias, namely, unobservable across-province differences. In addition, the model with province 
fixed-effects is the most demanding and at the same time reliable estimation in this context. 
The coefficient from the OLS estimation is slightly lower than the Random and Fixed Effects models that 
predict an average increase in incomes of 5.87 percent with lower standard errors taking 4 regions as a 
cluster standard robust. The same estimations without the inclusion of controls on individuals’ 
characteristics regarding the occupation and the industry of employment, yield coefficients that are 3 
percentage units higher (Appendix 4). Focusing on the impact of basic education, returns to schooling 
might be over-estimated if we exclude the occupation variable. Therefore, the main estimation in this 
project of the income returns to education uses the repeated cross-sectional data method with province 
fixed-effects.  However, there could still be heterogeneity at the individual level thus raising endogeneity 
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concerns with respect to the linear regression estimation. The strategy for eliminating individual 
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems is overcome by using the quantile regression, natural 
experimental methods and quasi-experimental methods, respectively. The causal impact of education on 
income is discussed in the following section. 
4.2 The Validity of the Instruments Used 
In this section we consider the validity of our instrument for educational attainment, namely the 
compulsory schooling reforms that were imposed in Thailand in 1978 and 2000.  The Treatment group 
are individuals affected by the shock which is expected to have a significant impact on the number of 
years of education of the affected individuals. The distinction between the monthly wages and education 
attainment of the Control6/9 versus the Treatment6/9 groups is examined the second-stage IV regression. 
The results of the first-stage IV regression examine the correlation between year of birth and the 
education attainment of the Control versus Treatment groups. 
4.2.1 Results of the estimation of the first-stage IV regression 
To provide a valid instrument, the first-stage linear regression of the instruments on the years of 
schooling is estimated. We thus want to verify whether the Treatment group obtain relatively higher 
years of schooling than the Control groups by estimating the pooled repeated cross sections linear 
regression of a dummy variable, on years of schooling, controlling for observable variables (equation 
1.2).  The cross-sectional data including province fixed-effects, and time fixed-effects, are presented in 
Table 4.3.   
The First Stage Instrumental Variable Regression  
!"#$$%&'(!"# =   !! + !!!"#$%!" + !!!"#$"%!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"##$%&!" +!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!"#$$%&!" + !!!"#!!" + !!!"#!! + !! + !! + !!"#    (1.2) 
As a result of the first stage of a pooled repeated cross sections of Treatment6 versus Control6 groups 
(!"#$%!) (Equation 1.2) (the years of schooling is taken as a main dependent variable), the Treatment6 
group obtains over a hundred percent more years of schooling than the Control6 group with high 
statistical significance, at 1 percent.  We find a significant impact on the Treatment9 group compared to 
  
 
126 
the Control9 group. The Treatment9 group obtains approximately 38 percent more years of schooling 
than the Control9 group. This can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, there is a strong positive 
relationship between the individuals who are affected by this shock and their educational attainment.  
Additionally, the rule of thumb by Staiger and Stock (1997) is found to be satisfied as the F-statistics are 
higher than 10.  Therefore, we are confident about the strength of the instrument in this dissertation. 
Moreover, our findings of the first-stage IV regression are in line with the expectations discussed and are 
also consistent with the studies that use similar instruments such Brunello, Fabbri, and Fort (2013), 
Brunello et al. (2009) and  Fang et al. (2012). Secondly, we estimate the “same-age” analysis described in 
the previous chapter to capture the other possible effects such as the one of working experience on 
income. Most of the results of the first-stage IV-regression with the “same-age” analysis are in line with 
the pooled repeated cross-sectional data (Table 4.3.1 and 4.3.2)15. Using the compulsory schooling 
reforms as the instrument is thus found to be a valid instrument when estimating the causal impact of 
education on income of the individuals.   
4.3 Results of the Estimation of the Causality Impact of Education on Income 
In this section we present our 2SLS and DD results, for both the pooled repeated cross sections and the 
“same-age” analysis.  The investigation examines how much an extra year of schooling increases 
individuals’ incomes by comparing the differences in earnings over a 20 year period, following the start 
of the reforms. 
                                                            
 
15 We found the Control group tend to obtain higher and statistically significant years of schooling compared to the 
Treatment group in some age-category such as 42 and 47 year-old for the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, and 
21,23, and 26 year-old for the 9-year compulsory schooling reform. We find that the Control groups of these age-
category are selected from the LFS 2008 (aged: 21 and 42), LFS 2010 (aged: 23), and LFS 2013 (aged: 26 and 47). 
The Treatment groups were at the same age as the Control group, and then are respectively selected from the LFS 
2010, LFS 2012 and LFS 2015. We find that the average years of schooling are significantly different across year 
(Appendix 6). More importantly, the years of schooling (on average) of the Treatment was higher than the Control 
each year. Therefore, the years of schooling of the Control can be higher than the Treatment specifically when we 
pooled the Control cohorts (from the LFS that normally contains comparatively higher average years of schooling) 
with the Treatment cohorts (from the LFS that contains lower mean years of schooling). For example, selecting the 
Control6-LFS2008 (the mean of years of schooling are 14 years) with the Treatment6-LFS2010 (the mean years of 
schooling are 12 years). 
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4.3.1 Results of the Instrumental Variable Methods  
Second stage: The Instrumental Variable Regression (IV) 
!"#$_!! = !! + !!!"#$$%&'(! + !!!"#$"%! + !!!"#!! + !!!"##$%&! + !!!"#$%&'(! +!!!"#$$%&! + !!!"#!! + !!!"#!! + !! + !! + !!"    (1.3) 
Table 4.4 contains our pooled repeated cross sections of Control6 versus Treatment6 groups and 
Control9 versus Treatment9 groups with and without IV estimations for the 6-year and 9-year 
compulsory schooling reforms, respectively.  The table summarizes the results regarding the return to 
education, controlling for individual characteristics such as age dummies, age squared, gender, marital 
status, occupation property and geographical variables.   
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 4.4 contain the results of the non-instrumented linear regression with province 
fixed-effects for the 6-year16 and 9-year17 compulsory schooling reforms, (labelled FE(COMP6) and 
FE(COMP9), respectively).  In column 1 and 3 we see a significant positive correlation of income with 
an extra year of schooling with p-values of 0.01 and 0.03, respectively.  To investigate the causal impact, 
we next turn to the IV regressions. Columns 2 and 4 present the IV estimations taking, respectively, 
COMP6 and COMP9 as instruments of schooling. Firstly, taking the 6-year compulsory schooling reform 
as an instrument, in the second column we see that an extra year positively impacts the incomes of 
individuals by around 13 percent.  The coefficients provided are the average outcome for the populations 
of interest aged 38 to 49 years-old, since this is the age range available according to the National Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) 2006-2015. Our results point at higher returns to education in Thailand than for 
individuals in the US aged 30-49 years-old (Angrist and Krueger, 1991).  The latter study used 
compulsory schooling as an instrument for education and found that an extra year of school increased 
incomes by approximately 8.5 percent.  However, the returns to education in this study were found to be 
relatively lower than the study of Fang et.al. (2012) that took the compulsory schooling reform in China 
                                                            
 
16 The pooled cross-sectional of NLFS (2006-2015) contains Control6 and Treatment6 groups when they were 38 to 
49 years old.   
17 The pooled cross-sectional of NLFS (2006-2015) contains Control6 and Treatment6 groups when they were 17 to 
28 years old.   
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as an instrument for education and found the returns to education to be approximately 26 percent.  The 
fourth model (IV(COMP9)) that uses the 9-year compulsory schooling law as an instrument reveals a 
positive effect of education on income.  In other words, an extra year of education increases incomes by 
8.5 percent on average for those individuals who were between 17 to 28 years old in 2006-2015.  
To sum up, taking the same observation of interest for the 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling we 
find that the causal impacts, (IV(COMP6)) and (IV(COMP9)), give higher returns to education compared 
to non-instrumented estimations, FE(COMP6) and FE(COMP9).  Harmon and Walker (1995) estimated 
the returns to education in the UK, taking the compulsory schooling reform in the UK as the instrument. 
Their study found that the OLS estimation and IV predict, respectively, that an additional year of 
schooling results in a 6 and 15 percent increase in incomes. 
The estimated coefficient of this correlational prediction could be subject to a downward bias and to 
underestimation because of the correlation of the unobservable characteristics and the endogenous 
variable (i.e. schooling). The wealthier individuals, that we view as “higher-ability” individuals, would 
choose investing in education more, thereby achieving higher earnings compared with the “lower-ability” 
individuals. Importantly, the level of significance is much higher in the instrumented estimations: 
FE(COMP6) and FE(COMP9) provide a lower statistical validity at 10 percent significance compared to 
IV(COMP6) and IV(COMP9) that give a 1 percent statistical significance on the years of schooling 
coefficients. We therefore conclude that the results from the instrumented methods are more trustworthy 
in measuring the true value of the causal  impact of education on income than the non-instrumental 
methods. The non-instrumented linear regression leads to an under-estimation of the coefficient since the 
observable characteristics, such as ability or motivation of individuals, are correlated to the choice of 
schooling. As a consequence, this endogeneity bias is overcome by taking the choice of schooling to 
depend solely on the eligibility for the compulsory schooling reforms. 
We thus confirm that the Treatment6 and Treatment9 individuals are actually benefitting from additional 
schooling years compared to individuals who were not covered by the compulsory schooling policies.  
The compulsory schooling estimations give positive and significant results, providing support for the 
view that the 6-year and 9-year compulsory reforms tend to impact the number of years in school of the 
pupils.  This also implies a success of the reforms imposed. However, we cannot conclude that the 6-year 
compulsory schooling is more beneficial than the 9-year compulsory schooling in terms of returns to 
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education. When comparing age groups, the 38 to 49 years-old are the middle-aged group while the 17 to 
28 years old are more likely to be newly graduated or still in higher education.  Above all, the higher 
returns to education of the Treatment6 (Treatment9) group compared to the Control6 (Control9) group 
imply a positive benefit from the enactment of the compulsory schooling laws.  In other words, the 
Treatment6(9) group have better opportunities to finish High School(Lower-secondary) and/or continue 
to higher education than those in the Control6(9)group.  
In contrast to the above pooled estimation results, the rate of return to education might have a different 
impact across generations.  Work experience might be a major factor influencing incomes besides the 
education dimension.  To find the true causal impact of education we thus need to account for the 
unobservable characteristics of work experience, which will be analyzed in the next section by using the 
“same-age” analysis instead of making use of pooled repeated cross-sectional data.   
Same Age Analysis 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) estimated the returns to education, using the quarter (of the year) of birth as 
an instrument, for individuals aged 30 to 39, and 40 to 49 year-old. That study pointed that their IV 
results can lead to an over-identification18 since the results are similar to the OLS. In addition, Staiger and 
Stock (1997) re-estimated the study of the Angrist and Krueger (1991) and found the F-statistic given in 
the first-stage IV regression were below 10. In this section, we improve the precision of the IV 
estimations by restricting the work experience differences that may have any causal impact on income.  
We estimate the instrumented effect of education on income in a pooled cross-section and fixed-effects 
estimations, while controlling for the heterogeneity of province characteristics and unobservable time-
invariant individual-characteristics. We tackle the omitted unobservable variables’ bias of work 
experience by considering the return to education when the controlled and treated individuals are the 
same age.  The returns to education using the same age analysis should be higher than IV pooled repeated 
cross sections if there is a bias due to the work experience affecting incomes of individuals. 
                                                            
 
18 The OLS and IV should yield different estimated results since the study of Angrist and Krueger (1991) confirmed 
the existence of the endogeneity bias on schooling. Angrist and Krueger (1991, pp. 997-1002) further pointed that the 
IV estimation can be biased upwards when there is a correlation between earnings and age-earning profile within 
pooled repeated cross-sectional data. In addition, using a quarter (of the year) of birth as the instrument yielded the 
same returns to schooling.   
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6-year compulsory schooling reform 
Treatment6 individuals were 40 years old in 2006, while Control6 individuals reached that age in 2008.  
Hence Treatment6-2006 are pooled with Control6-2008 observations.  We applied this strategy across all 
available data in the LFS from 2006 to 2015.  Given data availability constraints, this strategy limits our 
observations to same-age individuals ranging from 40 to 47 years-old from 2006 to 2015 (LFS).  
Tables 4.5 shows the results of the “same-age” analysis when estimating a linear model (FE(COMP6a)) 
and the instrumental variable methods (IV(COMP6a)) on the repeated cross-sectional data of the Control6 
and Treatment6 groups for ages ranging from 40 to 47 years-old.  Our findings for the IV estimation with 
fixed effects indicate that an additional year of schooling positively impacts individual incomes by 13%, 
12%, 14%, 13%, 12%, 12%, 12% and 13% when those individuals were 40 to 47 year-old, sequentially 
(Column 2 in Table 4.5). The coefficients of interest in the IV estimation are all positive and significant at 
the 1% threshold.  On the other hand, we found that the estimates of the returns to education to be much 
smaller when implementing the non-instrument approach. Importantly, not all of the coefficients given in 
Column 1 are statistically significant at the 1% percent threshold.  As a consequence, the IV estimation is 
the most suitable model for a comparison with the linear regression model in order to find the return of 
schooling in terms of earnings.  
When infering the impact of work experience on incomes, we found quite similar returns to education 
from the “same-age” analysis IV(COMP6a) compared to the IV pooled repeated cross-sectional 
estimation IV(COMP6) of 12.8 percent of income increase accordingly the additional year of schooling 
obtained. The influence of work experience on income is eliminated by controlling for age. Therefore, we 
conclude that an additional year of schooling increases individuals’ income by approximately 13 percent 
according to IV(COMP6) and IV(COMP6a). 
9-year compulsory schooling reform  
In this section we investigate the rate of return to education by exploiting the 9-year compulsory 
schooling reform. We impose that the variable Treatment9 is equal to 1 when the individual was born in 
1989 and Control9 is equal to 0 for individuals born in 1987. The pooled repeated cross-sectional method 
and the province fixed-effects are also applied using the cross-section data of LFS (2006-2015).  
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The rate of return to education is investigated when both groups of individuals, - Treatment9 and 
Control9, - are the same age in 2006 to 2015, which implies that we consider ages ranging from 19 to 26.  
The same analysis is applied as for the 6-years compulsory education reform.  For example the Control9 
individuals were 19 year-old in 2006, thus implying that we pool this group of individuals with 
Treatment9 individuals from 2008.  We proceed likewise for individuals aged 20 to 26.  Our IV results 
separately for age-groups 19 to 26 are, sequentially, 7%, 9%, 10%, 9%, 9%, 9%, 8%, and 9% (Column 2 
in Tables 4.6).  All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% threshold of significance.  
However, the IV estimation on the “same-age” samples (IV(COMP9a)) predicts comparatively larger 
returns to education compared to the Fixed-Effects estimation without IV (FE(COMP9a)): most of the 
coefficients are only significant at the 10 percent threshold of significance (Column 1 in Table 4.6).  The 
“same-age” analysis estimating 9-year compulsory schooling (IV(COMP9a)) gives relatively higher 
returns to schooling compared to the IV pooled repeated cross-sectional model IV(COMP9).  This implies 
there is a correlation between work experience and income for Treatment9 and Control9 individuals 
when they were 19-26 years-old.  This could provide answers to our hypothesis regarding why the age 
earning profile of Control9 individuals is relatively higher than the Treatment9 individuals at all ages 
(Section 3.2.3).  Therefore, the biases in the correlation relationship between education and income are 
not only the ability or motivation bias but also the work experience differences especially for the young 
cohorts.  
We thus conclude that the compulsory schooling policies that increase education attainment especially for 
basic education, i.e. High School level in Thailand, have been successful. However, the attainment of 
Lower-Secondary education should be a primary concern.  According to the Office of National Economic 
and Social Development Board, the primary completion rate of the Thai population has been considered 
for a decade, with over 90 percent of pupils by cohort finishing at least primary education. However, 
there were approximately over 16 percent and 36 percent of pupils19 (aged 1520 and 1821) in 2014 who 
failed to obtain Lower- and Upper- Secondary education, respectively.  
                                                            
 
19 See Figure 1.11 in Chapter 1 for the proportion of pupils who completed the basic education levels by year. 
20 Normal age of pupils to complete the Lower-secondary education. 
21 Normal age of pupils to complete the Upper-secondary education. 
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4.3.2 Difference-in-Differences  
The compulsory schooling laws imposed in 1978 and 2000 have been proved to constitute a natural-
experiment that led to increases in incomes of the individuals subjected to those laws.  In this section, we 
apply a quasi-experimental design by using the Difference-in-Differences methods (DD) in order to find 
the results of the compulsory schooling reforms on income. The IV results reveal an impact on 
individuals’ wages of approximately 13 percent and 8.5 percent following the 6- and 9-year compulsory 
schooling reforms, respectively. To account for the two years’ work experience difference between the 
Control and Treatment groups we also proceeded to a “same-age” analysis. The Difference-in-
Differences (DD) is the estimation based on a comparison with counterfactual events. Given the common 
time trend in income, we found that younger generations earn less than the older. The normal differences 
between the Pre-control versus Post-control and Pre-treatment versus Post-treatment are then 
calculated, resulting in the difference-in-differences of the returns to education between the Treatment 
and Control groups.  The evaluations of the 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling laws are, thus 
investigated. 
6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
!!! = (!!!! − !!"! ) − (!!"! − !!!! ) (3.1)   
Figure 4.1: The Normal Differences between the Control6 and Treatment6 Groups (43-47 year-olds) 
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We focus on the pooled observations of individuals aged 43-47 years old in our database, and who are 
born in 1963 (Pre-control6 = Y6 00), 1965 (Post-control6 = Y6 01), 1966 (Pre-treatment6 = Y6 10), and 
1968 (Pre-treatment6 = Y6 11). We then estimate Equation 3.1. and the coefficients of the results from the 
DD estimator using the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals and the “same-age” analysis are 
shown in Table 4.7.  The normal differences between Control6 and Treatment6 groups are shown in 
Figure 4.3.  There is a negative relationship of income between the Pre-control6 and Post-control6.  On 
the other hand, there is a positive relationship of income between the Pre-treatment6 and Post-
treatment6.  Consequently, being covered by the 6-year compulsory schooling reform gave 
approximately 6 percent income gain with statistical significance. 
Since the DD estimation on the pooled observation (43-47 year-old) is estimated on the Pre/Post-
control6 and Pre/Post-treatment6 who were born in 4 different year of birth, there could be an upward 
bias because of a correlation of earnings and age-earning profiles. We, thus applied the DD estimator, 
when the individuals of the four groups under consideration were the same age in order to control for 
working experience. We found the normal differences between the Control6 and Treatment6 groups are 
positive. The income increases of the Control6 group are relatively smaller than the Treatment6 group at 
all age-categories (Figure 4.4). The rate of returns to education on income of the individuals were found 
to be increased by approximately 8%, 8%, 10%, 7%, and 3% for individuals aged 43 to 47, sequentially 
(Table 4.7). On average, the “same-age” analysis with the DD provides relatively lower rate of returns to 
education given in the IV estimation since we predict that the income of individuals increase by 
approximately 12.8 percent. We found  relatively low returns to education for individuals aged 47 
because the Post-treatment6 group were 47 in 2015 where the data provided by the NSO constituted only 
the first quarter of the survey. We implemented the DD results for the 47-age category using the 
interviewees from the first quarter for all groups and found comparatively the same ranges of the returns 
to education as for other age categories. 
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Figure 4.2: The Normal Differences between the Control6 and Treatment6 Groups using the “same-age” 
Analysis 
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9-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
!!! = (!!!! − !!"! ) − (!!"! − !!!! )  (3.2)  
Figure 4.3: The Normal Differences between the Control9 and Treatment9 Groups (22-26 year-olds) 
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the additional year of schooling, is relatively higher for the Treatment9 group as opposed to the Control9 
group. The DD coefficients obtained are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent at the following 
values for individuals aged 22 to 26 years old, sequentially: 4%, 15%, 18%, 10%, and 6%. 
As with the 6-year compulsory schooling, the DD coefficient becomes higher when we narrow down the 
group of observations from the pooled repeated cross sections to the “same-age” analysis. For these 
young generations, the returns to education in the “same-age” analysis estimated with both DD and IV 
give relatively higher coefficients than the pooled repeated cross-sectional data. Significantly, we found 
that the returns to education from the IV estimation (8.5% of income increased) are higher than the results 
given by the DD results (7.37% of income increased). The impact of education on income is estimated  by 
the former. The latter estimated the impact of the compulsory schooling reform on income.  
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Figure 4.4: The Normal Differences between the Control9 and Treatment9 Groups using the “same-age” 
Analysis 
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Effect of Compulsory Schooling Reforms on Schooling 
The impact of the 6- and 9- year compulsory schooling reforms on education attainment is estimated 
using the difference-in-differences methods and a combination of the LFS-2015/2006, LFS-2014/2007, 
and LFS-2012/2009 surveys. The results are presented in Table 4.3.3.. According to the normal difference 
method, we found that those in the Treatment6 group obtained more years of schooling than the Control6 
group, and this was statistically significant. On the other hand, the Treatment9 group was found to have 
fewer years of schooling than the Control9 group. This is likely to be because the Treatment9 group were  
registered in the educational system when the survey was collected and they were relatively young (17-
28).  
For the double differences, we found negative but insignificant coefficients on the years of schooling for 
the 6-year compulsory schooling reforms when we employed a combination of the LFS2015/2006 and 
LFS-2012/2009 surveys. The Treatment6 group obtained fewer years of schooling than the Control6 
group by approximately 0.41 and 0.05 years, respectively. However, the Treatment6 group have more 
years of schooling than the Control6 group, approximately 0.46 and 0.02 more years of schooling 
(statistically insignificant) for the LFS-2014/2007 and LFS-2013/2008 surveys, respectively. For the 9-
year compulsory schooling reform, we found that the education outcome of the Treatment9 group was 
higher than the Control9 group, and was also statistically significant. The years of schooling of the 
Treatment9 group was approximately 92%, 46%, 45%, and 52% higher when compared with the 
Control9 group.  
The insignificant impact of eduational outcomes between the Treatment6 and Control6 groups could be 
due to the enactment period of the 6-year compulsory schooling law that was imposed starting in 1978. 
Therefore, there could be a lack of difference between the years of schooling between those who are 
affected and those non-affected by the law. On the other hand, we found a significant difference on 
education attainment between the Control and Treatment groups under the 9-year compulsory schooling 
reform that were just imposed in 2000 during 2006 to 2015.  
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Summary and Discussion  
Our study reveals a causal impact of education on individual’s income, without, however, qualifying the 
effect when it comes to the income categories that benefited the most from the educational reforms. In 
this section, we have implicitly assumed that the ability of the Control and Treatment groups is the same. 
By extension, the decision on the investment in schooling of these two groups depends solely on the 
compulsory schooling laws imposed in Thailand subjected to the year of birth. Our first main finding is 
that the 6-year and 9-year compulsory laws increased the number of years of schooling of the individuals 
by approximately 8.5 years and 5 years, respectively. However, we cannot conclude that the 9-year 
compulsory schooling law proved less effective, in term of educational attainments, than the 6-year 
compulsory schooling law. The individuals in the sample associated with the former were relatively 
young (17 to 28 year-old) in the 2006 to 2015. These individuals could thus still be in the educational 
system at the moment of the data collection. Secondly, the individuals who are covered by the law tend to 
receive higher incomes than those who are not. Thirdly, our study reveals a strong causal effect of 
education on individual income in Thailand. We found that an additional year of schooling has a mean 
effect of increasing individuals’ income by approximately 13% and 8% for the 6-year and 9-year 
compulsory schooling laws, respectively.  
Our results are in line with the results from the studies of Angrist and Krueger (1991), Wang, Zheng, and 
Zhao (2012), Warunsiri and Mcnown (2010), Wage (2013), Harmon and Walker (1995), Balestra and 
Beckesgellner (2013), and Girma and Kedir (2005) where the returns to education from the linear 
regression are lower than the Instrument Variable method (IV). The results of the estimation of the non-
instrumented level of education on income were found to have a relatively lower schooling coefficients 
than the instrumented methods. There are two distinct reasons why the estimated coefficients of the IV 
are higher than the OLS, as discussed in Card (1999). First, the estimation is consistent in estimating the 
average marginal returns to schooling of all population assuming their marginal returns to schooling are 
identical, i.e. what is known as “the homogenous impacts” assumption. The returns to education thus 
capture an average treatment effects (ATE). As a consequence, the upward bias in the estimated 
coefficient with the IV as compared to the OLS estimation, captures the fact that the marginal returns of 
the Treatment are higher than the average marginal returns of the entire population under study. However, 
the compulsory schooling laws are required to have an impact on everyone born in 1968 (Treatment6) 
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and 1989 (Treatment9) in order to confirm the impact of the compulsory schooling reform on income. In 
other words, the decision on schooling is dependent solely on the laws imposed.  
On the other hand, one may find that some individuals decided not to respond to the law because of 
individual-specific attributes. The compulsory schooling laws may have an impact specifically on those 
who responded to the interventions. Therefore, the estimated would more likely capture a Local average 
treatment effects (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Our results were most likely driven by some 
individuals in the Treatment groups, i.e. those who decided to change their years of schooling once the 
laws were imposed. Approximately 14% of the individuals born in 1968 (Treatment6) have not 
completed the minimum level of Primary education22. For the individuals born in the 1989, about 12% of 
them did not finish at least the requirement of the Lower-secondary education23. Significantly, the 
assumption under LATE is verified since every Treatment6/9 individual who reacted to the laws did so by 
increasing their years of schooling (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).  
Therefore, results estimated with the IV capture the marginal returns for the subgroup, whose returns to 
education are relatively high (i.e. the disadvantaged individuals) (Card, 1999, p. 1841). Without the 
compulsory laws, the disadvantaged individuals would obtain below-average schooling levels because of 
the high marginal cost of investing in education. As the IV coefficients are higher than the OLS, it 
implies that the compulsory schooling reform in Thailand tend to impact the schooling choices of the 
disadvantaged individuals rather than that of the advantaged ones. The schooling decision of the former is 
more elastic than the latter because of them being budget constrained. As a consequence, the impact of 
education on income in this study should rely on the estimation of the Instrumental variable methods (IV) 
instead of the non-instrumented estimations (which produce coefficients with a downward bias because of 
the “ability bias”).  Since everyone in the society does not have the same endowment in terms of ability, 
the choices in schooling investment and the returns to schooling vary across population.  
Since the investment in schooling is endogenous to the returns to schooling, the estimated effect of 
education on incomes is capturing the average effect, disregarding potential ability groups benefitting 
                                                            
 
22 See Table 3.2 in Chapter 3 for the Descriptive Statistics of the 6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform. 
23 See Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 for the Descriptive Statistics of the 9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform. 
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more than others. For instance, higher income groups may benefit more from extra education, if human 
and physical capital are complementary in the production process. In such instances, a uniform increase 
in education could exacerbate inequalities. The next section revisits our results while accounting for 
individual incomes. 
4.4 The Effect of Education on Income Inequality 
4.4.1 Results of the Quantile Regression Method 
According to the previous section’s estimations, an extra year of schooling increases the income of an 
individual aged 15 to 60 years old by 5.87 percent.  The income returns to education are estimated under 
the assumption of an identical ability across individuals. However, the returns on education may vary 
across the individuals whose income endowments are different. In other words, individuals in different 
income groups may benefit differently from the same education obtained. This is because the ability to 
obtain income may vary across income groups.  The richer the individuals are, the higher their ability. To 
overcome heterogenous returns, the Mincer’s equation (Equation 1.1) is augmented so as to capture the 
ability by using individuals’ quantile index. 
The Augmented Mincer Earning Equation: Quantile Regression 
!![!"#$_!!"#] = !!! + !!!!"#$%!" + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#!" + !!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#$%&'!!" + !! + !!"#                     (2.1)  
In equation 2.1, we estimate the quantile regression in order to observe the correlation of the returns with 
each level of education. The log of the distribution of monthly wages of 5 income groups (Q(0.05), 
Q(0.25), Q(0.50). Q(0.75), and Q(0.95))24  is regressed on the dummy variable of the level of education 
that the individuals obtained, taking no education (year of education equal to zero) as a reference level.  
                                                            
 
24 According to the density and fraction of the population on income distribution in Chapter 3 (See Figure 3.11. and 
3.12, page 74), the distinct changes occur systematically from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile. In addition, 
depicting the poorest income group at the 5th percentile is more likely to estimate the returns to education for those 
who are poor rather than using the official income groups (NESDB) that begins with the 10th percentile. This is 
because the monthly income of the 5th quanitle groups is closer to the poverty line than those in the 10th percentile. 
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The estimations include the following covariates: gender, age, urban/rural area, and relationship with the 
head of household, province, and time-fixed effects. The individuals’ heterogeneity is accommodated for 
in this section.  In addition, the standard error robustness is included. The results of the correlation 
relationship between education and income distribution are presented in Table 4.2 and Figures 4.1 & 4.2.  
The returns to education are presented for each level of education completed from Pre-primary education 
through to the Doctorate degree.  At each level of education, the returns to education are presented by 
quantile groups from Q(0.05) to Q(0.95) (Table 4.2 Columns 1 to 5). The results of the quantile 
regression (QR) are in line with the previous section: the higher the education obtained, the higher the 
increase in income. However, the returns to education rise at an increasing rate as we consider higher 
levels of completed education.  Therefore, and in line with Card (1999) and Harmon et al. (2003), our 
results confirm the non-linearity of returns to education for increasing levels of completed education. It is 
likely then that the returns to education depend more on the qualifications (i.e. high school) that 
individuals obtained rather than on the number of years of education. The coefficients (QR) in Table 4.2 
show that the returns to education are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level at every 
level of completed election except for pre-primary education. 
Comparing the returns to education by income groups, the poorest income group Q(0.05) has the highest 
returns to education for every level of education completed.  The rate of return decreases over income 
groups at the High school level25. In addition, the differences in returns to education between income 
groups at High School level are more than at Higher education levels26. We find that the rates of return on 
education between the middle Q(0.50), the rich Q(0.75) and the richest Q(0.95) are quite similar at the 
higher education level. Although the poorest Q(0.05) income group has the highest returns to the 
Bachelor’s to Doctorate degrees, the poor Q(0.25) income group has a relatively lower return to education 
than the middle quantile Q(0.50) for some levels of education, such as Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees.  
In addition, the returns to  the Diploma and Doctorate at the richest quantile Q(0.95) were found to be 
higher than the returns to the rich Q(0.75) income groups.  
                                                            
 
25 Primary, Lower-Secondary and Upper-Secondary Education. 
26 The Diploma, Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate degrees. 
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Figure 4.5: The Returns to Education by Income groups: The High-School Levels (Quantile Regression) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: The Returns to Education by Income groups: The Higher Education Levels (Quantile Regression) 
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Summary and Disscussion 
The correlation between education, income and its distribution in Thailand can be summarised by three 
main points.  Firstly, average income increases with education.  Our data reveals that per capita income in 
Thailand has (on average) increased over decades, in line with our estimation. Secondly, the returns to 
education decrease over quantile groups, thereby indicating a reduction in income inequality. With 
regards to the impact of ability on income in Thailand, we conclude that ability could be substituted by 
education. The upper income groups who are depicted as more able individuals than the lower income 
groups have lower returns to education. Thirdly, the income of individuals in the poorest quintile Q(0.05) 
increases respectively by approximately 25 percent, 53 percent, 80 percent, and 98 percent when they 
obtained the Primary, Lower-secondary, Upper-secondary, and Diploma education, respectively. 
Although achieving a Bachelor’s (Master’s) degree requires only two (four) additional years of education 
after having the Diploma, the income of the poorest increases by more than double compared with a 
Diploma and High School levels. According to the results from the Quantile regression (QR), income 
inequality, thus, could be reduced by better educating the Thai population, especially by focusing on 
high-school education27. Again, the gap between rich and poor narrows when the returns to education at 
the upper end of the income distribution increase relatively less than at the lower end of the distribution. 
Our results contrast with the evolution of the Gini coefficient in Thailand - the main income inequality 
measure - that has remained stable over many decades.  This raises the question, why would income 
inequality remain stable since the educational attainments have been increasing over decades. This 
implies that there could be other factor that have had a negative impact on the country’s income 
inequality. Alternatively, our estimation could suffer from an endogeneity bias that is not explored in the 
estimation of the conventional Quantile regression (QR). The impact of unobservable characteristics 
should also be corporated to give us a flawed estimation. According to the study of Griliches (1977), 
“ability” is found to have a positive correlation to the income of individuals. “High-ability” individuals 
are depicted as those who receive the higher income compared to the “Low-ability” individuals. In other 
words, the income of the “High-ability” individuals increased more than the one of “Low-ability” 
                                                            
 
27 See Figure 1.11 in Chapter 1 for the Basic Education educational attainment rates in Thailand that increases over 
time from 2001 to 2014. 
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individuals because of the differences in education, healthcare, and family background (Becker, 2009). In 
addition to the earnings function discussed in Becker (2009, pp.98-99), the income of the individual 
depends on the average and marginal rate of returns to human capital investment. Holding the cost of 
human capital investment and the endowment of earnings when there is no investment of human capital 
constant, “ability” can, thus, be measured by the marginal returns to human capital28.  
Comparing the results from the linear regression using province Fixed-Effects (FE) and the Quantile 
Regression (QR), the average returns to education are different from the returns to education by income 
distribution (Table 4.2).  We therefore conclude that one of the determinants of income is the 
unobservable ability of individuals. Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) and Becker (2009) show that the 
investment in human capital depends on the marginal returns of earnings. The higher the marginal returns 
of the individuals (higher ability), the more they will invest in education. This is in line with our results 
showing that the individuals at the upper tails of the earnings distribution acquire the highest levels of 
education (Appendix 5). The education accumulated increases monotonically with the income groups 
considered. We find that the majority of the poorest Q(0.05) (95%), poor Q(0.25) (88%) and the middle 
Q(0.50) (70%) income groups obtained Upper-secondary and below education29. Significantly, the 
poorest Q(0.05) and the poor Q(0.25) were more likely to quit the educational system after completion of 
the Primary Education. On the other hand, over half of the rich Q(0.75) income group obtained at least 
the Diploma education. Significantly, the majority of the individuals in the richest Q(0.95) income groups 
(80%) decided to complete at least the Bachelor’s. Therefore, we can conclude that the mean correlation 
of income and education can cause an upward bias by not accounting for the impact of ability on income.  
To account for the unobservable factor in the estimation of the correlation between the education and 
income of the individuals we made use of the Quantile Regression (QR), and we found that when 
controlling for educational levels, the income of the higher ability individuals increases less with 
education, than the income of less able individuals. Even after accounting for these differential abilities, 
                                                            
 
28 The marginal rate of returns is a function of the average rate and the elasticity of the investment on average returns: !"#$%&'!"#$%&"' =  !"#$%&'!"#$%&#(1 + !!"#$%&'&%(!"#$%&#) . Therefore, it is presumed that there is a positive 
correlation between the average rate and marginal rate of retuns to human capital (Becker, 2009, p.99). 
29 See Table 3.9 in Chapter 3 for the educational achievement by quantile groups.  
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however, an endogeneity bias may still be present due to self-selection biases in the determination of the 
number of years of schooling. Less able individuals, i.e. those belong to lower income groups, may 
choose dropping out of school because of personal circumstances such as budget constraints or personal 
interests, for example.  On the other hand, the more able individuals, i.e. the ones belonging to upper 
income groups, may choose continuing to the higher level of education since they are not budget 
constrained. The less able (disadvantaged) individuals would value their current income over the future 
income (Harmon et al., 2003). As a consequence, the less able are more likely to invest less in education. 
Therefore, the impact of ability on the endogenous years of schooling, might cause results to not reflect 
the true causal impact of education on income across income distribution because of the difference in 
optimal schooling choices of the individuals. To eliminate the endogeneity bias, we resort to natural and 
quasi-natural experimental estimations in this dissertation by using the Instrumental Variable (IV) and the 
Difference-in-Differences (DD) methods. Prior to examination of the causal impact of education on 
income and income inequality, the validity of the instruments employed, i.e. of the proximate year of 
birth relative to the compulsory schooling reforms, will first be examined in the next section.  
It has been shown in the previous section (Section 4.3) that education has a positive causal impact on the 
income of individuals. To overcome the heterogeneity bias regarding the impact of ability on income, the 
Quantile Regression (QR) was applied (Section 4.1). Overall, we found that the more education 
individuals accumulated, the higher are the incomes of the individuals. More significantly, there are 
heterogenous impacts on the returns to education across income groups where the returns decrease as the 
income quantiles increase. Therefore, the investment in education leads to greater equality in income 
distribution. Yet these results seem at odds with the evolution of income inequality in Thailand. One 
potential reason for this inconsistency is that our earlier results may be contaminated by endogeneity to 
the extent that lower income groups may choose obtaining less education, and thus, earn less income than 
the upper income groups. This self-selection bias is overcome in this section by making use of the 
exogenous shocks in Thailand’s education system. Therefore, the causal impact of education on income 
inequality is investigated using the Instrument Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) and the Difference-
in-Differences (DD) methods.  We aim to answer the following questions: Does additional schooling 
increase or decrease wage inequality?	 Does additional schooling increase wages more for the more able 
than for the less able? 
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4.4.2 Results of the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression methods 
First-stage regression  
!"#$%!"! = !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" + !!!!"#$%&'(!" +!!!!"#$%&!" + !! + !!"#                           (2.2)  
!"#$%!! , the dummy variable is equal to 1 if an individual obtained at least a particular level of 
education and 0 if they did not.  
Second Stage: The Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) 
!![!"#$_!!"#]! =  !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!" + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" +!!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!!"#$%&!" + !! + !!"#                                         (2.3)  
Comparable Quantile Regression (Equation 2.1 is augmented by !"#$%!! ) 
!![!"#$_!!"#] = !!! + !!!!"#$%!"! + !!!!"#$"%!! + !!!!"#!!" + !!!!"##$%&!" +!!!!"#$%&'(!" + !!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#!"! + !!!!"#$%&'(!" + !! + !!"#  (2.4) 
We estimate the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression described in Equation (2.2).  We borrow the 
instruments from the previous section implementing the causality impact of education on the income 
distribution.  The returns to each level of education completed are estimated, taking the determination of 
schooling as endogenous. In this section, we additionally consider the impact of ability on the number of 
years of schooling under two selections based on the eligibility under the compulsory schooling laws 
proximately by the individual year of birth.  This identification strategy allows us to compare the returns 
to education of the Control and Treatment groups of the different quantiles. The impact of ability on 
income is also hold under the quantile index, !.  Therefore, the heterogeneity bias according to the ability 
of the individuals in the different quantile index is overcome, along with the endogeneity bias.  
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According to the reduced form of the IVQR method (Equation 2.2), the log of monthly wages of each 
income group is estimated controlling for gender, marital status, head of household status, urban and rural 
area, region of residence and year, capturing time fixed-effects. The IVQR is estimated on the pooled 
repeated cross sections of the Control and Treatment groups according to the compulsory educational 
policies (6- and 9- year compulsory education laws).  However, the age and its square could not be 
controlled in the IVQR estimator because of the nonparametric and miss-match issues due to the 
propensity score tests in which the IVQR makes use of the local parametric regression and kernel 
function. This is because of the missing values as continuous data in the dataset is larger compared with 
the discrete data (Frolich and Melly, 2010, pp. 450-451). Therefore, the results from the pooled repeated 
cross-sectional IVQR estimator could present a upward bias due to the effects of age on income since the 
individual’s income increases with age (Section 4.2).  Moreover, for reasons already detailed earlier, we 
shall perform a same-age analysis. 
6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
We first focus on the 6-year compulsory schooling reform by focusing – as earlier – on individuals born 
in 1966 and 1968.  The Comp630 take the value zero if the individuals are Control6 and one if they 
belong to the Treatment6 group.  The pooled repeated cross sections of these two groups was estimated 
when they were in the middle age group, i.e. 38 to 49 years old.  Table 4.9 presents the results from the 
IVQR methods that take the 6-year compulsory schooling law as the instrument along with the results 
from the conventional quantile regression (QR) (Equation 2.4). The estimation of the QR includes the age 
dummies as a covariate while the IVQR does not, since a continuous variable such as age could not be 
controlled for in a nonparametric model as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the “same-age” analysis with 
the IVQRa is estimated and will be discussed along with the pooled repeated cross-sectional data 
estimating the QR and IVQR.  Table 4.9.1 to 4.9.7 present the results from the IVQRa and thus depicts 
the returns to Primary education through to Doctorate degrees for the Treatment6 and Control6 groups 
(aged 40 to 47 years old). In this dissertation, we not only implement the impact of education on income 
                                                            
 
30 The minimum age of leaving school is when the pupils reach 12 years old.  In other words, the pupils must 
complete at least 6th grade before dropping out school. 
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over quantile groups but also observe the trends in the returns for different income groups with the QR, 
IVQR, and IVQRa estimations. Overall, we found that the trends in the returns to education vary across 
different levels of education, especially when the QR estimations are compared with the IVQR and 
IVQRa estimations. Significantly, the trends from these three models are slightly different from each 
other, especially for the completion of education to Bachelor’s degree level and above.  
We found that the returns to education are positive and statistically significant at a 1 percent threshold 
according to the QR for those who completed at least the Upper-secondary education level to the 
Bachelor’s degree. The coefficients provided by the QR are comparatively smaller than the results 
provided by the IVQR and IVQRa for all income groups and levels of education. In addition, the QR and 
IVQR indicated that most of the returns to education for the poorest quantile group Q(0.05) are 
insignificant at all levels of education, except for those completing at least the Diploma and Bachelor’s 
degree (statistically significant at 10% threshold).  For the other income groups, the coefficients provided 
by the IVQR are statistically significant at the 1% threshold solely for those completing the Diploma and 
Bachelor’s degree.  On the other hand, the IVQRa gives positive and statistically significant results for all 
levels of education. Therefore, the Treatment6 group benefits more than the Control6 group from 
completing any educational grade (from primary education to the Doctoral degree) for all income groups. 
Significantly, the returns to education are increasing over the level of education, except for the returns to 
the Diploma (which are lower than those fro the Upper-secondary education). 
There is no consistent trend in the returns to schooling across the quantile index for the different levels of 
education. Our predictions on the returns to completing High school from the QR (Upper graph in Figure 
4.7) show a decreasing trend from the poorest Q(0.05) to the middle Q(0.50) income groups in the returns 
from Primary to Upper-Secondary education. The returns to these levels of education increase as we 
move from the middle Q(0.50) to the richest Q(0.95) income groups. The (QR) results are different from 
the IVQRa and IVQR estimations, especially for  Primary and Lower-secondary education. The returns to 
education of the poorest Q(0.05) quantile group were found to be the lowest, compared to the returns to 
education for all other income groups (Lower graph in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.7.1 to 4.7.2). Significantly, 
the returns to education increase by income group. For the Upper-secondary education, the rate of returns 
were found to be decreasingly lower as we move from the poorest Q(0.05) to the middle Q(0.50) income 
groups, after when they steadily increase over the rest of income groups according to the IVQR and 
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IVQRa estimations (Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.7.3). The income of the richest income groups Q(0.95) who 
had completed Upper-secondary level education increased by over 190 percent when compared to those 
who had not attained this level of education. In addition, completing at least Upper-secondary education 
yields an income increase of 50 percent over those completing lower-secondary level education. For the 
other income groups the increased returns to completing at least the Upper-secondary education by 140 to 
170 percent compared to those who completed below Upper-secondary education, and 60 percent  
compared to those completing  Lower-secondary education.   
The IVQRa shows that income increase with the completion of Upper-secondary education (Figure 4.7.3). 
From the decreasing trend given by the IVQRa it can be concluded that the completion of at least the High 
School and of lower levels of education leads to a reduction in income inequality only between the 
poorest Q(0.05) and the poor Q(0.25) income groups. Significantly, the lowest returns to education were 
found at the poorest Q(0.05) income group. However, most of the coefficients obtained with the IVQRa 
for the poorest income group Q(0.05) are positive i.e. the income of the Treatment6 is higher than the 
Control6.  
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Figure 4.7: The Returns to the High-School Level of Education at Different Quantiles (38-39 years old) 
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Figure 4.7.1: The Returns to Primary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis  
 
Figure 4.7.2: The Returns to the Lower-secondary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” 
Analysis  
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Figure 4.7.3: The Returns to the Upper-secondary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” 
Analysis 
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The returns to Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees are found to be consistent across income groups for the 
QR and IVQRa estimations (Upper graph in Figure 4.8 and Figure 4.8.3).  The results from all estimations  
reveal that the income of the poorest Q(0.05) was found to increase more than the other income groups 
(Table 4.9.5 and 4.9.6). The returns to the Bachelor’s degree for all income groups were 100 to 200 
percent higher when compared to those who did not obtain a Bachelor’s degree. Comparing the gap 
between the poorest Q(0.05) and the richest Q(0.95) income groups, the income of the former increase 
more than the latter.  However, there is not much difference in the returns to education between the poor 
Q(0.25), the middle Q(0.50), and the rich Q(0.75) income groups for the Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees 
where the returns to education decreased with income quantiles increase. This implies that obtaining at 
least a Bachelor’s degree could reduce income inequality in Thailand. 
Similar results are given by the QR, IVQR and IVQRa estimations when focusing on Doctorate degrees 
(Table 4.9 and 4.9.7).  The decreasing trend in the returns at this level of education implies a reduction in 
income inequality (Figure 4.8 and 4.8.4). The income growth is concentrated in the poorest income 
groups Q(0.05) and decreases over other income quantiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
155 
Figure 4.8: The Returns to the Higher Education Levels of Education at Different Quantiles 
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Figure 4.8.1: The Returns to the Diploma at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
 
Figure 4.8.2: The Returns to the Bachelor’s Degree at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
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Figure 4.8.3: The Returns to the Master’s Degree at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
 
Figure 4.8.4: The Returns to the Bachelor’s Degree at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
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In this section, the results suggest that obtaining at least High school education could lead to a reduction 
in the income gap separating the poor Q(0.25) from the middle Q(0.50). Significantly, the income 
inequality can be decreased over all income groups by the completion of degrees from Bachelor’s to 
Doctorate levels.  The returns to education between the poor Q(0.25) and the rich Q(0.75) are relatively 
the same even though the income growth is highly concentrated in the poorest income groups Q(0.05). 
However, the majority of the population has not completed the High school levels of education. This may 
hint to why income inequality has remained stable overtime even though universal primary education has 
been implemented which in turn has led to the growth in average incomes. Moreover, the results also 
imply that the Treatment6 group tend to continue to higher levels of education compared to the Control6 
group, without however inducing the majority of the compliers to continue to university level. Using the 
6-year compulsory schooling law alone has not allowed us to draw a precise conclusion on the effect of 
education on income inequality for the younger generation. To see the causal impact of education on 
income distribution for the younger generations, the 9-year compulsory schooling law is then used as the 
instrument and discussed in the following section. 
9-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
In this section, the 9-year compulsory schooling reform is taken as the instrument in the quantile 
regression estimation. The impact of returns to education on the income distribution of the Treatment9 
versus Control9 groups, born in 1987 and 1989, are estimated.  The returns to education over the income 
distribution from the QR and IVQR estimation are presented in Table 4.10.  According to the pooled 
IVQR method, we found the coefficients of the returns to all level of education to be positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent threshold for all income groups except for the returns to Primary 
education of the poorest Q(0.05) income group (which was statistically significant at the 5 percent 
threshold). However, counterintuitively, the returns to the Upper-secondary level yield a lower income 
increase than the Lower-Secondary and the Primary education for all income groups (IVQR and IVQRa). 
This is because some of the Treatment9 and Control9 individuals could still be in the education system at 
the time of data collection. The oldest cohorts of the Control9 group were 28 years old compared to the 
youngest cohorts of the Treatment9 group who were only 17 years old.  Moreover, the Treatment9 group 
individuals are more likely to be still studying at university when Control9 group individuals may have 
joined the job market.  Therefore, a reliable assessment of the impact of education on income for this 17-
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29-year-old age group should rely on estimations that are able to control for age since the income effects 
were found to be highly sensitive to age differences. Assessing the rate of return according to the pooled 
repeated cross sections of the Treatment9 and Control9 groups without controlling for the age of 
individuals, could cause flaws in the estimations.  This is unlike the previous section where we can 
primarily determine the returns to education by the pooled repeated cross sections of the IVQR since the 
observations take into account a relatively older generation (aged 38 to 49).  They have long since left 
school and have only a small probability of going back to school or university. 
To overcome the non-parametric and mismatch variables between the continuous variable and other 
variable, Table 4.10.1 to 4.10.7 presents the results from the “same-age” analysis of the IVQRa. The 
IVQRa is estimated when individuals (Treatment9 and Control9) were at the same age of 19 to 26 years 
old. Significantly, the maximum level that these cohorts could have completed at the age of 26 is the 
Master’s degree.  For age-related issues mentioned above, we do not consider the Doctorate degree. 
Assuming away potential endogeneity problems, the returns to education of individuals aged 19 to 26 are 
positive and highly significant at the 1 percent threshold for all levels of education. Taking 9-year 
compulsory schooling as the instrument, we find that the Treatment9 group has a relatively higher, 
statistically significant, income than the Control9 group  for all levels of education.  Overall, according to 
the QR and IVQRa estimations that control for age, the highest returns to education received by 
individuals (all income groups) comes with the completion of at least a Bachelor’s degree. 
There is a decreasing trend in the returns to Primary to Upper-secondary education for all income groups 
according to the IVQR and the IVQRa estimations (Lower graph in Figures 4.9, Figure 4.9.1 to 4.9.3. 
More significantly, the highest returns to High school level are concentrated at the poorest Q(0.05) 
followed by the richest Q(0.95) income groups.  
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Figure 4.9: The Returns to the High-School Level of Education at Different Quantiles (17-28 year-olds) 
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Figure 4.9.1: The Returns to the Primary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
 
Figure 4.9.2: The Returns to the Lower-secondary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” 
Analysis 
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Figure 4.9.3: The Returns to the Upper-secondary Education at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” 
Analysis 
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According to the QR and IVQR estimations, the effect of education on income decreases across quantiles 
from the poorest Q(0.05) to the rich Q(0.75) (Figure 4.10). However, the richest income group Q(0.95) 
benefits in term of returns to education more than the poor Q(0.25), the middle Q(0.50), and the rich 
Q(0.75) income groups.  The returns to the Bachelor’s degree were estimated when individuals were 22 to 
26 years old (Table 4.10.5). The normal ages for entering and graduating from university are 18 and 22 
years old, respectively. We found that the returns to education of the Treatment9 group were positive but 
insignificant compared with the Control9 group when they were 22 and 23 years old for most income 
groups. The exceptions were the poorest Q(0.05) and the richest Q(0.95) income groups aged 23. The 
reason behind those insignificant impacts of the individuals’ income (aged 22 to 23) is that some 
individuals may spend more than 4 years (normal duration) in university.  Some faculties such as 
medicine and education usually take at least 5 to 6 years to complete. We found that the returns to 
education become positive and highly significant for the 24- to 26-year-old. The income of the 
Treatment9 group increases by approximately 164%, 101%, 93%, 98% and 143% over the income 
groups (aged 24 to 26 year-old).  
The returns to education were found to be highest for the poorest Q(0.05) income groups (aged 24 and 
26),  an approximate increase of 164% in incomes compared to those not progressing into Bachelor’s 
degree education. We also found a decreasing trend in the returns to obtaining the Bachelor’s and 
Master’s degrees over all income groups for those who were 24 to 26 years old. The trend of the returns 
to education for individuals (IVQRa) are quite similar to the results given by the pooled estimations (QR 
and IVQR). The returns to education first decrease until the 75th quantile groups, then increase, giving the 
highest returns to education for the 95th quantile groups. The returns to the Master’s degree are highest for 
the poorest income groups Q(0.05), at approximately 87 percent,  for individuals aged 25 to 26, 
respectively (Table 4.10.6). The rate of return to the Master’s degree for the poor Q(0.25), the middle 
Q(0.50) and the rich Q(0.75) income groups were found to be slightly lower than for the richest Q(0.95). 
This implies that the gap between the poorest Q(0.05) individuals and the rich Q(0.75) groups can be 
narrowed if everyone’s education increases uniformly up to the completion of at least the Bachelor’s 
degree.   
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Figure 4.10: The Returns to Higher Education at Different Quantiles (17-28 years old) 
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Figure 4.10.1: The Returns to the Diploma at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
 
Figure 4.10.2: The Returns to the Bachelor’s Degree at Different Quantiles using the “same-age” Analysis 
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F.4.9.3 P.159 
 
 
 
Upper-Secondary Education 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
F.4.10.1 P.163 
 
 
Diploma Degree 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
F.4.10.2 P.163 
 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
19 year-old 
-2.5 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
20 year-old 
-2 
-1 
0 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
22 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
 
 
 
F.4.9.3 P.159 
 
 
 
Upper-Secondary Education 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
F.4.10.1 P.163 
 
 
Diploma Degree 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
F.4.10.2 P.163 
 
 
Bachelor’s Degree 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
19 year-old 
-2.5 
-2 
-1.5 
-1 
-0.5 
0 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
20 year-old 
-2 
-1 
0 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
22 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.5
1 
1.5
2 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
 
 
 
 
 
F.4.10.3 P.163 
 
 
Master’s Degree 
(Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
 
 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
24 year-old 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
25 year-old 
  
 
166 
In this section, we conclude that returns to education increase over most income groups. The highest 
income increases were found at the poorest Q(0.05) income group for the completion of all levels of 
education. However, the returns to education decrease with the quantiles index increased specifically 
from the poorest Q(0.05), the poor Q(0.25), the middle Q(0.50), and the rich Q(0.75) income groups. The 
results suggest that the 9-year compulsory schooling law led to a decrease in income inequality.  
Comparing the non-instrumented and instrumented estimations, we can confirm that there is a self-
selection bias in the estimation of the impact of education on income distribution, since the results from 
the QR are largely different from the IVQR and IVQRa  ones for every quantile group. The ordinary 
quantiles approach (QR) underestimates the rate of return to High school level, as seen in the results of 
the OLS and IV in the previous sections. The expected value of the returns to education given by the QR 
are lower than the coefficients from the estimations that more likely reflect the true value of the impact of 
education on income distribution (i.e. IVQR and IVQRa). Additionally, the returns to schooling given in 
the QR were found to be overestimates of the returns to education at Higher education levels. We 
concluded that the QR reveals an upward bias due to the correlations between ability and the endogenous 
variable, education. Instrumenting education in the quantile regression allows us to capture the impact of 
the self-selection bias on the investment in education of individuals. The conventional quantile regression 
is shown to underestimate the impact of education on income inequality in Thailand when we consider 
the returns to High school education and overestimate the impact of Higher education levels.   
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4.4.3 Difference-in-Differences  
The Difference-in-Differences approach is applied across the income distribution for the Pre-control, 
Post-control, Pre-Treatment and Post-treatment groups.  The returns to education are thus estimated 
separately for each quantile, namely for Q(0.05), Q(0.25), Q(0.50), Q(0.75) and Q(0.95), which 
sequentially define the poorest to the richest income groups.  The impact of the 6- and 9- year compulsory 
schooling policy is evaluated.  The returns to education are estimated in terms of the increase in income 
yielded by each extra year of schooling obtained in the Control versus Treatment groups. 
6-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
!!!! = (!!!! − !!"! )! −  (!!"! − !!!! )!  (3.3)   
In this section, the DD estimation is applied separately to different quantiles (Equation 3.3).  Table 4.11 
and Figure 4.11 presents the returns to education across income groups for the Control6 and Treatment6 
groups when they were 43 to 47 years old.  The Treatment6 group obtained a relatively lower average 
income than the Control6 group before the policy was implemented for all quantile groups.  However, the 
Treatment6 groups’ income increases more than the one of the Control6 groups’ after the 
implementation of the policy.  The DD estimator gives positive and highly significant results for all 
income groups.  Compared to the average income growth, the returns to education for most quantile 
groups are below the average returns to schooling, depicting a 5.7 percent income increase for each 
additional year of education.  The highest returns were found in the richest income groups Q(0.95).  An 
extra year of schooling increases the income of the richest income group within the Treatment6 group by 
8 %, with statistical significance at a 1 percent threshold.  The returns to education for the poorest 
Q(0.05) to the middle Q(0.50) income groups are proportionally the same, at a 5 % increase in income.  
An extra year of schooling for the rich income group Q(0.75) yields a slightly smaller estimate (4.6%) 
than for the lower quantile groups.  Figure 4.11 reviews the returns to schooling according to the pooled 
repeated cross sections DD estimation.  There is a stable trend across quantiles especially for the poorest 
Q(0.05) to the rich Q(0.75) income groups. 
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Figure 4.11: The Returns to the Extra Year of Schooling at Different Quantiles using the Difference-in-
Differences [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
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Figure 4.12: The Returns to the Extra year of Schooling at Different Quantiles using the Difference-in-
Differences with the “same-age” Analysis [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
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9-Year Compulsory Schooling Reform 
!!!! = (!!!! − !!"! )! −  (!!"! − !!!! )!   (3.4)   
In this section, the impact of the 9-year compulsory schooling law is estimated for the Pre-control9, Post-
control9, Pre-Treatment9 and Post-treatment9 groups. Table 4.12 reviews the results of the DD 
estimations.  The income of the Control9 group increases more than the one of the Treatment9 group for 
both periods and for all income groups.  The normal differences of the Pre-Treatment9 versus Post-
treatment9 groups, and Post-control9 versus Pre-Control9 for different quantile groups are evaluated to 
construct our Difference-in-Differences estimator as in Equation 3.4. We find a positive relationship 
between the Treatment9 and Control9 groups. The extra year of schooling increases the income of the 
Treatment9 group more than the Control9 group with statistical significance at a 1 percent threshold for 
every income group.  The highest returns to education are in the middle-income groups Q(0.50).  The 
additional year of schooling increases incomes by approximately 8 percent for the middle-income groups 
(Table 4.12).  The average income growth of 7 percent for an additional year of schooling obtained is 
highly concentrated in the poor and the middle-income Q(0.50) groups.  On the other hand, obtaining the 
extra year of schooling were found to increase incomes by approximatively 6 percent. Figure 4.13 
reviews the trends of the returns to education over income groups. The returns to education are 
increasingly higher when comparing the three lowest income groups. The rate of returns then experience 
a decrease when moving to the middle Q(0.50) and then to the richest Q(0.95) income groups.  
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Figure 4.13: The Returns to the Extra Year of Schooling at Different Quantiles using the Difference-in-
Differences [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
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Figure 4.14: The Returns to the Extra Year of Schooling at Different Quantiles using the Difference-in-
Differences with the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
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Contrary to the previous section, the returns to an extra year of schooling across the income distribution 
are different from the returns to each level of education. The returns to an extra year of schooling decline 
as we move from the poor Q(0.25) to the upper tails Q(0.95) of income distribution. The returns to 
schooling of the poorest Q(0.05) income group were found to be relatively low compared to other income 
groups according to estimations for both of the compulsory schooling reforms. However, the estimations 
of the returns to education by year and level of education could be different. According to the estimations 
in Section 4.1.2, Card’s (1999), and Harmon et al. (2003), the returns to each year of extra schooling are 
not identical31. In line with the Instrument Variable Quantile Regression Methods (IVQR and IVQRa), the 
Difference-in-Differences estimated results also indicate that the decisions on schooling of the poorest 
Q(0.05) individuals are linked to them being budget constrained, thereby choosing to obtain a 
comparatively lower education than the wealthier income groups (Appendix 4). Therefore, educational 
policies that aim at reducing the cost of education, especially for the most disadvantaged, are suggested. 
In the summary and discussion, we focus on the returns to each level of education, as it is the 
qualification achieved which is more likely to be considered when entering the job market in Thailand. 
Summary and Discussion  
It is confirmed that the compulsory schooling reforms induce some individuals who are covered by the 
law to pursue their studies beyond the legal minimal schooling requirements imposed by the compulsory 
schooling laws. The income of the Treatment6 group was higher than the one of the Control6 group after 
obtaining the Upper-secondary education for all income groups, even though the minimum level of 
education imposed by the law was only primary education. Taking Lower-secondary education as the 
minimum requirement, the income of the Treatment9 group exceeds the Control9 group after obtaining 
the Diploma level education for all income groups. According to the Education for All Global Monitoring 
Report by UNESCO (2015) data provided by the NESDB, Thailand, confirms that all Thai students have 
access to primary education. More importantly, the results are in line with expectations, and suggest that 
the compulsory schooling laws induce equity by improving educational attainment of the less advantaged. 
The extension of the 6-year compulsory schooling laws was found to be less effective than the 9-year 
                                                            
 
31 Our results in Section 4.1.2 confirm the non-linearity of returns to education for increasing levels of completed 
education. The returns to education depend more on the qualifications (i.e. high school) that individuals obtained 
rather than on the number of years of education. 
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compulsory schooling in terms of expanding access to education for disadvantaged individuals. For the 6-
year compulsory schooling law, the returns to education for the poorest income group Q(0.05) become 
positive and statistically significantly at Bachelor’s degree level. In other words, the 6-year compulsory 
schooling law is effective if the poorest Q(0.05) continue and finish their first degree.  As a consequence, 
the minimum requirement of Primary level (6th grade) could not induce an improvement in income 
inequality in Thailand. The 6-year compulsory schooling reform proves unsuccessful for the less 
disadvantaged individuals as the poorest Q(0.05) still opt to drop out school sooner than those who are in 
the upper income groups. Our summary is in line with the Thailand’s college enrolment rates across the 
income distribution from 1986 to 2009 provided in OECD (2013). However, the university attainment 
rates of these poor individuals were far lower than for those in the upper quantiles.  
The opportunities for the disadvantaged (i.e. the two lowest income groups) became higher after the 9-
year compulsory schooling law was imposed. Extending the compulsory schooling law from 6 to 9 year 
implies a higher probability (especially for the disadvantaged individuals) to obtain the higher level of 
education since the individuals in all income groups were found to continue their studies beyond the 
minimum level required by the laws. This also might be because of the improvement of parents’ 
awareness on their children’s education over time. For example, one could attempt to obtain the High 
school level education before the maximum targeted level of education becoming the Diploma or 
Bachelor’s degree in more recent years. In addition, the 12-year Free Basic Education for all policy 
(imposed since 1999) could also ease reducing the cost of education (National Education Act 1999). 
The 9-year compulsory schooling reform together with the Free Basic Education scheme were indicated 
to be targeted at the poorest Q(0.05) individuals, aiming to expand access to education. Our results 
regarding the returns to education from the poorest Q(0.05) to the rich Q(0.75) income groups, show that 
education has a bigger impact on the less advantaged than on the more advantaged. The extension of the 
9-year compulsory schooling reform, thus helps reduce income inequality, although only between the 
poor Q(0.05) and the rich Q(0.75) income groups (when disregarding thus the richest individuals).  
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Our results also imply a negative relationship between returns to schooling and ability (Mwabu and 
Schultz, 1996). Education is found to be a substitute for ability. The returns to education of the lower-
ability individuals are higher than the one of the higher-ability individuals because the marginal cost of 
education for the former is higher than for latter. Therefore, less able individuals can partially compensate 
for their comparatively low income by the higher returns obtained through investment in education. 
Consequently, policies to expand educational opportunity targeted at the less able (the poorer) contribute 
to a reduction in income inequality in Thailand. These findings also indicate that the wealthier income 
groups acquire more education because they have a relatively lower marginal cost than the poorer income 
groups, and not because of a  higher marginal benefit of education (Ashenfelter and Rouse, 1998). 
Because of the complementary relationship between education and ability of the richest Q(0.95) income 
groups, the wealthiest tend to benefit more in terms of income, especially when considering the 
Bachelor’s degree and above, than the other income groups. One possible reason is that the wealthiest 
individuals invest in high quality education by sending their kids to private schools and international 
universities, thereby achieving high earnings.  
Overall, the trends in the returns to education across income groups (except for the richest Q(0.95) 
income group) are similar to those in the study of Fang et al. (2012) and Balestra and Backes-Gellner 
(2013).  These studies applied the IVQR and took the compulsory schooling reforms, in Switzerland and 
China respectively as the instruments. Given the intention to promote equality through the returns to 
education, this could be facilitated by encouraging the completion of the Bachelor’s degree.  Most people 
in Thailand however, do not pursue their studies up to the university level.  On the contrary, most only 
obtain Primary or Lower-Secondary education.  Therefore, this could be one reason why income 
inequality in Thailand remained unchanged even though economic growth has increased dramatically. 
However, it is impossible to encourage individuals, particularly in the middle age group, to go back to 
education.  This is because of the opportunity cost of studying.  Also, some may think they are too old to 
study.  Individuals who have been in the labour market for 10 years or more might not want to take the 
risk of spending 4 years at university and then re-entering the job market again when they are almost 50 
years old. On the other hand, policies seeking to reduce education costs could lead to a higher proportion 
of recent generations finishing at least a Bachelor’s degree (e.g. 9-year compulsory schooling laws).  
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The returns to High school level and higher education levels observed in this dissertation are not 
dissimilar to the findings of Harmon and Walker (1999).  The returns to High school education are lower 
in Thailand than in the UK.  However, the returns to higher education in Thailand are relatively greater 
than in the UK. This might imply that there is an excess demand for skilled labour in developing 
countries (Becker, 2009).  Therefore, the minimum level the majority of the population in Thailand 
should seek is at least the Bachelor’s degree.  Moreover, skilled labour is essential in order to absorb the 
spill-over effects of new technology from the developed countries.  
4.5. The Impact of Education on Poverty  
In this section, we make use of the results on the average returns to education and the returns across the 
income distribution to analyse the causes of the relative poverty in Thailand and specifically to identify 
any possible tool to help reduce the incidence of poverty in Thailand. The discussion of the incidence of 
poverty  incorporates both the returns to education at individual and aggregate levels.  In section 4.3, we 
found that education had a causal impact on average income growth in Thailand. An extra year of 
schooling was found to yield approximately 13 percent and 8 percent increases in income, especially for 
the Treatment groups, for the 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling laws, respectively.  Therefore, 
poverty is reduced through the growth of individuals’ income, as discussed in Burnett (2008). This is in 
line with the remarkable increase in Thailand’s GDP per capita over the period, as explained in the 
Chapter 1.  
According to the World Bank, expanding and increasing education should be a priority if poverty within a 
country is to be alleviated. However, the returns to education across income groups could enhance, 
exacerbate, or indeed have no impact on total productivity or on poverty. This is because the relationship 
between the productivity and equity varies across countries/situations depending on the regime type, i.e. 
whether citizens live in a dictatorship or in a democracy (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Luca, Litina, and 
Sekeris, 2015). In a democracy, an equitable distribution of income leads to an increase in the rate of 
growth of the country (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). The economic growth, thus, is enhanced by the high 
tax rate preferred by the majority of the population (median voter). Significantly, a transfer of income 
from the rich to the middle-income groups did more to boost economic growth than a transfer from the 
middle-income groups to the poor, especially in the developing countries. In other words, targeting the 
  
 
177 
lower income classes rather than the upper income classes could lead to a slow economic growth rate.  
Therefore, it is important to analyse the causes of the fall in the rate of poverty by including in the 
discussion the effects of additional education on the earnings distribution. Significantly, we focus on the 
returns to education for the poorest Q(0.05) income group, since the average monthly income of some 
individuals in this group were below the poverty line. Table 4.13 reviews the monthly incomes of the 
poorest income group Q(0.05) given by the NLFS (2006-2015) along with official poverty line data 
(2006-2015), provided by the NESDB. Over 50 percent of the individuals in this income group were 
below the poverty line. Moreover, the proportion of individuals (within the poorest income group) living 
under the poverty line tends to increase as the poverty line increases. Examining the returns to education 
for the disadvantaged provides a better understanding of whether or not education can reduce poverty. 
The explanation of any possible relationship between income inequality- inferred from the returns to 
education observed for different income groups- and the choice of public policy (i.e. economic growth 
and/or redistribution goals) are, thus, discussed.  
The returns to an extra year of schooling in the Treatment6 and Treatment9 groups fluctuate around 
approximately 5 percent and 6 percent, respectively.  However, the results indicate that education has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on the income of the poorest Q(0.05) group only when they 
completed at least the Diploma level. For the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, the returns to the 
Diploma, Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate levels compared with having no education were 
approximately 74 percent, 164 percent, 140 percent, and 200 percent respectively. Taking no education as 
a reference level, the 9-year compulsory schooling reform gives returns to Diploma, Bachelor’s and 
Master’s degrees at approximately 86 percent, 84 percent and 69 percent, respectively. Our results are in 
line with the study of Balestra and Backes-gellner (2013) on the implementation of the 9-year compulsory 
schooling reform in Switzerland. They found that the lower income groups with a vocational qualification 
(i.e. a Diploma certificate) obtained higher incomes than ones with academic qualifications (i.e. a 
Bachelor’s degree). 
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It may be true that the income of disadvantaged individuals increased with each additional level of 
education obtained. However, our study could not give a precise conclusion as to whether the poor moved 
to the non-poor income groups or not after they reached Diploma level. This is because the endowments 
of the same individuals before and after obtaining such education were not provided in the Thailand 
National Labour Force Survey. 
According to Center for System Peace (2014), Thailand is categorized as a democratic regime with a 
Polity IV score of  9, and political economy theories predict that at the steady state everyone in society is 
assumed to remain with the same endowments, even though education has a positive causal impact on 
income across all income groups. Significantly, the benefits from education are highly concentrated in the 
lower tail of the income distribution, especially when the disadvantaged are able to access university 
education. This suggests that the extension of  educational opportunities for the disadvantaged could have 
no impact on poverty incidence in Thailand.  Rather it is concluded  that poverty in Thailand is to be 
reduced mainly by the income growth of the individuals effected through the additional level of education 
obtained.    
Since the coup d’état that Thailand experienced in 2014, the Polity IV score has fallen to 4, thus 
effectively making Thailand a non-democracy. The relationship between productivity and redistribution 
under a dictatorship depends mainly on the dictator’s power and on the support gathered among capital 
owners (Luca et al., 2015). More specifically, upper income groups support the regime in place, and thus 
the bigger the elite in the country, the stronger the power of the dictatorship. Luca et al. (2015) concluded 
that a redistributive policy is preferable when there is a “power-insecure dictator”. According to the 
NESDB32, over 50% of aggregate income of the individuals are highly concentrated in the top income 
groups over the past two decades. This implies that the elites control the majority of the capital stock in 
the society and, as a result Thailand is more likely to be described as a “power-secure” dictatorship. 
  
                                                            
 
32 See Figure 1.9 in Chapter 1 for the income share by quintiles in 2015. For more information on the income share 
by quintiles 1988 to 2015 see 
http://social.nesdb.go.th/SocialStat/StatReport_Final.aspx?reportid=686&template=1R2C&yeartype=M&subcatid=6
8 
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Our findings indicate that the extension of educational policies induced a decrease in income inequality, 
specifically balancing the income of the poorest Q(0.05) to the rich Q(0.75) income groups. To eradicate 
poverty in Thailand, redistributive policies are suggested. The growth in the average income has been 
disproportionally concentrated in the richest income groups Q(0.95) following the extension of the 9-year 
compulsory schooling law. Therefore, this could have a positive impact on the economic growth resulting 
in reduced poverty in Thailand.  
4.6 Robustness Checks  
In this section we conduct a robustness check using the Instrumental variable methods (IV) with province 
fixed-effects. The age between the Control and Treatment groups are extended from 2 to 4 years 
differences when conducting the“same-age” analysis. We expect the results to be similar to our 
benchmark analysis.   
Results of Extending the age difference from 2 to 4 years  
The “same-age” analysis was applied when the sampled individuals were 41 to 45 years old for the 
robustness analysis for the 6-year compulsory schooling. The Control6 and Treatment6 individuals are 
taken to be born 4 years apart of 2 years apart as in the benchmark analysis. Our findings confirm that the 
individuals improved their income by approximately 13%, 12%, 14%, 12%, and 12% for an extra year of 
education obtained (Column 2 in Table 4.14).  This parallels the results from Section 4.3 which are 
provided in Column 3 in Table 4.14.  We conclude that individuals who were covered by the 6-year 
compulsory schooling benefit in terms of income more than those who were not.  The results from the 
non-instrumented estimation (Column 1 in Table 4.14) have a lower statistical significance, at the 5 
percent threshold of significance, compared to the IV estimation that gives a high statistical significance 
at the 1 percent level in line with the results from Section 4.3.  
For the robustness analysis for the 9-year compulsory schooling reform, with this 4-year difference 
between treated and control groups we find  that an extra year of schooling increases individuals’ incomes 
by approximately 9 percent. Significantly, an extra year of education when taking COMP9 as an 
instrument gives approximately 7%, 9%, 9%, 9%, 9% and 9% income increases with highly statistical 
significance when individuals were, sequentially, 20 to 25 years old (Column 2 in Table 4.15).  Column 1 
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provides the non-instrumented linear regression that under-estimates the effect since most of the 
coefficients are only at the 5% threshold of statistical significance.  Comparing the returns to education 
between Column 2 and 3, we found that 4-year differences in age give slightly smaller returns to 
education.  As a consequence, we can conclude that the compulsory education reforms are an efficient 
policy in compelling individuals to obtain more extended schooling. 
4.7 Placebo test 
In this section we examine two main placebo tests: we re-ran our estimations 5 years before the policies 
were implemented such that either none of groups or all of them were affected by the reforms.  The 
Difference-in-Differences and the Instrumental variable methods are used to investigate the first placebo 
test, and our expectation is that there should be no differences in the returns to education 5 years before 
the implementation of the reform. 
Results of the Placebo test (5 years before the implementation)  
The results of the first-stage and second-stage are presented in Table 4.16. For the 6-year compulsory 
schooling reform, we found a positive relationship between being Treatment6(Placebo) and the years of 
schooling (Column 1 Row 2). However, the coefficient given in the Placebo test is less statistically 
significant. This in turn reflects the existence of a general positive time-trend effect on education 
attainment especially for the older generations (43-54 years-old). On the other hand, the result of the first-
stage for the placebo test of the 9-year compulsory schooling reform gives a negative coefficient for being 
Treatment9(Placebo) on education attainment (Column 3 Row 2). As a result, there is a negative trend on 
the education attainment for the younger cohort, in line with the above time-trend effect since Control9 
individuals may have benefited from longer work experience.  
To confirm the existence of the positive time-trend effects on education attainment,  the “same-age” 
analysis is applied to both reforms (Table 4.16.1 and 4.16.2). We found the estimated results are positive 
and significant at the 1% threshold solely for some age-catergories (45, 48, 50, and 51 year-old) for the 
placebo test on the 6-year compulsory schooling law. For the placebo test on the 9-year compulsory 
schooling law, we found that Treatment9(Placebo) individuals aged 24, 27, 29 and 30 years old tend to 
obtain more years of schooling. However, the results given in the first-stage and second-stage of the 
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placebo tests provide relatively larger standard errors than in the benchmark analysis.  
We next turn to the placebo test for the Difference-in-Differences approach. The normal differences 
between the Control and Treatment groups is first examined. Figure 4.15 and 4.17 capture the normal 
differences 5 years before the implementation of the 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms, 
respectively.  The Control(Placebo)  was found to have higher incomes than the Treatment(Placebo)  
group both before and after the placebo reform. Again, this finding is due to a time trend since education 
increases with time, especially in developing countries.  Eliminating the time-related-differences, we 
found that there is no difference between the placebo Treatment(Placebo)  and Control(Placebo)  groups.   
Table 4.17 presents the results of the DD estimator for the placebo test.  As a result, the 
Treatment6(Placebo) group earns higher incomes than the Control6(Placebo) group although the 
difference is not statistically significant.  This confirms that the positive impact from the DD estimations 
is due to a time trend. We extend the DD estimator using the “same-age” analysis giving the consistent 
results with the DD estimator using the pooled observations (Table 4.17.1). According to the normal 
differences by age-category illustrated in Figure 4.16, the Treatment6(Placebo) tend to earn higher 
incomes than the Control6(Placebo) at every age-category. Taking the double differences, the 
Treatment6(Placebo) individuals receive higher incomes than the Control6(Placebo) when they were 48, 
49, and 50 year-old with the results being significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% thresholds, respectively.  
The normal differences by age for the Treatment9(Placebo) and the Control6(Placebo) also revealed the 
same trend that the former tend to earn higher incomes than the latter (Figure 17 and 18). However, we 
find no difference in the double differences for the Treatment9(Placebo)  and Control9(Placebo)  groups 
by both pooled repeated cross sections and the “same-age” analysis (Table 4.17 and 4.17.2). We are 
eventually confirming that our identification strategy captures a real exogenous shock on education. 
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Figure 4.15: The Normal Differences between the Control6 and Treatment6 Groups (Placebo test) 
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Figure 4.16: The Normal Differences between the Control6 and Treatment6 Groups using the “same-age” 
Analysis (Placebo test) 
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Figure 4.17: The Normal Differences between the Control9 and Treatment9 Groups (Placebo test) 
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Figure 4.18: The Normal Differences between the Control9 and Treatment9 Groups using the “same-age” 
Analysis (Placebo test)  
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4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter investigates the causal impact of education on income and income inequality using the 
Thailand National Labour Force Survey from 2006 to 2015.  In this chapter we control for the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity biases of education.  To explore the pure correlation between the variables 
of interest we used linear regression and quantile regression methods.  We found that average income 
positively correlates with the level of education acquired.  However, the returns to education vary across 
income groups.  We therefore concluded that there is a heterogeneity bias (i.e. ability) in the returns to 
education.  To eliminate the potential endogeneity contaminating our results, natural experimental 
methods are employed to assess the effect of an exogenous shock in the educational system in Thailand 
on incomes (6- and 9-year compulsory schooling reform).  The policy is confirmed to have a positive and 
significant impact solely on the eligible individuals.  We employed the proximate year of birth just before 
and after the implementation of the policy to select our sample, and applied an Instrumental Variable 
(IV), an Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression (IVQR) and a Difference-in-Differences (DD) 
methods to assess the impact of this exogenous shock. 
An additional year of schooling increased the income of the Treatment group by 13 percent and 8.5 
percent, taking 6-year and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms as the instruments. Moreover, the study 
confirmed that the compulsory schooling laws induce some eligible individuals to continue their studies 
beyond the minimum requirement to Upper-Secondary and University levels. Comparing the 
effectiveness of the 6- and 9- year compulsory schooling reforms, the expansion of education towards the 
lower income groups widens access especially for disadvantaged individuals. Education could be an 
effective way to promote both productivity and balance income inequality in Thailand. Income inequality 
could partly be reduced through increasing completion of the Bachelor’s and postgraduate degrees. There 
are two main policy implications from this analysis:  firstly, the need to increase education attainment 
especially at Upper-secondary and Bachelor’s degree levels; and secondly, there is a need to expand 
access to education for disadvantaged families. For the power-secure dictatorship in Thailand, growth-
enhancing policies are preferable over redistributive policies. As a consequence, poverty reduction in 
Thailand is effected mainly through the average income growth from the extension of education.  
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Table 4.1: The Correlation of Years of Schooling and Income (Linear Regression) 
Dependent Variable:     (1)             (2)           (3)   
                 
Log of Monthly Wages              OLS               FE             RE         
 
Years of schooling            0.0590**          0.0587**    0.0587*** 
                              (11.16)       (9.57)       (9.57)                
 
Age                           0.0138          0.0127*           0.0127*** 
                               (3.10)            (4.06)            (4.06)    
   
 
Age squared                 0.0000480         0.0000856       0.0000855    
                               (0.70)            (1.75)               (1.74)    
  
 
Male                         0.153**          0.163**       0.163*** 
                               (9.05)         (11.71)          (11.71)                              
     
 
Urban                        0.143***       0.120*            0.120*** 
                              (19.87)            (4.18)            (4.19)    
  
 
Married                    0.0693*           0.0870**          0.0870*** 
                               (3.70)            (6.40)            (6.40)    
  
  
Head of Household                0.0743**          0.0645***        0.0645*** 
                               (9.90)           (13.44)           (13.43)    
 
 
Skilled Labour               0.484***          0.490***          0.490*** 
                             (16.53)       (15.60)           (15.60)    
 
 Year                           0.0466***         0.0468***         0.0468*** 
                              (19.72)           (24.35)        (24.33)    
 
 Constant               -86.45***         -86.87***         -86.92*** 
                              (-17.84)          (-22.04)          (-21.81)  
 
Observations                   1540253         1540253         1540253    
Adjusted R-squared             0.532             0.548                   
Notes: OLS: Cross-sectional regression, FE: Cross-sectional regression with Province Fixed Effects, RE: 
Cross-sectional regression with Random Effects. All models implemented in the pooled repeated cross sections 
when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-2015).***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 	
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Table 4.2: The Correlation of Education and Income by Quantile (Quantile Regression) 
Dependent Variable:        FE      (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages   Q(0.05)            Q(0.25)             Q(0.50)             Q(0.75)             Q(0.95) 
 
Pre-Primary -0.0547           0.023*   -0.011*             -0.123***      -0.219***       -0.208*** (-
1.09)            (0.011)       (0.004)               (0.003)                (0.004)            (0.005) 
 
Primary                     0.180 0.247***  0.206*** 0.140*** 0.059***        0.016*** 
    (2.90) (0.011)             (0.004)                (0.003)   (0.004)         (0.005) 
 
 
Lower-secondary                0.363*        0.533***             0.411*** 0.334*** 0.241*** 0.209*** (4.31)
 (0.011)             (0.004)                (0.003)   (0.004)       (0.005)
    
 
Upper-secondary        0.515*             0.784***             0.569***          0.493*** 0.441***	 0.443*** (5.22)              
(0.011)              (0.004)                (0.003)               (0.004)              (0.005)  
 
 
Diploma                 0.646**        0.980***             0.721***  0.669*** 0.628***						0.674***	
   (6.49) (0.011)             (0.004)                (0.004)   (0.004)            (0.005)  
 
 
Bachelor                 1.036** 1.403*** 1.179*** 1.219***       1.176***        1.098*** 
                (8.69) (0.011)             (0.004)  (0.004)                 (0.004)           (0.005) 
 
 
Masters    1.195** 1.569*** 1.384*** 1.407*** 1.288***        1.272*** 
    (10.53)  (0.011)              (0.005)                (0.004)   (0.004)           (0.006)  
 
 
PhD    1.452*** 2.006*** 1.781***        1.646*** 1.473***        1.604*** 
     (16.74) (0.014)              (0.007)                (0.004)   (0.005)            (0.018)  
 
Observations                1540253   1591389              1591389          1591389    1591389         1591389 
Notes:  All models implemented in the pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 15-60 year-old 
NLFS (2006-2015). ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively. Taking No education (year of 
education equl to zero) as the reference level of education.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
189 
Table 4.3: The First-Stage of the Eligibility Cohort on Years of Schooling 
Dependent Variable:                 (1)         (2)              
Years of schooling        COMP6    COMP9 
     (38-49 year-old)              (17-28 year-old)             
 Years of schooling                 1.054***     0.380***  
       (0.000)                (0.000)              
Validity of the Instruments         
F-test: Staiger & Stock (1997)  4159.6          1213.3   
Observations         84414       51820               
Notes: COMP6 defines 6-year compulsory schooling taking value of 1 for the Treatment6 (born in 1968) and 0 
for Control6 (born in the 1966). COMP9 define 9-year compulsory schooling taking value of 1 for the 
Treatment9 (born in 1989) and 0 for Control9 (born in the 1987). ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten 
percent, respectively.	F-Statistics according to Staiger & Stock (1997) is observed by excluding the instruments 
from the first-stage IV regression. 
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Table 4.3.1: The First-Stage of the Eligibility Cohort on Years of Schooling [The Same Age]: 6-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Dependent Variable:          (1)       
       
Log of Monthly Wages             The First-stage COMP6  
 
38-49 year-old               0.857***      
        (0.000)                         
F-test =  9043.4 
40 year-old              3.632***        
        (0.000)              
F-test = 2770.0 
  
41 year-old              1.429***    
        (0.001)              
F-test = 1525.5 
 
42 year-old              -2.697***    
        (0.000)              
F-test = 1957.5 
 
43 year-old              1.176***     
        (0.000)              
F-test = 1733.5 
 
44 year-old              0.959***      
        (0.014)              
F-test =  1143.6 
 
45 year-old              3.687***      
       (0.000)              
F-test = 2943.4  
46 year-old              3.522***     
       (0.000)              
F-test = 1263.6 
 
47 year-old              -2.582***      
       (0.000)              
F-test =  1146.9 
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Table 4.3.2: The First-Stage of the Eligibility Cohort on Years of Schooling [The Same Age]: 9-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform 
Dependent Variable:          (1)       
       
Log of Monthly Wages              The First-stage COMP9 
 
22-28 year-old                 0.459***     
           (0.000)                
F-test = 5068.5 
 
19 year-old              2.338***        
        (0.000)              
F-test = 209.8 
 
20 year-old              0.197**    
        (0.003)              
F-test = 82.46 
 
21 year-old              -2.651***    
        (0.000)              
F-test = 343.5 
 
22 year-old              0.0718     
        (0.278)              
F-test =  305.2 
 
23 year-old              -0.238***      
        (0.001)              
F-test = 440.8 
 
24 year-old              2.274***      
       (0.000)              
F-test =  966.6 
 
25 year-old              1.766***     
       (0.000)              
F-test = 824.8 
 
26 year-old              -2.315***      
       (0.000)              
F-test = 691.6 
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Table 4.3.3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the First-Stage of the Eligibility Cohort on Years of 
Schooling  
Dependent 
Variable:     
Years of 
Schooling 
COMP6 COMP9 
Treatment6 Control6 Normal Differences Treatment9 Control9 
Normal 
Differences 
2015 
 
7.691 
 
7.238 
 
0.453 
(0.235) 
13.315 
 
13.151 
 
0.164 
(0.269) 
2006 
 
8.704 
 
7.836 
 
0.868*** 
(0.116) 
11.037 
 
11.789 
 
-0.753*** 
(0.174) 
  
Difference-in-Differences =   -0.415 
                                                (0.324) 
Difference-in-Differences =     0.917** 
                                                  (0.201) 
2014 
 
15.381 
 
15.746 
 
-0.365* 
0.042 
15.381 
 
15.746 
 
-0.365* 
(0.139) 
2007 
 
10.952 
 
11.780 
 
-0.828*** 
0.054 
10.952 
 
11.780 
 
-0.828*** 
(0.076) 
  
Difference-in-Differences =     0.462 
                                                   (0.088) 
Difference-in-Differences =      0.462 
                                                  (0.201) 
2013 
 
12.078 
 
11.763 
 
0.316** 
(0.061) 15.795 15.991 
-0.196*** 
0.016   
2008 
 
12.079 
 
11.784 
 
0.295*** 
(0.060) 14.377 15.029 
-0.652*** 
0.032 
  
Difference-in-Differences =    0.020 
                                                    (0.099) 
Difference-in-Differences =      0.456*** 
                                                   (0.047) 
2012 
 
8.994 
 
8.284 
 
0.710** 
(0.262) 
12.794 
 
12.966 
 
-0.172 
(0.090 )  
2009 
 
8.989 
 
8.226 
 
0.763*** 
(0.075) 
11.753 
 
12.441 
 
-0.688*** 
(0.048) 
  
Difference-in-Differences =    -0.053 
                                                    (0.193) 
Difference-in-Differences =     0.516** 
                                                   (0.127) 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
193 
Table 4.4: The Returns to Education with and without Instrumental Variables Methods 
 Dependent Variable:    (1)            (2)                    (3)               (4) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            FE(COMP6)              IV(COMP6)            FE(COMP9)                   IV(COMP9) 
 
Years of schooling           0.0544**           0.128***         0.0258**                   0.0847*** 
                            (11.69)           (20.10)    (9.29)                 (11.93)    
 
Age                          -0.0130                -0.0232           
                             (-0.21)               (-0.73)           
 
*Benchmark group    Age Dummies*     Age Dummies*         
COMP6: 49 year-old    38 year-old -0.839***   17 year-old -0.371*** 
COMP9: 28year-old     (-8.96)     (-9.27) 
      39 year-old -0.694***   18 year-old    -0.286*** 
         (-8.85)      (-9.82) 
      40 year-old   -0.857***  19 year-old    -0.395*** 
         (-9.46)       (-16.46) 
      41 year-old   -0.581***   20 year-old   -0.268*** 
         (-7.12)      (-30.00) 
      42 year-old   -0.756***   21 year-old    -0.398*** 
         (-9.54)      (-15.96) 
      43 year-old   -0.463***   22 year-old   -0.247*** 
          (-8.43)      (-12.22) 
      44 year-old   -0.360***   23 year-old    -0.199*** 
          (-6.55)       (-11.91)    
      45 year-old   -0.319***   24 year-old  -0.207*** 
           (-5.42)      (-9.37) 
      46 year-old   -0.344***   25 year-old   -0.133*** 
           (-5.94)      (-7.05) 
      47 year-old   -0.0497     26 year-old   -0.0263* 
           (-1.03)      (-2.11) 
      48 year-old   -0.464***   27 year-old -0.169***
         (-8.11)      (-5.84) 
       
Age squared                0.000408            0.00128           
                              (0.59)               (1.94)           
 
Male                        0.156**          0.0979***   0.0643*        0.0961*** 
                              (9.39)           (13.97)   (4.40)         (6.34) 
 
Urban                       0.140*           0.0390   0.0583         0.0492** 
                              (3.48)           (1.76)   (3.07)                     (2.87) 
 
Married                   0.0883**          0.0983***   -0.00402         0.0433*** 
                              (9.34)           (16.86)   (-0.42)                    (3.71) 
  
Head of Household              0.0713**         0.0759***  0.0595         0.0775*** 
                              (9.39)           (25.88)   (3.00)                    (5.66)   
 
Skilled Labour             0.588***               0              0.258***                     0    
                             (17.44)                (.)            (15.12)                   (.)    
 
Year                         0.0374***             -0.0136**  0.0605***         0.0453*** 
                             (13.22)               (-3.20)   (17.67)         (17.36) 
  
Constant                     -67.58**          35.08***  -113.6***        -111.5*** 
                            (-11.21)           (4.13)   (-16.59)    (-15.46)   
  
Observations                  84414             84414             51820                    51820    
Adjusted R-squared            0.539                             0.367   0.423                            0.250 
Notes: FE(COMPY): Non-instrument linear regression with Province Fixed-Effects, IV(COMPY): Instrument 
Variable Methods with Province Fixed-Effects, Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year 
compulsory schooling), The models of the FE/IV(COMP6) are implemented on the pooled repeated cross 
sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The models of the 
FE/IV(COMP9) are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 
1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old), The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 
regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively 
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Table 4.5: The Returns to Education with and without Instrumental Variables Methods using the “same-age” 
Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: Log of 
Monthly Wages 
 
 
Non-instrument Linear Regression 
 
FE(COMP6) 
 
 
Instrument Variable Methods 
 
IV(COMP6) 
 
 
Pooled Cross-sectional 
(38-49 year-old) 
 
 
0.0544** 
(11.69) 
 
 
0.128***        
(20.27)          
 
The “same-age” Analysis 
 
FE(COMP6a) 
 
 
IV(COMP6a) 
 
40 year-old 0.0579***  (13.31) 
0.133***  
(18.33) 
41 year-old  0.0597***  (13.26) 
 0.125*** 
 (20.14) 
42 year-old  0.0638**  (9.71) 
0.138***  
 (21.39) 
43 year-old  0.0552** (9.69) 
0.126*** 
  (15.20)  
44 year-old 0.0581**   (11.94) 
0.123***  
(22.22) 
45 year-old 0.0623**  (8.97) 
 0.124***           
(19.18) 
46 year-old  0.0576** (12.36) 
0.123***  
(56.68)   
47 year-old 0.0677** (8.20)  
 0.129***   
 (37.20) 
Note: FE(COMPY): Non-instrument linear regression with Province Fixed-Effects, IV(COMPYa): Instrument 
Variable Methods with Province Fixed-Effects, Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year 
compulsory schooling). Subscription a indicate the estimation using the same age analysis. The standard error 
given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, 
five, ten percent, respectively 
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Table 4.6: The Returns to Education with and without Instrumental Variables Methods using the “same-age” 
Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: Log of 
Monthly Wages 
 
 
Non-instrument Linear Regression 
 
FE(COMP9) 
 
 
Instrument Variable Methods 
 
IV(COMP9) 
 
 
Pooled Cross-sectional 
 (17-28 year-old) 
 
0.0258**         
(9.29)          
 
0.0849***  
(11.97)   
  
The “same-age” Analysis 
 
FE(COMP9a) 
 
 
IV(COMP9a) 
 
19 year-old  0.0161*   (3.73) 
0.0722***    
(4.54) 
20 year-old  0.0191**   (8.85) 
 0.0891*** 
(6.02) 
21 year-old  0.0225*** (16.85) 
0.0967***  
(6.75) 
22 year-old   0.0246**           (11.11)   
0.0861***   
(11.51) 
23 year-old 0.0272**    (7.83) 
0.0864***   
(13.89) 
24 year-old 0.0302**   (10.58) 
0.0875***   
 (19.04) 
25 year-old  0.0275**  (8.74) 
0.0811***    
 (12.34) 
26 year-old     0.0313**    (10.16) 
   0.0875*** 
(19.40) 
Note: FE(COMPY): Non-instrument linear regression with Province Fixed-Effects, IV(COMPYa): Instrument 
Variable Methods with Province Fixed-Effects, Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year 
compulsory schooling). Subscription a indicate the estimation using the same age analysis. The standard error 
given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, 
five, ten percent, respectively 
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Table 4.7: The Returns to Education on Income of the Difference-in-Differences Approach  [6-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Differences 
(Treatment6 VS Control6) Difference-in-Differences 
Sample 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
 
43-47 years old 
(R-square=0.46) 
 
 
 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
43 years old 
(R-square=0.45) 
 
 
0.018 
 (0.014) 
 
 
0.094*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.076*** 
(0.022) 
 
 
44 years old 
(R-square=0.45) 
 
 
0.027* 
(0.015) 
 
 
0.107*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
0.081*** 
(0.024) 
 
 
45 years old 
(R-square=0.43) 
 
 
0.088*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.184*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.096*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
46 years old 
(R-square=0.45) 
 
 
0.053*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.126*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.073*** 
(0.023) 
 
 
47 years old 
(R-square=0.44) 
 
 
0.118*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
0.144*** 
(0.025) 
 
 
0.027  
(0.035) 
 
 
47 years old (q=1) 
(R-square=0.45) 
 
 
0.122*** 
(0.030) 
 
 
0.213*** 
(0.033) 
 
 
0.091* 
(0.050) 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 
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Table 4.8: The Returns to Education on Income of the Difference-in-Differences Approach  [6-year 
Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Differences 
(Treatment9 VS Control9) 
 
Difference-in-Differences 
 Sample 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
 
22-26 years old 
(R-square=0.27) 
 
 
 
-0.120*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.048***  
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.073*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
22 years old 
(R-square=0.14) 
 
 
0.018*** 
 (0.012) 
 
 
0.061*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
0.043** 
(0.017) 
 
 
23 years old 
(R-square=0.17) 
 
 
0.003  
(0.014) 
 
 
0.148*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
0.146*** 
(0.016) 
 
 
24 years old 
(R-square=0.22) 
 
 
0.059*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.242*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.183*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
25 years old 
(R-square=0.24) 
 
 
0.121*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.230*** 
(0.016) 
 
 
0.109*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
26 years old 
(R-square=0.24) 
 
 
0.222*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.192*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
-0.030 
(0.019) 
 
 
26 years old (q=1) 
(R-square=0.29) 
 
 
0.220*** 
(0.017) 
 
 
0.282*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
0.062** 
(0.026) 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 																				
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Table 4.9: The Returns to Education at Different Quantiles  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)  Q(0.75)  Q(0.95) 
Primary Education 
 
QR    -0.069*          -0.126***        -0.178***        -0.151***        -0.165*** 
                             (0.031)          (0.012)          (0.010)          (0.011)          (0.018) 
 
IVQR    -0.007            0.093*           0.119***         0.211***         0.497** 
 (0.105)          (0.040)          (0.035)         (0.057)          (0.177)  
Lower-secondary Education                 
 
QR                      -0.029           -0.086***        -0.133***        -0.075***        -0.032    
                             (0.028)          (0.011)          (0.010)          (0.010)          (0.018) 
 
IVQR                      0.090            0.162*           0.184**          0.279***         0.474*   
     (0.192)          (0.066)          (0.057)          (0.070)          (0.200) 
Upper-secondary Education     
 
QR              0.116***         0.006            0.047***         0.258***        0.189***  
     (0.029)          (0.013)          (0.013)          (0.014)          (0.020)   
 
IVQR                     0.629            0.508**          0.479**          0.592**          0.762    
     (0.403)          (0.180)          (0.163)          (0.194)          (0.404)   
Diploma Certificate  
 
QR                     0.308***         0.421***         0.390***         0.335***         0.234*** 
                             (0.036)          (0.017)         (0.015)          (0.015)          (0.022) 
 
IVQR                       1.218**          1.276***         1.231***         1.171***         1.043* 
     (0.434)          (0.232)          (0.203)          (0.264)          (0.422) 
Bachelor Degree 
 
QR                          0.206***         0.215***         0.248***         0.211***         0.238*** 
                             (0.019)          (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.012) 
 
IVQR                        1.296**          1.283***         1.187***         1.066***         0.887* 
                                      (0.476)          (0.258)          (0.255)          (0.266)          (0.400)    
Masters Degree 
 
QR            0.063*           0.021           -0.086***        -0.098***        -0.074*** 
                             (0.027)          (0.014)          (0.011)          (0.012)          (0.020)    
 
IVQR              0.914            0.895            0.912            0.692            0.294 
             (1.536)          (0.757)          (0.700)          (1.192)          (1.592)    
Doctorate Degree 
 
QR  0.212***         0.096***        -0.034           -0.035*           0.025   
                            (0.029)          (0.017)          (0.018)          (0.015)          (0.058)   
   
IVQR              0.302            0.607            0.474            0.237            0.059    
              (5.247)          (3.092)          (1.849)          (1.253)          (2.334) 
 
 
Observstions   87058            87058            87058            87058            87058   
Notes: All models implemented in the pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 38 to 49 NLFS 
(2006-2015).QR is the Quantile Regression; IVQR is the Instrumental variable quantile regression methods. 
The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular level of 
education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error given in 
parentheses 					
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Table 4.9.1: The Returns to the Primary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression 
Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR    -0.069*          -0.126***        -0.178***        -0.151***        -0.165*** 
                             (0.031)          (0.012)          (0.010)          (0.011)          (0.018) 
 
IVQR    -0.007            0.093*           0.119***         0.211***         0.497** 
 (0.105)          (0.040)          (0.035)         (0.057)          (0.177)  
 
 
40                      0.288**          0.281***         0.311***         0.610***         1.071*** 
                             (0.106)          (0.048)          (0.054)          (0.120)          (0.136) 
 
Observations 14891            14891            14891 14891            14891 
 
41                   0.510*          0.370**     0.409**   0.728** 1.204***                          
(0.222)          (0.113)          (0.130)          (0.248)          (0.272) 
 
Observations    10068            10068            10068            10068            10068 
 
42                       -0.288           -0.120*         -0.070     -0.049  -0.051                            
 (0.174)          (0.055)          (0.049)          (0.057)          (0.137) 
 
Observations    12213            12213            12213            12213            12213    
 
43                      1.162***         0.875***         0.978***         1.374***         1.627*** 
                            (0.301)          (0.167)          (0.190)          (0.146)          (0.161)   
 
 Observations   11061            11061            11061            11061            11061   
 
44    1.954**          1.536***       1.519***   1.734*** 2.048***                          
     (0.731)          (0.403)          (0.349)          (0.247)         (0.366) 
 
Observations    8818             8818             8818             8818             8818   
   
45    0.382***         0.361***         0.453***         0.836***         1.302*** 
                             (0.095)          (0.047)          (0.046)          (0.127)         (0.117)   
 
Observations    12348            12348            12348            12348            12348    
 
46   0.507***         0.396***         0.470***         0.933***         1.317*** 
                            (0.150)          (0.069)          (0.075)          (0.156)          (0.114)   
 
Observations    6904             6904             6904             6904             6904   
 
47   -0.288           -0.154           -0.118     -0.046  -0.091                            
     (0.234)          (0.109)          (0.077)          (0.091)          (0.216)   
 
Observations      5509             5509             5509             5509             5509   
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9.2: The Returns to the Lower-secondary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile 
Regression Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                      -0.029           -0.086***        -0.133***        -0.075***        -0.032    
                             (0.028)          (0.011)          (0.010)          (0.010)          (0.018) 
 
IVQR                      0.090            0.162*           0.184**          0.279***         0.474*   
     (0.192)          (0.066)          (0.057)          (0.070)          (0.200) 
 
 
40    0.250***         0.266***         0.276***         0.450***         0.817*** 
                             (0.071)          (0.033)          (0.032)          (0.061)          (0.108) 
   
Observations    14891            14891            14891            14891            14891 
 
41                      1.968            1.650***         1.755***         1.905***         2.262*** 
                             (2.331)          (0.414)          (0.463)          (0.346)          (0.570)   
 
Observations    10068            10068            10068            10068            10068    
 
42                       -0.693***        -0.205**         -0.105           -0.042           -0.022 
                            (0.194)          (0.070)          (0.061)          (0.088)          (0.186)    
 
Observations    12213            12213            12213            12213            12213    
 
43                1.918**          1.668***         1.792***         1.896***         2.183*** 
                            (0.650)          (0.330)          (0.215)          (0.177)          (0.284) 
 
Observations    11061            11061            11061            11061            11061   
 
44   -0.606*          -0.182           -0.080      0.041  0.091                           
 (0.280)          (0.096)          (0.104)          (0.186)          (0.533)  
  
Observations   8818             8818             8818             8818             8818   
 
45    0.474***       0.405***  0.400***  0.511*** 0.941***                         
     (0.077)          (0.031)          (0.025)          (0.052)          (0.124)   
 
Observations    12348            12348            12348            12348            12348 
 
46    0.441***       0.370***         0.366***         0.494***         0.981*** 
                             (0.099)          (0.042)          (0.040)          (0.075)          (0.125) 
 
Observations    6904           6904             6904             6904             6904   
 
47   -0.403**        -0.125*          -0.047           -0.000            0.095   
                            (0.132)          (0.055)          (0.045)          (0.055)          (0.263) 
 
Observations    5509             5509             5509             5509             5509    
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 									
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Table 4.9.3: The Returns to the Upper-secondary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile 
Regression Methods using the “same-age” Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR              0.116***         0.006            0.047***         0.258***        0.189***  
     (0.029)          (0.013)          (0.013)          (0.014)          (0.020)   
 
IVQR                     0.629            0.508**          0.479**          0.592**          0.762    
     (0.403)          (0.180)          (0.163)          (0.194)          (0.404)    
 
40                      0.942***         0.796***         0.878***         1.147***         1.438***                           
     (0.224)          (0.117)          (0.120)          (0.144)          (0.244) 
 
Observations                  14891            14891            14891            14891            14891   
  
41           2.876*           2.283***         2.200***         2.212***         2.497** 
                             (1.224)          (0.585)          (0.408)          (0.431)          (0.813)    
 
Observations                  10068            10068            10068            10068            10068 
   
42                       -0.547*          -0.162           -0.011            0.065            0.054                             
     (0.264)          (0.111)          (0.107)          (0.181)          (0.408) 
 
Observations   12213            12213            12213            12213            12213    
 
43                2.280*           1.993***         2.003***         2.020***         2.303*** 
                            (1.053)          (0.318)          (0.218)          (0.220)          (0.388) 
 
Observations                  11061            11061            11061            11061            11061  
 
44      -0.405           -0.063            0.095            0.375            0.504 
                             (0.227)          (0.116)          (0.146)          (0.250)         (0.377)   
 
Observations                   8818            8818             8818             8818             8818   
  
45   1.112***         0.886***         1.052***         1.347***         1.755***                           
   (0.189)          (0.111)          (0.179)          (0.157)          (0.189)   
 
Observations                  12348            12348            12348            12348            12348   
 
46    1.361***         1.023***         1.099***         1.386***         1.715***  
    (0.376)          (0.155)          (0.155)          (0.173)          (0.231)  
 
Observations                   6904             6904             6904             6904             6904   
  
47    -0.399**         -0.144           -0.013              0.057            0.133 
                             (0.135)          (0.093)          (0.095)                 (0.127)          (0.281) 
 
Observations                   5509             5509             5509             5509             5509 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9.4: The Returns to the Diploma of the Instrumental variables Quantile Regression Methods using the 
“same-age” Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                     0.308***         0.421***         0.390***         0.335***         0.234*** 
                             (0.036)          (0.017)         (0.015)          (0.015)          (0.022) 
 
IVQR                       1.218**          1.276***         1.231***         1.171***         1.043* 
     (0.434)          (0.232)          (0.203)          (0.264)          (0.422) 
 
 
40                 0.742***         0.693***         0.832***         0.986***         0.934*** 
                             (0.165)          (0.092)          (0.082)          (0.087)          (0.237) 
  
Observations                  14891            14891            14891            14891            14891    
  
41              -0.310           -0.000            0.090            0.048           -0.667 
                             (0.560)          (0.562)          (0.560)          (0.554)          (2.789)  
   
Observations                  10068            10068            10068            10068            10068 
 
42                       -0.364***         0.016            0.151*           0.223**          0.038  
     (0.104)          (0.059)          (0.076)         (0.086)          (0.158) 
 
Observations                  12213            12213            12213            12213            12213    
  
43                            -0.519           -0.000            0.102            0.253            0.105   
                             (0.275)          (0.234)          (0.262)          (0.352)          (0.527) 
 
Observations                  11061            11061            11061            11061            11061 
 
44   -0.223            0.056            0.209            0.241            0.234   
                           (0.131)          (0.098)          (0.110)          (0.155)          (0.276)   
 
Observations                   8818             8818             8818             8818             8818   
 
45    1.070***         0.875***         0.996***         1.178***         1.353*** 
                             (0.174)          (0.054)          (0.092)          (0.066)          (0.116)   
 
Observations                  12348            12348            12348            12348            12348  
 
46   1.154***       0.875***     0.999***  1.202*** 1.377***                         
(0.170)          (0.094)          (0.109)          (0.102)          (0.226)   
 
Observations                   6904             6904             6904             6904             6904 
   
47  -0.283*          -0.060            0.065            0.223            0.095 
                            (0.123)          (0.071)          (0.073)          (0.133)          (0.205) 
 
Observations                   5509             5509             5509             5509             5509 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9.5: The Returns to the Bachelor’s degree of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Methods 
using the “same-age” Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                          0.206***         0.215***         0.248***         0.211***         0.238*** 
                             (0.019)          (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.008)          (0.012) 
 
IVQR                        1.296**          1.283***         1.187***         1.066***         0.887* 
                                      (0.476)          (0.258)          (0.255)          (0.266)          (0.400)    
  
 
40                      1.876***         1.654***         1.659***         1.755***         2.002***                           
     (0.378)          (0.208)          (0.132)          (0.219)          (0.357) 
 
Observations                  14891            14891            14891            14891            14891   
  
41          2.804**         2.229***         2.075***         2.078***         2.377**                          
     (0.921)          (0.526)          (0.436)          (0.417)          (0.837) 
 
Observations                 10068            10068            10068            10068            10068 
 
42   -0.134            0.149            0.191            0.204           -0.098   
                            (0.168)          (0.103)          (0.122)          (0.159)          (0.250) 
 
 Observations                 12213            12213            12213            12213            12213   
 
43              2.387***         2.067***         1.996***         2.047***         2.335*** 
                            (0.422)          (0.200)          (0.181)          (0.152)          (0.394)   
  
 Observations                  11061            11061            11061            11061            11061    
 
44  -0.025            0.291            0.404*    0.292 0.010                             
  (0.254)          (0.169)          (0.189)          (0.196)          (0.234)   
 
Observations                   8818             8818             8818             8818             8818   
 
45    1.792***      1.576*** 1.609*** 1.723*** 1.989***                          
    (0.203)          (0.107)          (0.106)          (0.113)          (0.229) 
 
Observations                  12348            12348            12348            12348            12348    
 
46  2.070***      1.719*** 1.733*** 1.807*** 2.014***                          
  (0.364)          (0.250)          (0.168)          (0.172)          (0.434) 
 
Observations                   6904             6904             6904             6904             6904   
  
47   -0.059            0.105            0.192            0.142           -0.144   
                            (0.340)          (0.148)          (0.180)          (0.243)          (0.332) 
 
Observations                   5509             5509             5509             5509             5509 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9.6: The Returns to the Master’s degree of the Instrumental variables Quantile Regression Methods 
using the “same-age” Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR            0.063*           0.021           -0.086***        -0.098***        -0.074*** 
                             (0.027)          (0.014)          (0.011)          (0.012)          (0.020)    
 
IVQR              0.914            0.895            0.912            0.692            0.294 
             (1.536)          (0.757)          (0.700)          (1.192)          (1.592)    
 
 
40                      0.829***         0.983***  0.898*** 0.539*** 0.287**                           
(0.133)          (0.074)          (0.088)          (0.076)          (0.090) 
 
Observations                  14891            14891            14891            14891            14891   
 
41          2.485***         2.015***         1.922***         1.875***         2.093*   
                            (0.589)          (0.387)          (0.256)          (0.259)          (0.836)  
 
Observations        10068            10068            10068            10068            10068 
 
42   0.253**          0.435***         0.394***         0.188***        -0.024   
                            (0.094)          (0.082)          (0.067)          (0.052)          (0.064) 
 
Observations                 12213            12213            12213            12213            12213    
 
43                     2.315***         2.070***         2.002***         2.022***         2.202**  
                            (0.401)          (0.249)          (0.277)          (0.206)          (0.672)  
 
Observations                  11061            11061            11061            11061            11061    
 
44  -0.039            0.077            0.040           -0.036           -0.144   
                            (0.222)          (0.188)          (0.116)          (0.079)          (0.115) 
 
Observations                   8818             8818             8818             8818             8818    
 
45         1.033***         1.114*** 1.126***         0.840***        0.395***                           
     (0.153)          (0.077)          (0.070)          (0.155)          (0.114) 
 
Observations                  12348            12348            12348            12348            12348   
 
46    1.099***         1.126***         1.111***         0.840***         0.355* 
                            (0.318)          (0.094)          (0.100)          (0.170)          (0.142)   
 
Observations                   6904             6904             6904             6904             6904    
 
47         0.209*           0.555***         0.507***         0.252**          0.032 
                             (0.090)          (0.100)          (0.119)          (0.081)          (0.110) 
 
Observations                   5509             5509             5509             5509             5509    
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9.7: The Returns to the Doctorate degree of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Methods 
using the “same-age” Analysis  [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR  0.212***         0.096***        -0.034           -0.035*           0.025   
                            (0.029)          (0.017)          (0.018)          (0.015)          (0.058)   
   
IVQR              0.302            0.607            0.474            0.237            0.059    
              (5.247)          (3.092)          (1.849)          (1.253)          (2.334) 
 
 
40     2.324***         1.949***         1.875***         1.862***         2.033***  
  (0.363)          (0.232)         (0.124)          (0.152)          (0.483)   
 
Observations                 14891            14891            14891            14891            14891 
 
41                 3.230*           3.059***         2.675***         2.730***         2.448*** 
                             (1.429)          (0.350)          (0.363)          (0.450)          (0.673) 
 
Observations                  10068            10068            10068            10068            10068    
  
42                       0.346            0.308            0.188            0.113     0.125                  
(0.385)          (0.206)         (0.113)          (0.111)          (0.213)   
  
Observations                  12213            12213            12213            12213            12213  
 
43                            2.117***         1.812***         1.740***         2.120***         2.414*** 
                             (0.614)         (0.150)          (0.215)          (0.175)          (0.420) 
 
Observations                  11061            11061            11061            11061            11061 
 
44   0.356            0.285           0.164            0.037           -0.154   
                            (0.648)          (0.331)          (0.150)          (0.126)         (0.370) 
 
Observations                   8818             8818             8818             8818             8818 
 
45  2.381***         1.980***         1.883***         1.869***         2.079*** 
                            (0.372)          (0.089)          (0.086)          (0.094)          (0.581) 
 
Observations                  12348            12348            12348            12348            12348 
 
46          2.572***         2.008***         1.885***         1.858***         2.120*** 
                             (0.507)          (0.147)          (0.130)          (0.226)          (0.453) 
 
Observations                   6904             6904             6904             6904             6904      
 
47     0.624            0.400            0.212            0.126            0.014   
                            (0.603)          (0.303)          (0.134)          (0.119)          (0.338) 
   
Observations                   5509             5509             5509             5509             5509 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10: The Returns to Education at Different Quantiles  [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
Primary Education 
 
QR                      -0.200***      -0.118***   -0.112***   -0.101*** -0.049*                           
(0.046)          (0.015)          (0.011)          (0.012)          (0.023) 
 
IVQR    1.408**          0.908***         0.851***         0.936***         1.262*** 
     (0.437)          (0.141)          (0.080)          (0.110)          (0.174)   
 
Lower-secondary Education 
 
QR    -0.044           -0.012           -0.029***        -0.037***        -0.054** 
                            (0.025)          (0.009)          (0.007)          (0.007)          (0.017) 
 
IVQR      1.347***         0.782***         0.693***         0.720***         1.198*** 
                            (0.151)          (0.060)          (0.049)          (0.053)          (0.121) 
 
Upper-secondary Education 
    
QR              -0.039           -0.018           -0.031***        -0.017*          -0.037*   
                           (0.030)          (0.009)          (0.007)          (0.007)          (0.017)    
 
IVQR                          1.157***         0.643***         0.533***         0.538***         0.787*** 
                            (0.086)          (0.035)          (0.029)          (0.031)          (0.075) 
 
Diploma Certificate  
 
QR                       0.111***         0.154***         0.187***         0.254***         0.324*** 
                             (0.034)          (0.011)          (0.009)          (0.012)          (0.024) 
    
IVQR    1.191***         0.689***         0.606***         0.636***         0.823*** 
                          (0.084)          (0.036)          (0.029)          (0.028)          (0.060)   
 
Bachelor Degree 
 
QR                0.160***         0.095***         0.090***         0.089***         0.108*** 
                             (0.019)          (0.006)          (0.005)          (0.005)          (0.011)    
 
IVQR             1.286***         0.758***         0.686***         0.733***         0.930*** 
                             (0.089)          (0.039)          (0.028)          (0.028)          (0.056)   
   
Masters Degree 
 
QR   -0.055            0.028            0.098***         0.032*           0.067*   
                             (0.038)          (0.015)         (0.011)          (0.016)          (0.032) 
 
IVQR        1.543***         1.186***         1.043***         1.061***         1.347*** 
                             (0.160)          (0.071)          (0.066)          (0.076)          (0.090) 
 
Doctorate Degree  
 
QR   0.283***         0.319***         0.235***         0.249***         0.318 
                             (0.045)          (0.052)          (0.030)          (0.037)          (0.319) 
 
IVQR        1.556***         1.272***         1.210***         1.232***         1.572*** 
                                      (0.200)          (0.267)          (0.119)          (0.123)          (0.224) 
 
 
Observstion   53644            53644            53644            53644            53644  
 
Notes: All models implemented in the pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 17 to 28 NLFS 
(2006-2015). QR is the Quantile Regression; IVQR is the Instrumental variable quantile regression methods. 
The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular level of 
education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error given in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.1: The Returns to the Primary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression 
Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                      -0.200***      -0.118***   -0.112***   -0.101*** -0.049*                           
(0.046)          (0.015)          (0.011)          (0.012)          (0.023) 
 
IVQR    1.408**          0.908***         0.851***         0.936***         1.262*** 
     (0.437)          (0.141)          (0.080)          (0.110)          (0.174)   
 
 
19                      1.204**          0.583***         0.434***         0.429***         1.504* 
                             (0.467)          (0.132)          (0.120)          (0.115)          (0.644) 
 
Observations                   4889             4889             4889             4889             4889    
 
20                   -1.130           -0.563            -0.405           -0.335           -0.799   
                             (0.934)          (0.446)                (0.466)          (0.399)          (1.600)  
   
Observations                   5986             5986             5986             5986             5986   
 
21                       -0.405           -0.288           -0.248           -0.230           -0.258    
                             (0.236)          (0.294)          (0.239)          (0.211)          (0.303) 
 
Observations                   5918             5918             5918             5918             5918 
 
22                    1.632***         1.277***      1.099***  1.117*** 1.243***                          
   (0.208)          (0.265)          (0.143)          (0.206)          (0.368)  
  
Observations                   6764             6764             6764             6764             6764     
 
23         -1.138***        -0.463***        -0.376***        -0.391***        -0.647*** 
                            (0.158)          (0.095)          (0.068)          (0.076)          (0.180) 
 
Observations                   8121             8121             8121             8121             8121    
 
24    1.515***         1.223***      1.155*** 1.269*** 1.495***                          
    (0.082)          (0.072)          (0.067)          (0.088)          (0.306) 
 
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412    
 
25   1.686***         1.204***     1.043*** 1.096*** 1.368***                          
   (0.392)          (0.119)          (0.081)          (0.106)          (0.215)   
 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830             8830             8830    
 
26   0.288            0.157            0.052      0.025  -0.000                           
    (0.641)          (0.691)          (0.371)          (0.163)          (0.396) 
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.2: The Returns to the Lower-secondary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile 
Regression Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR    -0.044           -0.012           -0.029***        -0.037***        -0.054** 
                            (0.025)          (0.009)          (0.007)          (0.007)          (0.017) 
 
IVQR      1.347***         0.782***         0.693***         0.720***         1.198*** 
                            (0.151)          (0.060)          (0.049)          (0.053)          (0.121) 
 
 
19                       0.492**          0.288***         0.223***         0.223***         0.336**                            
     (0.171)          (0.056)          (0.041)          (0.038)          (0.105) 
 
Observations                   4889             4889             4889             4889             4889 
 
20           1.456            0.805            0.589            0.547            2.275 
                             (1.077)          (0.508)          (0.339)          (0.367)          (5.759)  
 
Observations                   5986             5986             5986             5986             5986 
 
21                       -0.405           -0.149           -0.101           -0.086           -0.140   
                             (0.212)          (0.076)          (0.058)          (0.059)          (0.121)   
 
Observations                   5918             5918             5918             5918             5918    
 
22                    -1.244***        -0.539***   -0.457*** -0.502*** -0.830**                           
   (0.344)          (0.146)          (0.134)          (0.143)         (0.295) 
 
 Observations                   6764            6764             6764             6764             6764  
 
23    -1.386***    -0.568***  -0.442*** -0.427*** -0.620***                          
     (0.244)          (0.081)          (0.052)          (0.053)          (0.117)   
 
Observations                   8121             8121             8121             8121             8121 
 
24    1.378***         0.905***         0.811***         0.847***         1.099*** 
                             (0.122)          (0.047)          (0.044)          (0.050)          (0.091)  
   
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412   
 
25   1.184***         0.820***      0.783*** 0.835*** 1.207***                         
    (0.101)          (0.061)          (0.048)          (0.057)          (0.122)  
 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830            8830             8830 
 
26   -0.262**         -0.143         -0.083  -0.118  -0.171                            
    (0.090)          (0.118)          (0.063)          (0.073)          (0.159)   
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.3: The Returns to the Upper-secondary Education of the Instrumental Variables Quantile 
Regression Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR              -0.039           -0.018           -0.031***        -0.017*          -0.037*   
                           (0.030)          (0.009)          (0.007)          (0.007)          (0.017)    
 
IVQR                          1.157***         0.643***         0.533***         0.538***         0.787*** 
                            (0.086)          (0.035)          (0.029)          (0.031)          (0.075) 
 
 
19                        0.393***         0.210***         0.149***         0.144***         0.163* 
                             (0.103)          (0.040)          (0.027)          (0.027)          (0.070) 
 
Observations                   4889             4889             4889             4889             4889   
 
20           -1.317           -0.618           -0.408           -0.446           -2.311 
                             (0.869)          (0.460)          (0.398)          (0.423)          (2.830) 
 
Observations                  5986             5986             5986             5986             5986   
  
21                       -0.336**         -0.078           -0.029           -0.020           -0.033                            
     (0.112)          (0.049)          (0.028)          (0.038)          (0.059) 
 
Observations                   5918             5918             5918             5918             5918    
   
22                   -1.482***        -0.693***   -0.536*** -0.506*** -0.974**                           
   (0.268)          (0.190)          (0.122)          (0.152)          (0.318) 
   
Observations                   6764            6764             6764             6764             6764    
  
 23   -1.292***        -0.477***  -0.395*** -0.363*** -0.614***                          
   (0.113)          (0.057)          (0.034)          (0.055)          (0.141)   
  
Observations                   8121             8121             8121             8121             8121 
 
24      1.201***         0.727***         0.705***         0.762***         1.010*** 
                             (0.088)          (0.044)          (0.036)          (0.047)          (0.086)    
 
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412 
 
25   1.067***         0.693***         0.651***         0.724***         1.088*** 
                            (0.099)          (0.047)          (0.050)          (0.046)          (0.104) 
 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830             8830             8830    
 
26   -0.207**         -0.108*          -0.080           -0.105           -0.223 
                             (0.064)          (0.045)          (0.054)          (0.062)          (0.120)  
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217 
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.4: The Returns to the Diploma certicate of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression 
Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                       0.111***         0.154***         0.187***         0.254***         0.324*** 
                             (0.034)          (0.011)          (0.009)          (0.012)          (0.024) 
    
IVQR    1.191***         0.689***         0.606***         0.636***         0.823*** 
                          (0.084)          (0.036)          (0.029)          (0.028)          (0.060)   
 
 
21                       -0.307           -0.066           -0.039           -0.000           -0.023  
     (0.204)          (0.045)          (0.038)          (0.044)          (0.094) 
    
Observations                   5918             5918             5918             5918             5918   
 
22                    1.897***         1.448***         1.314***         1.358***         2.170** 
   (0.494)          (0.256)          (0.201)          (0.233)          (0.777) 
 
 Observations                   6764             6764             6764             6764             6764    
 
23    -1.157***        -0.388***  -0.329***  -0.347*** -0.693***                          
    (0.209)          (0.047)          (0.048)        (0.059)          (0.134) 
 
Observations                   8121             8121             8121             8121             8121 
 
24    1.317***         0.847***         0.787***         0.851***         1.139*** 
                             (0.105)          (0.047)          (0.035)          (0.048)          (0.066) 
 
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412   
 
25   1.136***         0.750***         0.704***         0.754***         0.971*** 
   (0.126)          (0.051)          (0.050)          (0.065)          (0.092) 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830             8830             8830   
 
26   -0.259**         -0.091*          -0.072           -0.105*          -0.231* 
                             (0.083)          (0.038)          (0.043)          (0.050)          (0.116)   
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217    
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.5: The Returns to the Bachelor’s degree of the Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression 
Methods using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR                0.160***         0.095***         0.090***         0.089***         0.108*** 
                             (0.019)          (0.006)          (0.005)          (0.005)          (0.011)    
 
IVQR             1.286***         0.758***         0.686***         0.733***         0.930*** 
                             (0.089)          (0.039)          (0.028)          (0.028)          (0.056)   
 
 
22  1.724***         1.340***         1.228***         1.358***         2.157*** 
                            (0.328)          (0.143)          (0.189)          (0.220)          (0.366)  
 
Observations                   6764             6764             6764             6764             6764   
  
23  -0.972*          -0.372***        -0.298***        -0.316***        -0.536** 
                            (0.384)          (0.060)          (0.070)          (0.078)          (0.203)  
 
Observations                   8121             8121             8121             8121             8121   
   
24    2.015***         1.243***         1.099***         1.204***         1.529*** 
                            (0.167)          (0.087)          (0.038)          (0.055)          (0.105)  
 
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412    
 
25   1.577***         1.204***         1.089***         1.075***         1.386*** 
                            (0.188)          (0.072)          (0.063)          (0.070)          (0.154)   
 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830             8830             8830    
 
26  -0.267*          -0.147*          -0.096           -0.091           -0.287 
                            (0.106)          (0.064)          (0.062)          (0.087)          (0.273) 
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217    
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular level of education 
and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.10.6: The Returns to the Master’s degree of the Instrumental variables Quantile Regression Methods 
using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
QR   -0.055            0.028            0.098***         0.032*           0.067*   
                             (0.038)          (0.015)         (0.011)          (0.016)          (0.032) 
 
IVQR        1.543***         1.186***         1.043***         1.061***         1.347*** 
                             (0.160)          (0.071)          (0.066)          (0.076)          (0.090) 
  
 
24   1.011***         0.706***         0.693***         0.742***         0.822***  
   (0.055)          (0.034)          (0.027)          (0.032)          (0.065)   
 
Observations                   8412             8412             8412             8412             8412   
 
25   0.875***         0.649***         0.624***         0.654***         0.693***  
   (0.081)          (0.036)          (0.033)          (0.034)          (0.083) 
 
Observations                   8830             8830             8830             8830             8830    
   
26  -0.009            0.081**          0.131***         0.111**          0.051 
                            (0.047)          (0.029)          (0.033)          (0.035)          (0.051) 
 
Observations                   6217             6217             6217             6217             6217    
Notes: The education levels are a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals completed at least particular 
level of education and 0 if he/she has not. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, The standard error 
given in parentheses. 
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Table 4.11: The Returns to Education on Income at Different Quantiles of the Difference-in-Differences 
Approach [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Differences 
(Treatment6 VS Control6) 
 
Difference-in-Differences 
 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
43-47 years old 
(R-square=0.46) 
 
 
 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
Q(0.05) 
(R-square=0.15) 
 
 
-0.031  
(0.021) 
 
 
0.021  
(0.021) 
 
 
0.052** 
(0.025) 
 
 
Q(0.25) 
(R-square=0.21) 
 
 
-0.030 *** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
Q(0.50) 
(R-square=0.32) 
 
 
-0.050 *** 
(0.007) 
 
 
0.006  
(0.007) 
 
 
0.055*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
Q(0.75) 
(R-square=0.38) 
 
 
-0.053*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.007  
(0.007) 
 
 
0.046 *** 
(0.008) 
 
 
Q(0.95) 
(R-square=0.26) 
 
 
-0.033*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
0.051 *** 
(0.016) 
 
 
0.084 *** 
(0.018) 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.11.1: The Returns to Education on Income at Different Quantiles of the Difference-in-Differences 
Approach using the “same-age” Analysis [6-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
43-47 year-old   0.052**  0.051***        0.055*** 0.046 *** 0.084 *** 
     (0.025)    (0.012)   (0.008)    (0.008)          (0.018)   
 
R-square     0.15   0.21  0.32  0.38  0.26 
 
43 year-old   0.088*  0.059*** 0.062***         0.042***         0.131*** 
              (0.051)          (0.022)          (0.016)          (0.014)          (0.034) 
 
R-square     0.15  0.21  0.32  0.37  0.25 
 
44 year-old   0.120**        0.042*        0.065***       0.078***         0.184*** 
                           (0.050)          (0.025)          (0.017)          (0.020)          (0.037)  
 
R-square    0.15  0.20 0.31  0.38  0.25 
 
45 year-old   0.053  0.117*** 0.121**          0.078***         0.054* 
                             (0.043)          (0.023)          (0.014)          (0.014)          (0.030) 
 
R-square      0.13		 	 0.18		 	 0.30		 	 0.38		 0.26 
  
46 year-old            0.060         0.091***         0.112***         0.052***         0.034 
                             (0.054)          (0.024)          (0.019)          (0.017)          (0.038)   
 
R-square      0.14		 	 0.20   0.32 		 0.39		 	 0.25 
 
47 year-old     -0.058  0.021  0.023  0.002       0.027 
                             (0.076)          (0.032)          (0.025)          (0.021)          (0.053)   
 
R-square      0.12		 	 0.17   0.29		 	 0.38   0.28 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.12: The Returns to Education on Income at Different Quantiles of the Difference-in-Differences 
Approach [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Differences 
(Treatment9 VS Control9) 
 
Difference-in-Differences 
 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
22-26 years old 
 
 
 
-0.120*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.048***  
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.073*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
Q(0.05) 
 
 
 
-0.114*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
-0.053***  
(0.016) 
 
 
 0.061*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
Q(0.25) 
 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
-0.028*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
0.075*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
Q(0.50) 
 
 
 
-0.102*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.025*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
0.078*** 
(0.006) 
 
 
Q(0.75) 
 
 
 
-0.118*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.057*** 
 (0.006) 
 
 
0.061*** 
(0.007) 
 
 
Q(0.95) 
 
 
 
-0.166*** 
(0.011) 
 
 
-0.106*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
0.060*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.12.1: The Returns to Education on Income at Different Quantiles of The Difference-in-Differences 
Approach using the “same-age” Analysis [9-year Compulsory Schooling Reform] 
Dependent Variable:             (1)     (2)     (3)    (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)  Q(0.25)  Q(0.50)   Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
 
22-26 year-old   0.061***  0.075*** 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
     (0.018)    (0.007)   (0.006)    (0.007)          (0.014)   
 
R-square     0.12   0.16  0.19  0.20  0.21 
 
22 year-old   0.069  0.080*** 0.029**  -0.006  0.029 
              (0.044)          (0.017)          (0.013)          (0.011)          (0.031) 
 
R-square     0.09  0.08  0.09  0.12  0.14 
 
23 year-old   0.111** 0.124*** 0.125 ***       0.133***         0.150*** 
                           (0.044)          (0.015)          (0.013)          (0.013)          (0.026)  
 
R-square    0.09  0.10 0.12  0.14  0.17 
 
24 year-old   0.094***  0.172*** 0.215***          0.198***         0.196*** 
                             (0.043)          (0.015)          (0.010)          (0.013)          (0.033) 
 
R-square      0.11	 	 0.14		 	 0.17	 	 0.16	 0.17 
  
25 year-old            0.130***  0.136***         0.146 ***         0.104***         0.054** 
                             (0.033)          (0.012)          (0.010)          (0.014)          (0.026)   
 
R-square      0.12	 	 0.14  0.17 		 0.18		 	 0.17 
 
26 year-old      0.028  0.090*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 0.042 
                             (0.055)          (0.027)          (0.018)          (0.019)          (0.066)   
 
R-square      0.17	 	 0.17   0.19		 	 0.22   0.18 
Notes: Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression. The Robust Standard Errors and the 
Province Clustered Standard Errors are included in all models. ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively. 
 
Table 4.13: The Proportions of the Individuals by Level of Monthly Income Received of the Poorest Income 
Group Q(0.05) 
Year 
Poverty line 
(Monthly income 
in THB) 
Monthly Income (THB) of the Poorest Income Group Q(0.05) 
Less than  
1,500 1,500 to 2,000 
2,001 to  
Poverty line 
More than  
Poverty line 
2006 1,934 26.15 % 17.43 % - 56.42 % 
2007 2,006 15.82 % 24.15 % - 60.02 % 
2008 2,172 14.37 % 24.68 % 1.27 % 59.68 % 
2009 2,174 14.75 % 25.15 % 1.35 % 58.75 % 
2010 2,285 13.30 % 25.35 % 4.12 % 57.22 % 
2011 2,415 13.67 % 24.86 % 6.99 % 54.48 % 
2012 2,492 15.22 % 24.44 % 7.18 % 53.16 % 
2013 2,572 13.75 % 23.47 % 15.04 % 47.74 % 
2014 2,647 12.03 % 21.29 % 17.69 % 48.99 % 
2015 2,644 7.04 % 25.85 % 17.96 % 49.15 % 
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Table 4.14: The Robustness Check on the IV: One Year after the Implementation of the 6-year Compulsory 
Schooling Reform using the “same-age” Analysis 
Years of Schooling 
(Robustness Checks)  
 
Non-instrument  
Linear Regression                                                                                                                                                   
Placebo FE(COMP6a)          
(4 years gap) 
Instrument Variable Method   
Placebo IV(COMP6a)
 (4 years gap) 
Instrument Variable Method    
IV(COMP6a)
     (2 years gap) 
41 year-old    0.0534** (10.05) 
 0.126*** 
(16.60) 
 0.125*** 
 (20.14) 
42 year-old   0.0572**     (10.89) 
0.122***  
 (19.69) 
0.138***  
 (21.39) 
43 year-old  0.0657** (11.38) 
0.136***   
(31.08) 
0.126*** 
  (15.20)  
44 year-old 0.0649**   (8.35) 
  0.125*** 
   (21.61) 
0.123***  
(22.22) 
45 year-old  0.0552**    (8.22) 
0.119***   
(21.23)  
 0.124***           
(19.18) 
46 year-old 0.0589**   (8.57) 
0.122***  
(37.06) 
0.123***  
(56.68)   
Notes: FE(COMPY): Non-instrument linear regression with Province Fixed-Effects, IV(COMPYa): Instrument Variable 
Methods with Province Fixed-Effects, Subscription a indicate the estimation using the same age analysis. Original take the 
individuals born on the 1966 (Control6) and 1968 (Treatment6) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on1965 
(Control6) and 1969 (Treatment6).  The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered 
robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively. 
Table 4.15: The Robustness Check on the IV: One Year after the Implementation of the 9-year Compulsory 
Schooling Reform using the “same-age” Analysis 
Years of Schooling 
(Robustness Checks)  
Non-instrument Linear 
Regression                                                                                                                                                   
Placebo FE(COMP9a)          
(4 years gap) 
Instrument Variable Method    
Placebo IV(COMP9a)          
 (4 years gap) 
Instrument Variable Method    
IV(COMP9a)          
(2 years gap) 
20 year-old  0.0157** (6.38) 
0.0665***  
(4.43)   
 0.0891*** 
(6.02) 
21 year-old 0.0223***   (30.26) 
0.0903***  
(9.04) 
0.0967***  
(6.75) 
22 year-old   0.0265** (8.37) 
0.0892***  
(8.78) 
0.0861***   
(11.51) 
23 year-old 0.0279**  (6.85) 
0.0890***  
(15.31) 
0.0864***   
(13.89) 
24 year-old 0.0265**  (10.79) 
0.0858*** 
 (21.97) 
0.0875***   
 (19.04) 
25 year-old   0.0314*** (13.73) 
0.0872*** 
 (24.60) 
0.0811***    
 (12.34) 
Notes: FE(COMPY): Non-instrument linear regression with Province Fixed-Effects, IV(COMPYa): Instrument Variable Methods with 
Province Fixed-Effects, Subscription a indicate the estimation using the same age analysis. Original take the individuals born on the 1987 
(Control9) and 1989 (Treatment9) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on1986 (Control9) and 1990 (Treatment9).  The 
standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten 
percent, respectively. 
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Table 4.16: The Placebo Test using the Instrumental Variable Methods 
Dependent Variable:    (1)            (2)                    (3)               (4) 
       
Years of Schooling/ 
Log of Monthly Wages            1st Stage COMP6       2nd Stage COMP6        1st Stage COMP9       2nd Stage COMP9          
 
Original            1.054***   0.128***     0.380***                   0.0847*** 
                            (0.000)           (20.10)              (0.000)           (11.93)   
 
Observation    84414   84414  51820          51820 
 
Placebo Test           0.766**           0.123***    -0.047***                   0.0983*** 
     (19.70)           (20.46)              (-1.80)         (17.27)    
 
Observation   72966   72966   87977   87977 
Notes: COMPY: Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), For COMP6, the 
Original take the individuals born on the 1966 (Control6) and 1968 (Treatment6) and the Placebo test is for the individuals 
born on1961 (Control6) and 1963 (Treatment6). For COMP9, the Original take the individuals born on the 1987 (Control9) 
and 1989 (Treatment9) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on1982 (Control9) and 1984 (Treatment9). The 
standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, 
five, ten percent, respectively. 
Table 4.16.1: The Placebo Test using the Instrumental Variable Methods for the 6-year Compulsory Schooling 
Reform using the “same-age” Analysis 
Dependent Variable:     (1)    (2)             
       
Years of Schooling/ 
Log of Monthly Wages                    1st Stage COMP6    2nd Stage COMP6  
 
Placebo Test             0.0285**            0.123***   
       (7.78)            (20.53)                      
F-test = 9793.1 
 
45 year-old             0.830***   0.131***     
       (34.68)            (20.36)     
F-test = 2601.8 
 
46 year-old             0.287**    0.117***  
       (3.70)            (18.02)     
F-test = 2103.5 
 
47 year-old             -0.878***   0.136***  
       (-28.99)            (21.88)     
F-test = 1794.8 
 
48 year-old             0.114***     0.121***    
       (4.35)            (18.46)     
F-test = 2016.4 
 
49 year-old             0.0574     0.119***  
       (1.73)            (18.24)     
F-test = 1342.7    
 
50 year-old             0.975***   0.125***   
      (35.50)            (19.15)     
F-test = 2426.8 
 
51 year-old             1.046***   0.125***   
      (25.61)            (19.58)     
F-test = 1043.7 
 
52 year-old             -0.927***    0.136***   
      (-20.04)            (28.86)     
F-test = 1314.1    
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Table 4.16.2: The Placebo Test using the Instrumental Variable Methods for the 9-year Compulsory Schooling 
Reform using the “same-age” Analysis 
Dependent Variable:     (1)    (2)             
       
Years of Schooling/ 
Log of Monthly Wages                 1st Stage COMP9    2nd Stage COMP9  
 
Placebo Test             -0.0475***    0.0977***   
      (-1.80)    (17.16)                
F-test = 5130.4 
 
24 year-old              0.755***     0.102***     
       (31.64)            (11.28) 
F-test = 856.9 
 
25 year-old             -0.0973     0.0976***      
       (-1.59)            (15.66) 
F-test = 1025.6 
 
26 year-old             -0.981***     0.105***     
       (-41.10)            (25.96) 
F-test = 1140.1 
 
27 year-old             0.0903***    0.100***   
      (4.22)            (13.40) 
F-test = 1052.6 
 
28 year-old              0.0404    0.0937***  
       (1.66)            (15.86) 
F-test = 905.6 
 
29 year-old             1.000***   0.100***   
      (41.35)            (23.65) 
F-test = 1202.8 
 
30 year-old             0.932***   0.0944***   
      (35.12)            (16.38) 
F-test = 1080.9 
 
31 year-old             -1.099***   0.107***   
      (-26.20)            (30.57)  
F-test = 710.4   
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Table 4.17: The Placebo Test using the Difference-in-Differences Methods 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Difference  
(Treatment VS Control) Difference-in-Differences 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
Original COMP6 
(44-47 year-old) 
R-Square= 0.46 
 
 
-0.044** 
(0.009) 
 
 
0.013 
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.057*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
Placebo COMP6 
(48-52year-old) 
R-Square= 0.55 
 
-0.074*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
-0.057*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
  
0.017 
(0.013) 
 
 
Original COMP9 
(22-26 year-old) 
R-Square= 0.27 
 
-0.120*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
-0.048***  
(0.009) 
 
 
  
0.073*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
Placebo COMP9 
(27-31 year-old) 
R-Square= 0.27 
 
-0.0010*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
-0.010*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
Notes: For COMP6, the Original take the individuals born on the 1963 and 1965 (Control6) and 1966 and 
1968 (Treatment6) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on 1958 and 1960 (Control6) and 1961 and 
1963 (Treatment6). For COMP9, the Original take the individuals born on the 1984 and 1986 (Control9) and 
1987 and 1989 (Treatment9) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on 1979 and 1981 (Control9) and 
1982 and 1984  (Treatment9). The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 
regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively. 
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Table 4.17.1: The Placebo Test using the Difference-in-Differences Methods for the 6-year Compulsory 
Schooling Reform using the “same-age” Analysis 
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Difference  
(Treatment VS Control) Difference-in-Differences 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
Placebo COMP6 
(48-52year-old) 
R-Square= 0.55 
 
-0.074*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
-0.057*** 
(0.019) 
 
 
  
0.017 
(0.013) 
 
 
48 year-old 
R-Square= 0.55 
 
 
0.077*** 
 (0.015) 
 
 
0.111*** 
(0.013) 
 
 
  
0.034* 
 (0.020) 
 
 
49 year-old 
R-Square= 0.53 
 
 
0.077*** 
(0.018) 
 
 
0.141***  
(0.017) 
 
 
  
0.064**  
(0.027) 
 
 
50 year-old 
R-Square= 0.52 
 
 
0.101*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
0.166***  
(0.016) 
 
 
  
0.065***  
(0.020) 
 
 
51 year-old 
R-Square= 0.56 
 
 
0.138*** 
 (0.025) 
 
 
0.130*** 
 (0.026) 
 
 
  
-0.008  
(0.038) 
 
 
52 year-old 
R-Square= 0.52 
 
 
0.163*** 
 (0.017) 
 
 
0.109*** 
 (0.024) 
 
 
  
-0.054  
(0.041) 
 
 
Notes: For COMP6, the Original take the individuals born on the 1963 and 1965 (Control6) and 1966 and 
1968 (Treatment6) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on 1958 and 1960 (Control6) and 1961 and 
1963 (Treatment6). The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered 
robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively. 									
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Table 4.17.2: The Placebo Test using the Difference-in-Differences Methods for the 9-year Compulsory 
Schooling Reform using the “same-age” Analysis	
Dependent Variable: 
Log of Monthly Wages Normal Difference  
(Treatment VS Control) Difference-in-Differences 
 
Before 
 
After 
 
Placebo COMP9 
(27-31 year-old) 
R-Square= 0.27 
 
-0.0010*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
-0.010*** 
 (0.010) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
27 year-old 
R-Square= 0.26 
 
 
0.033** 
 (0.012) 
 
 
0.033** 
 (0.012) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
28 year-old 
R-Square= 0.27 
 
 
0.117*** 
(0.010) 
 
 
0.117***  
(0.010) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
29 year-old 
R-Square= 0.27 
 
 
0.212*** 
 (0.011) 
 
 
0.212*** 
 (0.011) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
30 year-old 
R-Square= 0.30 
 
 
0.210*** 
 (0.014) 
 
 
0.210*** 
 (0.014) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
31 year-old 
R-Square= 0.28 
 
 
0.174*** 
 (0.020) 
 
 
0.174*** 
 (0.020) 
 
 
  
0 
(.) 
 
 
Notes: For COMP9, the Original take the individuals born on the 1984 and 1986 (Control9) and 1987 and 
1989 (Treatment9) and the Placebo test is for the individuals born on 1979 and 1981 (Control9) and 1982 and 
1984  (Treatment9). The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered 
robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
This dissertation contributes to understanding the importance of educational attainment and achievement 
for income, income inequality and poverty in Thailand. We have examined the causal impact of education 
on income across the entire income distribution; in addition, the impact of education on income inequality 
and poverty incidence in Thailand has also been considered. The repeated cross-sectional data provided in 
the National Labour Force Survey, Thailand (2006-2015) was the main data source used in this project. 
The main focus of this dissertation was to consider the impact of Thailand’s compulsory schooling reform 
as an exogenous shock in Thailand’s educational system. The selection of the samples for study was 
based on the years of birth of individuals in relation to the reforms imposed in 1978 and 2000. Focusing 
on the compulsory schooling laws, the causal impact of education on income in different segments of the 
income distribution has been investigated. In addition, we studied the extent of the opportunities available 
to pupils in different income groups and whether they obtained the same access to education. 
In this chapter, we review the general conclusions, policy recommendations and implications for future 
studies. The work of each chapter in this dissertation is first described (Section 5.1). The general 
conclusions relating to the research questions are given in Section 5.2. In the third section, the results are 
further interpreted so as to offer policy recommendations regarding educational expansion. The last 
section qualifies the findings of this project and includes suggestions for future research. 
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5.1 Summary 
Chapter 1 introduced the contribution of this study to devising ways to reduce poverty and income 
inequality in Thailand. The aims are ending poverty by 2030 in accordance with the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), and reducing income inequality consistent with Thailand’s twelfth (2017 to 
2021) National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP). In this chapter we provided the 
general background concerning the incidence of economic growth, poverty, income inequality and an 
overview of the educational system in Thailand. Firstly, Thailand has experienced a strong economic 
performance with an average annual growth rate of 2.75 percent over the last two decades (1995 to 2016). 
However, Thailand has lagged behind its upper-middle-income East Asian neighbours such as Malaysia 
and China. Secondly, Thailand experienced a steady decline in poverty over the period 2000-2015: the 
national poverty headcount decreased from 42.33 percent in 2000 to 7.21 percent in 2015. Thirdly, 
Thailand has experienced high, but stable income inequality: the Gini coefficient remained persistently 
above 0.45 from 2011 to 2015, broadly similar to Malaysia and China. Significantly, over half of the total 
income in Thailand belongs to the wealthiest income group.  
Critically, the education attainment targets, especially for the current (9-year) compulsory schooling 
reform, have not been universally achieved. We found that approximately 16 percent of pupils have not 
completed lower-secondary education (the minimum level required by law). Significantly, this thesis 
provides evidence for policy-makers to rescue these pupils whom we anticipate to be from disadvantaged 
families. Policy-makers could facilitate/subsidise these disadvantaged individuals if we can confirm that 
1) education can be a tool to improve income and, in turn, economic growth; 2) education can be a means 
of redressing income inequality; and 3) poverty can be reduced by education. The results and 
methodologies developed in our study could provide general principles regarding education and 
development processes for other countries (especially developing ones), and specifically those countries 
which have experienced significant economic growth, but where poverty and income inequality remain 
key challenges.  
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Chapter 2 reviewed a broad range of scholarly contributions on the effects of education on economic 
development and on income, income inequality, and poverty. Most studies confirmed that human capital 
is one of the most important elements in fostering growth and reducing income inequality, thus resulting 
in poverty alleviation. Firstly, the existing literature confirms a positive correlation between an additional 
year of schooling and the income of individuals (Blaug, 2002; Card, 1999; Chiswick, 1976; Contreras, 
2003; Hawley, 2004; Mincer, 1974; Patrinos and Ridao-Cano, 2006). However, this correlation is likely 
to be an underestimate of the true rate of return to education due to endogeneity concerns. Moreover, only 
a few studies implied a causal impact of higher level of education on an individual’s wages. To overcome 
the limitations of omitted variables bias, the instrumental variable estimation (IV) is employed in order to 
control for differences in an individual’s observable characteristics in many studies. Taking compulsory 
schooling in various countries (i.e. USA, UK, Fiji and China) as the instruments, the studies found the 
positive impact of education on individuals’ incomes (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Fang et al., 2012; 
Gounder and Xing, 2012; Harmon and Walker, 1999). More importantly, the returns to education 
according to the causality estimations are found to be higher than ones obtained by the correlation 
estimation. This dissertation is the first attempt to exploit a natural experiment in the context of two 
educational reforms (1978 and 2000) in Thailand, in order to explore the impact of education on income. 
Recent studies have examined how the rate of return to education varies across the income distribution 
and confirms the existence of heterogeneous returns to education. Income inequality diminishes if the 
returns to education of the lower income groups are found to be higher than the top quantile groups (Arias 
and Hallock, 2001; Balestra and Backes-Gellner, 2013; Harmon et al., 2003; Mwabu and Schultz, 1996; 
Wang, 2013). A number of empirical studies show that there is a close relationship between education 
and income distribution using the traditional quantile regression method (QR). However, the returns to 
education in different income groups (positively or negatively correlated) are different across context and 
countries. There is a controversy as to whether an increase in the education level of individuals might 
either reduce or exacerbate income inequality, given the relationship between ability and returns to 
education. Becker (2009) concluded that more able individuals might acquire more education, as the costs 
of schooling are lower, thus earning more income than less able individuals. The less able may opt to 
drop out of school due to self-selection bias. To overcome the endogeneity bias previous studies made use 
of the Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression approach (IVQR), taking the exogenous shock on the 
determination of education investment as the instrument. However, only a few studies used compulsory 
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schooling reform as the instrument (Balestra and Backes-gellner, 2013; Brunello et al., 2009). 
Significantly, the causal impact of education on income in different income groups using the compulsory 
schooling reforms have been estimated solely in the case of developed countries (i.e. Switzerland and 16 
other European countries). Finally, a number of studies concluded that the more educated the population, 
the lower the incidence of poverty due to their contribution towards economic growth. Additionally, 
research suggests poverty could be reduced by decreasing income inequality, where the income of  
disadvantaged individuals increases more than the income of advantaged individuals.  
Chapter 3 described the methodologies and the model identification strategies used in this dissertation. 
The aim is to tackle the heterogeneity and endogeneity biases that are present in most of the earlier 
literature. We examined the descriptive statistics and baseline equations as regards the contributions of 
education to individuals’ incomes in different income groups, along with control variables such as 
occupation, rural or urban area of residence, gender, marital status, and head of household status. We first 
gave a flavour of the relationship between individuals’ income and their education. In line with previous 
findings and expectations, we found a positive correlation between education and incomes in the specific 
context of Thailand. Additionally, incomes were also found to increase with age. To adopt the 
Instrumental Variable approach, we exploit the proximity of birth of the treatment and control groups, 
which guarantees that these two groups will only differ in the extent to which they were differentially 
affected by the policy.  
We sample the population born around the threshold year that the reform came into application, defining 
the change in compulsory schooling years into a control group (population born around but before the 
threshold) and a treated group (population born around but after the threshold). For the 6-year 
compulsory schooling reform (i.e. 1978 reform), the cut-off year of birth is 1967. Therefore, the Control6 
and Treatment6 cohorts are those who were born in 1966 and 1968 respectively. For the 9-year 
compulsory schooling reform (i.e. 2000 reform) the cut-off year of birth is 1988, and the Control9 and 
Treatment9 cohorts, are thus those born in 1987 and 1989. We found the Treatment groups earn more 
(statistically significant) than the Control groups for both compulsory schooling reforms. Comparing at 
the same level of education obtained, on the other hand, we found an insignificant difference in income 
between the Control and Treatment groups for both compulsory schooling reforms.  
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The estimations described in this chapter were the conventional linear regression, the ordinary quantile 
regression, the Instrumental Variable methods (IV), and Instrumental Variable Quantile Regression 
methods (IVQR) methods. In this dissertation we mainly used the augmented Mincer's earnings equation 
to investigate the relationship between years of schooling, level of education obtained and monthly 
income of the individuals. The estimation controlled for observable characteristics: age, age squared, 
gender, area of residence, marital status and head of household status. The estimations included the 
geographic (province) fixed effects, as well as aggregate time fixed effects. To capture the heterogeneity 
bias we considered on the conditional quantile wage function depicted the time-invariant error term on 
the cognitive ability of the individual that is increasing with quantile indices. We split individuals into 
five income groups: the poorest (Q= 0.05), the poor (Q=0.25), the middle (Q=0.50), the rich (Q=0.75) 
and the richest (Q=0.95). 
Dealing with the endogeneity of the returns to education across the entire income distribution, the 
predicted values of years of schooling are first estimated in relation to the proximity of birth of the 
treatment and control groups, and then plugged in the Second-stage. We investigated separately the 
returns to education across income groups by level of completed education, from the Primary (6th grade) 
to Doctorate levels. Since the Treatment and Control groups were born in two different years, the results 
could be affected by the variation in the age-earning profile and work experience of these two groups. We 
thus considered individuals when they are the same age at the time of measuring incomes in the 
estimations. 
The additional robustness tool was introduced with the Difference-in-Differences approach. The normal 
differences in the marginal rate of schooling of the Control(before-after) and Treatment(before-after) 
groups were first explored. The true causal effects of the compulsory law reforms were given by the 
double differences between these two groups. The permanent differences and the comparison over time 
between the Control and Treatment groups were eliminated according to the double differences. We 
distinguished 4 different groups within the sample, based on their year of birth. We borrowed the cohorts 
(Control and Treatment groups) from the instrumental variable methods to construct and substitute the 
Pre-treatment and Post-treatment groups for the DD estimation respectively. The pre- prefix refers to the 
period preceding the policy implementation, thus constituting individuals who have not received the 
treatment. The post- refers to the period following the policy implementation. For the control groups, the 
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Pre-control group is selected from those who are two years older than the Post-control group. Under the 
requirement of the DD estimation, we found that these 4 groups have a common-trend in income across 
ages.  
Chapter 4 presented the empirical results relating to the returns to education on income and income over 
different quantiles, followed by a discussion of the impact of education on poverty reduction in Thailand. 
Comparing the correlation and causality estimated results, our estimations confirm the existence of the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity bias on schooling. The returns to education were found to be varied across 
income groups (ability). Moreover, individuals’ decisions to invest in education tend to be influenced by 
their ability/ level of their income. One reason given by Becker (2009) is that wealthier families decide to 
invest in education more than poorer families because of the relatively lower schooling cost of the former 
compared to the latter. On top of the difference in the cost of education,  disadvantaged individuals would 
choose entering the job market instead of investing in education since they value the present income over 
the future income.  
The compulsory schooling reforms induce some individuals who are covered by the law to continue their 
studies, not simply meeting requirements, but continuing to higher education levels beyond the minimum 
level that the compulsory laws require. The extension of the 6-year compulsory schooling laws was found 
to be less effective than the 9-year compulsory schooling in terms of expanding access to education for 
disadvantaged individuals. 
The estimated results applying the Difference-in-Differences design (DD) are consistent with the 
Instrumental Variable methods (IV) approach. Constructing Pre-control and Post-control groups as a 
counterfactual, and re-grouping the Control (Treatment) to become the Pre (Post)-treatment is confirmed 
to be a valid procedure for policy evaluation methods. In other words, making use of the individauls born 
closely to each other (and specifically near the cutoff date of the policy implementation), and applying the 
DD estimator represented the causality impact. This is essential when the data does not provide the same 
sample that is observed both before and after periods of receiving the treatment. Our estimations also 
suggest the benefits in re-producing the estimation with the “same-age” analysis to confirm the true 
causal effects. Although the age and its square have been taken as covariates, there could be effects of 
income life-cycle and work experience on income.  
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In line with existing studies, education was found to have a positive and strong effect on the average 
income of individuals (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Balestra and Backes-gellner, 2013; Fang et al., 2012; 
Girma and Kedir, 2005; Harmon and Walker, 1995; L. Wang, 2013; W. Wang et al., 2012; Warunsiri and 
Mcnown, 2010). Although the estimations of the correlation of education on income distribution in our 
study are in line with the study of Patrinos and Ridao-Cano (2006), the estimated results over income 
groups become different when accounting for the endogeneity bias on the determination of schooling 
investment. We found that the returns to education were concentrated in the upper income groups in most 
situations. For the 6-year compulsory schooling law, the return to education in the lower income groups 
becomes higher than the upper income groups when we considered the Bachelor’s degree and above. For 
the 9-year compulsory schooling law, the highest returns to education were found for the poorest income 
groups, and decreased over quantiles when considering the completion of a Diploma or above. More 
significantly, when we estimated the effects of 9-year compulsory schooling law we found that the richest 
income groups are better off in terms of income than the middle and the rich income groups. The 
expansion of education seems to encourage a reduction in income inequality, thereby affect a reduction in 
poverty. However, the majority of the population in Thailand have only and completed the lower-
secondary level of education. Moreover, Thailand has been under the power-secure dictatorship33. We, 
therefore, concluded that the main element in reducing poverty in Thailand from 2006 to 2015 as 
economic growth. Significantly, poor individuals remained comparatively more disadvantaged than the 
wealthier individuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
33 The wealthiest (dictator’s supporter) owns the majority of capital in Thailand (Luca, Litina, & Sekeris, 2015).  
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5.2 General Conclusion  
This section provides the general conclusions responding to the research questions proposed in this 
dissertation as follows:  
1) How much does an extra year of schooling increase the mean income of individuals in Thailand? 
We can see that the Control groups that are not covered by the compulsory schooling laws are more 
disadvantaged in terms of income than the Treatment groups. This is because the Control groups left 
school prior to the Treatment groups. We found that individuals who are covered by the 6-year year 
compulsory laws obtain (statistically significantly) 86% more years of schooling than those who are not. 
For the eligible cohorts for the 9-year compulsory schooling law, these individuals have approximately 
46% more years of schooling than the ones who are not covered. As a result, the completion effects for 
the 6- and 9-year compulsory schooling reforms provide average income increases of the eligible cohorts 
(aged 38 to 49 and 17 to 28) of approximately 13 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively. Again, we can not 
conclude that the 9-year compulsory schooling law is less effective than the 6-year compulsory schooling 
reform because those affected by the former reform were relatively younger than the ones subjected in 
our analysis to the latter reform. The individuals that we used to estimate the returns to education of the 9-
year compulsory schooling could possibly be in the educational system at the moment of the data 
collection, thereby having neither completed their education, nor entered the job market.    
2) How much does the additional schooling increase (decrease) the income of individuals in different 
income groups? 
According to the 6-year compulsory schooling law, the extra year of schooling increases the income of 
the eligible individuals by 5 percent for the poorest, the poor, the middle, and the rich income groups. The 
highest returns to schooling were found in the richest income groups, at approximately 8 percent. For the 
9-year compulsory schooling law, we found that the additional year of schooling increases the income by 
7.5 percent for the poor and middle-income groups. The returns to education for the poorest, the rich and 
the richest income groups were found to be approximately the same rate (6 percent). Significantly, the 
extending minimum level of schooling from Primary education (6th grade) to Lower-secondary education 
(9th grade) tended to lead to a decrease in income inequality. The returns to education of the eligible 
cohorts (9-year compulsory schooling law) at the lower tails of the quantile groups become higher than 
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those at the upper tail of quantiles.  
3) To what extent does education affect poverty in Thailand?  
The minimum level of education needed to help the poor escape from poverty suggested from our 
estimations is to complete at least Diploma level. For the 6-year compulsory schooling reform, the returns 
to the Diploma, Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctorate levels (compared with having no education) were 
approximately 74 percent, 164 percent, 140 percent, and 200 percent respectively. Taking no education as 
a reference level, the 9-year compulsory schooling reform gives returns to Diploma, Bachelor’s and 
Master’s degrees of approximately 86 percent, 84 percent and 69 percent, respectively. However, the 
more significant element in reducing poverty in Thailand had been economic growth, as redistribution 
policies were not the priority under the past regimes. In addition, as only a minority of Thailand’s 
population has completed the higher education level, the policy attention has concentrated here, and the 
access to education for disadvantaged individuals has not been a priority. This study has shed some light 
on how the country can reduce income inequality (by 2021) and eradicate poverty (by 2030) in response 
to the current NESDP and the SDGs, respectively. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
The extension of educational attainment has an impact not only through increasing the average income of 
individuals, but also through reducing income inequality as incomes increase more for the disadvantaged 
than for the advantaged. The universal educational assessment goal has been dropped in the SDGs since 
most developing countries have achieved universal primary education. However, the minimum 
requirement of primary level (6th grade) has not induced a reduction in income inequality in many 
developing countries. To reduce income inequality and achieving the SDGs it is suggested that the 
priority task for policy-makers, especially in developing countries, should be to promote universal lower-
secondary education (9th grade).  
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According to Section 44 of the interim charter imposed by the National Council for Peace and Order34, 
the 15-year free education policy was introduced on the 15th of June, 2016,  extending the 12-year free 
education policy35 enacted in 1999. Under the free education scheme, direct subsidies attempt to cover the 
cost of education for all pupils studying from Pre-primary education to completion of the High school 
(12th grade). The expenditures cover tuition fees, books, educational aids, and uniform, and are distributed 
to every basic educational institution according to the number of pupils. The subsidy is identical for all 
pupils experiencing the same level of education. Significantly, however, the rates differ according to the 
level of education. For example, allocations are approximately 2,830 THB/person/year (82 USD/64 
GBP)36 for Pre-primary; 3,775 THB/person/year (109 USD/86 GBP) for Primary; 6,050 THB/person/year 
(175 USD/136 GBP) for Lower-secondary; and 6,900 THB/person/year (200 USD/157 GBP) for Upper-
secondary level education. More importantly, there is an extra subsidy of 1,000 THB/person/year (29 
USD/23 GBP), and 3,000 THB/person/year (87 USD/68 GBP) for disadvantaged pupils37 studying at the 
Primary and Lower-secondary level of education respectively.  
According to our estimations, some poor pupils still lagged behind in term of opportunities to access 
basic education, thereby preventing them from acquiring the minimum education requirement. The free-
education scheme (including the extra direct subsidies), thus appears to be inefficient in covering all the 
costs of education, especially for disadvantaged pupils in Lower- and Upper-secondary education. 
Besides the direct costs of education, individuals may be unable to pay for other indirect costs, such as 
transport costs. This could also imply that the total subsidy for the poor families has been insufficient to 
ensure poor families can pay for education. Therefore, it is suggested that additional policies and 
interventions aimed at supporting all the costs of education, especially for disadvantaged families, should 
be discussed (De Fraja, 2005).  
 
                                                            
 
34 The junta authority that has ruled Thailand since their 2014 Thai coup d'état. 
35 This covered free education pupils who studied from Primary (6th grade) to Upper-secondary (12th Grade) 
education.  
36 Currency rate on average in September 2016 to September 2017: 1 US dollar = 34.5 THB and 1 GBP = 44 THB 
provided by http://www.xe.com/company/ 
37 According to the Ministry of Education, Thailand, disadvantaged pupils are those whose parents’ income is less 
than 40,000 THB/year ($1,159 or £910). The number disadvantaged pupils in each school is held to be not more than 
40 percent and 30 percent of total pupils in the Primary and Lower-Secondary education, respectively.  
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In line with Becker (2009), the self-selection bias in our estimation sees richer families still opt to invest 
in education, irrespective of the policy imposed. This implies that the marginal cost of education for 
disadvantaged pupils is relatively higher than for the advantaged. The first suggestion regarding education 
policy is to therefore reallocate direct subsidies. This could be done by reducing the subsidy for pupils 
who are from wealthier families (while increasing subsidy for pupils from disadvantaged families). 
Therefore, as wealthier families would all receive lower subsidies (compared to the disadvantaged 
families), this would encourage equity in educational opportunity. Secondly, the level of subsidy has been 
stable since 2000 (The Ministry of Education, 2015). Although tuition fees have been stable, the other 
costs of education such as uniform, books etc. are increasing in line with the cost of living. In addition, 
the price of educational equipment may vary across provinces or regions. As a result, it is suggested that 
the level of these direct subsidies should increase in line with the cost of living, taking into account 
regional variations.  
5.4 Qualifications and Implications for Future Studies 
The limitation of our estimations is that an unavailability in the panel dataset. In other words, our random 
sampling is not estimated the same observations over time. On the other hand, we made uses of the repeat 
cross sectional dataset that is the random sampling is the same population observations over time. The 
results could, therefore, solely imply the changes or/and impact in the aggregate level instead of the 
individuals level. For example, we could find the impact of education on income of the general of 
population instead of the impact of  tracked individual by using dynamic analysis (Wooldridge, 2008, pp. 
4–6). Moreover, using the repeated cross-sectional data are more likely to be unable to hold for the 
independent identically distributed (i.i.d) sample assumption. To employ the pooled cross sections, 
instrument variable methods and the test for heterosledasticity (include robust standard errors or/and 
clusters standard errors in the estimation) can correct for the independent no identically distributed 
(i.n.i.d). However, the random sampling may be dropped because such estimations above are not allow 
for the replicability over time (Wooldridge, 2008, p.146). In addition to the Instrumental Variable 
methods, our results from the Difference-in-Difference methods are estimated from 4 different cohorts 
subjected to a lack of panel dataset. 
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Another limitation of our natural-experimental approach is that the Control and Treatment groups are not 
as comparable as one would wish since they are born two years apart for data availability reasons. This is 
because the exact date of birth of individuals could not be given by the National Statistical Office of 
Thailand (NSO) for confidentiality and ethical reasons.  However, we had instead to rely on the year of 
birth around the cutoff year of birth.  
 
According to the returns to the covariates (Appendix 7 and 8), our estimations solely provide the 
correlation of income and the covariates. In other words, the causal impact of education on different e.g. 
in gender, areas of residence, occupations, members in the family, and marital status have not been 
explored. Therefore, there could be stringed self-selection biases towards individuals in different 
situations. This indicates that there could other factors that determine an individual’s educational 
attainments, besides the ability bias/family’s income endowment. To encourage equity in educational 
opportunities, it is also worth studying all dimensions potentially influencing investment in education (for 
example, the disparities in educational opportunities between gender and area of residences).   
We found (from the DD estimators) that males have higher income than females. For the 6- and 9-year 
compulsory schooling reforms, male incomes increase by more than female incomes, with 18.5 percent 
and 4 percent respectively. However, the estimations give comparable results of approximately 9.5 
percent from the IV. The results from the correlation estimations show a relatively higher income increase 
at 16 percent (Appendix 6 in Column 1). This implies that there could be an unequal opportunity in 
access to education according to gender. Parents may choose to invest in educating their son rather than 
their daughter, reflecting cultural discrimination by gender. Therefore, it is suggested that the causal 
impact of education on income and income distribution should be estimated separately by gender.  
The rates of return to the covariates were found to be higher in the poorest urban income groups 
(Appendix 7). This may imply that the opportunities for schooling are mainly concentrated in the urban 
area. It would be worth studying whether lower income groups who usually reside in rural areas become 
better off solely when they migrate to the urban areas. Moreover, we could examine whether direct 
subsidies should be distributed at the same rate across urban and rural areas (or not). There could be other 
factors that induced individuals to drop out of school before reaching the minimum level the law requires. 
For example, pregnancy in school, and parents’ accountability. Therefore, a study regarding the 
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determination of schooling investment is suggested so as to further estimate (and then develop) the best 
optioned support for the pupils who have been left behind.  
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Appendix A 
Appendix 1: The Normal Distribution of Monthly Income and Frequency of the Data : NLFS 2006-2015 
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Appendix 2: The Correlation of the Control Variables and Treatment Dummy  
Dependent Variable:     (1)               (2)            
                  
     COMP6                 COMP9          
  
Years of schooling            1.054***     0.380***  
       (0.000)                (0.000)    
 
Age                           -2.000     -2.000   
                               (.)               (.)              
   
Age squared                 -169.2***    -88.73*** 
                               (-3018.18)    (-1224.51)     
 
Male                         0.00122     0.00291  
                               (0.36)           (0.66)     
 
Urban                        -0.0187     -0.00629     
                              (24.84)              (-1.47) 
    
Married                    -0.00321    -0.0186*  
                               (2.66)              (-4.26)  
  
Head of Household                -0.00521    0.00539 
                               (6.20)             (1.61) 
          
Skilled-Labour                 -0.0408*    -0.00644*    
                               (6.20)             (-1.97)      
  
 Year                           2.000       2.000     
                              (.)              (.)   
    
 
Observation    84414    51820 
    
Notes: COMPY is a Treatment dummy variable taking value of 1 if treated and 0 otherwise. Y is either 6 (6-
year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models of the COMP6 are implemented 
on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The 
models of the COMP9 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on 
the 1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old), The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 
regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectivelyAll models implemented in 
the pooled cross-sectional data when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-2015).***,**,* 
Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively 
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Appendix 3: Hausman test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5/1/2560 BE, 1:37 AM Page 1 of 1
Poverty   User: Siwaphon
                  Coefficients 
                   (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                   FEh          REh         Difference          S.E.
   schooling     .0587179     .0587173        5.43e-07        7.40e-07
         age     .0126834     .0126827        6.96e-07        5.72e-07
        age2     .0000856     .0000855        4.29e-08        7.80e-09
      gender      .163248     .1632241        .0000238        2.62e-06
        area     .1204295     .1203991        .0000304        7.32e-06
     married     .0870415     .0870196        .0000219        3.07e-06
    relation     .0645093     .0645364       -.0000271        4.02e-06
     skilled     .4900227     .4899993        .0000234        5.94e-06
        year     .0467809     .0467813       -4.46e-07        5.04e-07
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
                  chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
                          =      209.66
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
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Appendix 4: The Correlation of Years of Schooling and Income (Linear Regression) without Controlling for 
Occupation and Industry of Employment   
Dependent Variable:     (1)             (2)           (3)   
                 
Log of Monthly Wages              OLS               FE             RE         
Years of schooling            0.0838**  0.0839**  0.0839*** 
                              (12.62)       (10.94)       (10.95)    
         
 
Age                           0.0162*   0.0150*          0.0150*** 
                               (3.54)            (4.49)            (4.48)    
   
 
Age squared                 0.0000758  0.000115  0.000115* 
                               (1.02)            (2.09)               (2.09)    
  
 
Male                         0.0995**  0.108**   0.108*** 
                               (7.05)         (9.93)          (9.92)                              
     
 
Urban                        0.165***  0.140*     0.140*** 
                              (24.84)            (4.52)            (4.52)    
  
 
Married                    0.0564   0.0737*   0.0737*** 
                               (2.66)            (4.70)            (4.70)    
  
  
Head of Household                 0.0880**  0.0775**  0.0775*** 
                               (6.20)           (6.89)           (6.89)   
 
  
 Year                           0.0170**    0.0171**  0.0171*** 
                              (8.30)           (10.17)        (10.17)    
 
 
 Constant               -27.28**         -27.45**    -27.50*** 
                              (-6.46)          (-7.96)     (-7.91)  
 
 
 
Observations                   1540253         1540253         1540253    
Adjusted R-squared             0.532             0.548                   
Notes: OLS: Cross-sectional regression, FE: Cross-sectional regression with Province Fixed Effects, RE: 
Cross-sectional regression with Random Effects. All models implemented in the pooled cross-sectional data 
when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-2015).***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 
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Appendix 5: Educational Achievement by Group of Income   
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Appendix 5.1: Educational Achievement by Group of Income   
Level of Education 
Qunatiles 
Q(0.05) Q(0.25) Q(0.50) Q(0.75) Q(0.95) 
No Education 20,419         44.97% 
14,504           
31.94% 
7,816          
17.21% 
2,515           
5.54% 
150           
0.33% 
Pre-Primary  90,636          42.74% 
69,269           
32.67% 
29,758          
14.03% 
19,429           
9.16% 
2,961            
1.40% 
Primary 113,125          34.53% 
 114,278 
34.88% 
57,101          
17.43% 
38,702           
11.81% 
4,448            
1.36% 
Lower-secondary 75,821          23.96% 
 106,873            
33.77% 
68,617          
21.68% 
54,495            
17.22% 
10,693            
3.38% 
Upper-secondary 41,518          14.19% 
82,613           
28.24% 
68,878                    
23.55% 
74,910           
25.61%   
24,586           
8.41% 
Diploma 13,854           7.35% 
    37,257 
19.76% 
43,771          
23.21% 
  66,907            
35.48% 
 26,770           
14.20% 
Bachelor’s Degree 3,762          1.27% 
17,015           
5.73% 
39,306          
13.24% 
103,864           
34.98% 
133,011           
44.79% 
Master’s Degree 1,015          0.55% 
4,667            
2.54% 
13,073          
7.12% 
56,440           
30.75% 
108,365           
59.04% 
Doctorate  30                    0.13% 
33                     
0.14% 
182                   
0.76% 
2,579           
10.75% 
21,162           
88.23% 
Observation  360,180  446,509  328,502  419,841  332,146  
Data: The office of the National Economics and Social Development Board, Thailand (NESDB) 
Note: The proportions shown are the proportion of the individuals by each variable by Row.  
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Appendix 6: Means of Years of Schooling of Control and Treatment Groups by Year  
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Appendix 6.1: Means of Years of Schooling of Control and Treatment Groups by Year 
LFS/Mean of 
schooling Control6 Treatment6 Control9 Treatment9 
2006 11.55 12.49 11.83 10.94 
2007 11.16 12 11.73 10.72 
2008 14.29 14.58 15.04 14.2 
2009 11.01 11.9 12.85 11.64 
2010 12.1 12.32 14.4 12.96 
2011 11.04 11.92 14.19 12.89 
2012 11.02 11.56 13.78 13.35 
2013 14.18 14.41 16.7 16.34 
2014 14.09 14.65 16.63 16.11 
2015 10.75 11.25 14.26 14.6 
 
Appendix 7: The Returns to the Covariates 
   (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)    (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Male             Urban            Head of HH Married Skilled-Labour 
 
 
OLS                           0.153**  0.143***        0.0743**           0.0693*         0.484*** 
              (9.05)         (19.87)            (9.90)            (3.70)           (16.53)     
 
 
FE                                  0.163**          0.120*           0.0645***       0.0870** 0.490***        
              (11.71)         (4.18)          (13.44)        (6.40)          (15.60)          
 
 
IV(COMP6)                          0.0973***       0.0382             0.0786***          0.0990***          0 
     (13.87)           (1.68)            (22.73)             (17.81)              (.) 
 
 
IV(COMP9)                                 0.0934*** 0.0495**  0.0788*** 0.0427***      0 
                          (6.08)     (2.84)     (6.10)     (3.76)        (.)  
 
 
DD6                            0.185***         0.235 ***         0.054***         0.076 ***       1.116*** 
              (0.010)          (0.040)          (0.009)          (0.017)          (0.023)    
 
 
DD9                                   0.042 ***         0.102 ***         0.087***        -0.059***        0.421*** 
                (0.009)          (0.042)          (0.014)          (0.014)          (0.020)    
 
Notes: OLS: Cross-sectional regression, FE: Cross-sectional regression with Province Fixed Effects, 
IV(COMPY): Instrument Variable Methods with Province Fixed-Effects, Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory 
schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models of the FE/IV(COMP6) are implemented on the 
pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The models 
of the FE/IV(COMP9) are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on 
the 1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old),     The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 
regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively 
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Appendix 8: The Returns to the Covariates at Different Quantiles of the Quantile Regression (QR) 
Dependent Variable:             (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)              Q(0.25)             Q(0.50)             Q(0.75)             Q(0.95) 
Male 
 
Pooled           0.135***         0.123***       0.127***       0.136***       0.195*** 
                (0.002)          (0.001)         (0.001)        (0.001)             (0.002)    
 
 
COMP6                       0.185***         0.141***         0.129***         0.159***         0.216*** 
                             (0.011)          (0.005)          (0.004)          (0.004)           (0.007)    
 
COMP9        0.039***         0.036***              0.046***        0.069***         0.113*** 
                            (0.004)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.003)     
Age squared     
 
Pooled        -0.000***       -0.000***        0.000***         0.000***         0.000*** 
     (0.000)          (0.000)            (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)    
                 
COMP6      0.000            0.000              0.000         0.000            0.000    
                           (.)              (.)                (.)              (.)              (.)   
 
COMP9    0.000            0.000              0.000         0.000            0.000    
                           (.)              (.)                (.)              (.)              (.)   
Notes: Pooled: The pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-
2015), COMPY: Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models 
of the COMP6 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 
and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The models of the COMP9 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections 
of the individuals were born on the 1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old),   The standard error given in parentheses 
of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 
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Appendix 8: The Returns to the Covariates at Different Quantiles of the Quantile Regression (QR) Cont. 
Dependent Variable:             (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)              Q(0.25)             Q(0.50)             Q(0.75)             Q(0.95) 
Age   
 
Pooled     0.035***         0.017***         0.002***        -0.002***        0.004*** 
                (0.001)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)      (0.001)    
Age Dummies* 
COMP6 
*Benchmark group: 49 year-old                           
 
  38 year-old  -0.195**         -0.217***        -0.285***        -0.281***        -0.241*** 
     (0.073)          (0.031)          (0.026)          (0.025)          (0.040)     
  39 year-old  -0.115           -0.154***        -0.233***        -0.241***        -0.157*** 
     (0.070)          (0.029)          (0.024)          (0.024)          (0.037)   
  40 year-old    -0.253***      -0.266***        -0.313***           -0.309***        -0.272*** 
     (0.066)          (0.028)          (0.024)            (0.023)    (0.034)    
  41 year-old    -0.130*          -0.158***        -0.216***        -0.217***       -0.146*** 
       (0.062)         (0.026)          (0.023)          (0.021)          (0.031)    
  42 year-old    -0.293***        -0.273***        -0.297***        -0.282***       -0.239*** 
     (0.059)          (0.025)          (0.021)          (0.020)          (0.027)   
  43 year-old    -0.125*          -0.155***       -0.186***        -0.176***        -0.123*** 
     (0.055)          (0.023)          (0.020)          (0.018)          (0.024)    
  44 year-old    -0.134*          -0.150***        -0.175***        -0.149***        -0.089*** 
      (0.053)          (0.021)          (0.019)          (0.018)          (0.019)   
  45 year-old    -0.016           -0.091***        -0.144***        -0.140***        -0.091*** 
       (0.056)          (0.021)          (0.019)          (0.018)          (0.024) 
  46 year-old    -0.129*          -0.123***        -0.126***        -0.113***        -0.099*** 
     (0.051)          (0.020)          (0.018)          (0.016)          (0.017) 
  47 year-old    0.026           -0.009           -0.003           -0.001            0.036   
     (0.062)          (0.022)          (0.019)          (0.020)          (0.062) 
  48 year-old    -0.213***        -0.175***        -0.139***       -0.114***        -0.154*** 
     (0.059)          (0.022)          (0.020)          (0.017)          (0.017)     
COMP9  
*Benchmark group:28 year-old    
  17 year-old  -0.555***        -0.386***        -0.336***        -0.347***        -0.477*** 
     (0.083)          (0.031)          (0.021)          (0.021)          (0.049)    
  18 year-old  -0.494***        -0.303***        -0.261***        -0.305***        -0.406*** 
     (0.080)          (0.024)          (0.020)          (0.019)          (0.045)   
  19 year-old    -0.318***        -0.257***        -0.252***        -0.302***        -0.401*** 
     (0.065)          (0.023)          (0.018)          (0.018)          (0.042)  
  20 year-old    -0.252***        -0.211***        -0.217***        -0.253***        -0.341*** 
       (0.059)          (0.021)          (0.017)          (0.016)          (0.039)    
  21 year-old    -0.318***        -0.271***        -0.267***        -0.291***        -0.358*** 
     (0.054)          (0.019)          (0.016)          (0.015)          (0.036) 
  22 year-old    -0.151**         -0.189***        -0.210***        -0.222***        -0.287*** 
      (0.049)          (0.017)          (0.015)          (0.014)          (0.033) 
  23 year-old    -0.198***        -0.182***        -0.182***       -0.176***        -0.209*** 
       (0.042)          (0.016)          (0.014)          (0.012)          (0.030) 
  24 year-old    -0.103*          -0.155***        -0.184***        -0.194***        -0.197*** 
       (0.044)          (0.016)          (0.014)          (0.014)          (0.033) 
  25 year-old    -0.067           -0.088***        -0.088***        -0.100***        -0.124*** 
     (0.037)          (0.013)          (0.013)          (0.010)          (0.028)   
  26 year-old      0.026            0.010           -0.001           -0.008           -0.028    
     (0.033)          (0.014)          (0.016)          (0.013)          (0.029)   
  27 year-old    -0.043           -0.074***        -0.080***        -0.099***        -0.104** 
     (0.034)          (0.015)          (0.013)          (0.012)          (0.035)    
Notes: Pooled: The pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-
2015), COMPY: Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models 
of the COMP6 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 
and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The models of the COMP9 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections 
of the individuals were born on the 1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old),   The standard error given in parentheses 
of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 8: The Returns to the Covariates at Different Quantiles of the Quantile Regression (QR) Cont. 
Dependent Variable:             (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5) 
      
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)              Q(0.25)             Q(0.50)             Q(0.75)             Q(0.95) 
Urban  
 
Pooled                0.189***         0.125***          0.112***        0.103***       0.098*** 
                (0.003)          (0.001)           (0.001)          (0.001)           (0.002)    
       
COMP6             0.224***         0.143***          0.113***         0.110***        0.100*** 
                            (0.012)          (0.005)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.007)    
 
COMP9    0.150***         0.074***         0.055***         0.048***         0.046*** 
                             (0.011)          (0.004)          (0.003)          (0.003)           (0.007) 
 
 Married      
  
 Pooled    0.092***         0.080***         0.081***          0.073***       0.061*** 
     (0.003)           (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.002)    
                     
   COMP6    0.129***         0.081***         0.064***         0.061***         0.073*** 
                              (0.012)          (0.006)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.008)  
   
 COMP9    0.014           -0.003           -0.006      -0.006    0.006                            
     (0.011)          (0.004)          (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.008) 
 
Head of Household    
 
 Pooled      0.111***         0.087***       0.079***         0.073***        0.081*** 
                                   (0.003)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.002)    
            
 COMP6     0.112***        0.072***         0.062***         0.064***         0.077*** 
                             (0.011)          (0.005)          (0.004)          (0.004)          (0.007)   
 
 COMP9    0.134***         0.083***         0.060***         0.078***         0.097*** 
                             (0.011)          (0.005)          (0.004)          (0.005)          (0.011)   
 
Geographical      
 
Pooled (Province)   -0.003***        -0.003***        -0.002***        -0.002***       -0.002*** 
                                      (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)    
                         
COMP6 (Region)   -0.133***        -0.084***        -0.065***        -0.056***       -0.067*** 
                                        (0.005)         (0.002)          (0.002)          (0.002)          (0.003)    
 
COMP9 (Region)   -0.140***        -0.083***        -0.057***        -0.042***       -0.035*** 
                             (0.005)          (0.002)          (0.001)          (0.001)          (0.003)   
 
Notes: Pooled: The pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-2015), 
COMPY: Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models of the COMP6 are 
implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 and 1968 (38-49 year-old), 
The models of the COMP9 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 
1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old). The standard error given in parentheses of all models are included the 4 regions clustered 
robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, respectively.  
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Appendix 8: The Returns to the Covariates at Different Quantiles of the Quantile Regression (QR) Cont. 
Dependent Variable:             (1)                (2)                 (3)                 (4)                 (5) 
       
Log of Monthly Wages            Q(0.05)              Q(0.25)             Q(0.50)             Q(0.75)             Q(0.95) 
Year 
 
Pooled     0.062***         0.051***         0.043***         0.038***         0.031*** 
                                       (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)          (0.000)    
 
              
COMP6    0.049***         0.042***         0.032***         0.030***         0.025*** 
                             (0.006)          (0.003)          (0.002)          (0.002)          (0.004)    
  
 
COMP9    0.066***         0.059***     0.058***     0.051***     0.035***                          
     (0.006)          (0.002)          (0.002)          (0.002)          (0.004) 
 
 
           
Observations    
Pooled     1591389              1591389          1591389  1591389  1591389 
COMP6     87058            87058           87058            87058            87058 
COMP9      53644            53644            53644            53644            53644 
Notes: Pooled: The pooled repeated cross sections when the individuals were 15-60 year-old NLFS (2006-
2015), COMPY: Y is either 6 (6-year compulsory schooling) or 9 (9-year compulsory schooling), The models 
of the COMP6 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections of the individuals were born on the 1966 
and 1968 (38-49 year-old), The models of the COMP9 are implemented on the pooled repeated cross sections 
of the individuals were born on the 1987 and 1989 (17-28 year-old),   The standard error given in parentheses 
of all models are included the 4 regions clustered robust, ***,**,* Significance at one, five, ten percent, 
respectively 
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